Simulation of shock-induced bubble collapse with application to vascular injury in shockwave lithotripsy

Shockwave lithotripsy is a noninvasive medical procedure wherein shockwaves are repeatedly focused at the location of kidney stones in order to pulverize them. Stone comminution is thought to be the product of two mechanisms: the propagation of stress waves within the stone and cavitation erosion. However, the latter mechanism has also been implicated in vascular injury. In the present work, shock-induced bubble collapse is studied in order to understand the role that it might play in inducing vascular injury. A high-order accurate, shock- and interface-capturing numerical scheme is developed to simulate the three-dimensional collapse of the bubble in both the free-field and inside a vessel phantom. The primary contributions of the numerical study are the characterization of the shock-bubble and shock-bubble-vessel interactions across a large parameter space that includes clinical shockwave lithotripsy pressure amplitudes, problem geometry and tissue viscoelasticity, and the subsequent correlation of these interactions to vascular injury. Specifically, measurements of the vessel wall pressures and displacements, as well as the finite strains in the fluid surrounding the bubble, are utilized with available experiments in tissue to evaluate damage potential. Estimates are made of the smallest injurious bubbles in the microvasculature during both the collapse and jetting phases of the bubble's life cycle. The present results suggest that bubbles larger than 1 μm in diameter could rupture blood vessels under clinical SWL conditions.

Essays in mechanism design

This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, ”Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences”, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, ”Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources”, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism — the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism — when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, ”Vessel Buyback”, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.