Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games

In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.

Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.

We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.

We also provide an alternative characterization—all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose—they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.

Geometric integration applied to moving mesh methods and degenerate Lagrangians

Moving mesh methods (also called r-adaptive methods) are space-adaptive strategies used for the numerical simulation of time-dependent partial differential equations. These methods keep the total number of mesh points fixed during the simulation, but redistribute them over time to follow the areas where a higher mesh point density is required. There are a very limited number of moving mesh methods designed for solving field-theoretic partial differential equations, and the numerical analysis of the resulting schemes is challenging. In this thesis we present two ways to construct r-adaptive variational and multisymplectic integrators for (1+1)-dimensional Lagrangian field theories. The first method uses a variational discretization of the physical equations and the mesh equations are then coupled in a way typical of the existing r-adaptive schemes. The second method treats the mesh points as pseudo-particles and incorporates their dynamics directly into the variational principle. A user-specified adaptation strategy is then enforced through Lagrange multipliers as a constraint on the dynamics of both the physical field and the mesh points. We discuss the advantages and limitations of our methods. The proposed methods are readily applicable to (weakly) non-degenerate field theories---numerical results for the Sine-Gordon equation are presented.

In an attempt to extend our approach to degenerate field theories, in the last part of this thesis we construct higher-order variational integrators for a class of degenerate systems described by Lagrangians that are linear in velocities. We analyze the geometry underlying such systems and develop the appropriate theory for variational integration. Our main observation is that the evolution takes place on the primary constraint and the 'Hamiltonian' equations of motion can be formulated as an index 1 differential-algebraic system. We then proceed to construct variational Runge-Kutta methods and analyze their properties. The general properties of Runge-Kutta methods depend on the 'velocity' part of the Lagrangian. If the 'velocity' part is also linear in the position coordinate, then we show that non-partitioned variational Runge-Kutta methods are equivalent to integration of the corresponding first-order Euler-Lagrange equations, which have the form of a Poisson system with a constant structure matrix, and the classical properties of the Runge-Kutta method are retained. If the 'velocity' part is nonlinear in the position coordinate, we observe a reduction of the order of convergence, which is typical of numerical integration of DAEs. We also apply our methods to several models and present the results of our numerical experiments.

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.

Edge function method applied to thin plates resting on Winkler foundation

The Edge Function method formerly developed by Quinlan⁽²⁵⁾ is applied to solve the problem of thin elastic plates resting on spring supported foundations subjected to lateral loads the method can be applied to plates of any convex polygonal shapes, however, since most plates are rectangular in shape, this specific class is investigated in this thesis. The method discussed can also be applied easily to other kinds of foundation models (e.g. springs connected to each other by a membrane) as long as the resulting differential equation is linear. In chapter VII, solution of a specific problem is compared with a known solution from literature. In chapter VIII, further comparisons are given. The problems of concentrated load on an edge and later on a corner of a plate as long as they are far away from other boundaries are also given in the chapter and generalized to other loading intensities and/or plates springs constants for Poisson's ratio equal to 0.2