Markets and microstructure

This document contains three papers examining the microstructure of financial interaction in development and market settings. I first examine the industrial organization of financial exchanges, specifically limit order markets. In this section, I perform a case study of Google stock surrounding a surprising earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009, uncovering parameters that describe information flows and liquidity provision. I then explore the disbursement process for community-driven development projects. This section is game theoretic in nature, using a novel three-player ultimatum structure. I finally develop econometric tools to simulate equilibrium and identify equilibrium models in limit order markets.

In chapter two, I estimate an equilibrium model using limit order data, finding parameters that describe information and liquidity preferences for trading. As a case study, I estimate the model for Google stock surrounding an unexpected good-news earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009. I find a substantial decrease in asymmetric information prior to the earnings announcement. I also simulate counterfactual dealer markets and find empirical evidence that limit order markets perform more efficiently than do their dealer market counterparts.

In chapter three, I examine Community-Driven Development. Community-Driven Development is considered a tool empowering communities to develop their own aid projects. While evidence has been mixed as to the effectiveness of CDD in achieving disbursement to intended beneficiaries, the literature maintains that local elites generally take control of most programs. I present a three player ultimatum game which describes a potential decentralized aid procurement process. Players successively split a dollar in aid money, and the final player--the targeted community member--decides between whistle blowing or not. Despite the elite capture present in my model, I find conditions under which money reaches targeted recipients. My results describe a perverse possibility in the decentralized aid process which could make detection of elite capture more difficult than previously considered. These processes may reconcile recent empirical work claiming effectiveness of the decentralized aid process with case studies which claim otherwise.

In chapter four, I develop in more depth the empirical and computational means to estimate model parameters in the case study in chapter two. I describe the liquidity supplier problem and equilibrium among those suppliers. I then outline the analytical forms for computing certainty-equivalent utilities for the informed trader. Following this, I describe a recursive algorithm which facilitates computing equilibrium in supply curves. Finally, I outline implementation of the Method of Simulated Moments in this context, focusing on Indirect Inference and formulating the pseudo model.

An examination of strategic opportunities provided by the conference committee procedure in the U.S. Congress

Deference to committees in Congress has been a much studied phenomena for close to 100 years. This deference can be characterized as the unwillingness of a potentially winning coalition on the House floor to impose its will on a small minority, a standing committee. The congressional scholar is then faced with two problems: observing such deference to committees, and explaining it. Shepsle and Weingast have proposed the existence of an ex-post veto for standing committees as an explanation of committee deference. They claim that as conference reports in the House and Senate are considered under a rule that does not allow amendments, the conferees enjoy agenda-setting power. In this paper I describe a test of such a hypothesis (along with competing hypotheses regarding the effects of the conference procedure). A random-utility model is utilized to estimate legislators' ideal points on appropriations bills from 1973 through 1980. I prove two things: 1) that committee deference can not be said to be a result of the conference procedure; and moreover 2) that committee deference does not appear to exist at all.

Origin of Th/U variations in chondritic meteorites

Isotope dilution thorium and uranium analyses of the Harleton chondrite show a larger scatter than previously observed in equilibrated ordinary chondrites (EOC). The linear correlation of Th/U with 1/U in Harleton (and all EOC data) is produced by variation in the chlorapatite to merrillite mixing ratio. Apatite variations control the U concentrations. Phosphorus variations are compensated by inverse variations in U to preserve the Th/U vs. 1/U correlation. Because the Th/U variations reflect phosphate ampling, a weighted Th/U average should converge to an improved solar system Th/U. We obtain Th/U=3.53 (1_-mean=0.10), significantly lower and more precise than previous estimates.

To test whether apatite also produces Th/U variation in CI and CM chondrites, we performed P analyses on the solutions from leaching experiments of Orgueil and Murchison meteorites.

A linear Th/U vs. 1/U correlation in CI can be explained by redistribution of hexavalent U by aqueous fluids into carbonates and sulfates.

Unlike CI and EOC, whole rock Th/U variations in CMs are mostly due to Th variations. A Th/U vs. 1/U linear correlation suggested by previous data for CMs is not real. We distinguish 4 components responsible for the whole rock Th/U variations: (1) P and actinide-depleted matrix containing small amounts of U-rich carbonate/sulfate phases (similar to CIs); (2) CAIs and (3) chondrules are major reservoirs for actinides, (4) an easily leachable phase of high Th/U. likely carbonate produced by CAI alteration. Phosphates play a minor role as actinide and P carrier phases in CM chondrites.

Using our Th/U and minimum galactic ages from halo globular clusters, we calculate relative supernovae production rates for ²³²Th/²³⁸U and ²³⁵U/²³⁸U for different models of r-process nucleosynthesis. For uniform galactic production, the beginning of the r-process nucleosynthesis must be less than 13 Gyr. Exponentially decreasing production is also consistent with a 13 Gyr age, but very slow decay times are required (less than 35 Gyr), approaching the uniform production. The 15 Gyr Galaxy requires either a fast initial production growth (infall time constant less than 0.5 Gyr) followed by very low decrease (decay time constant greater than 100 Gyr), or the fastest possible decrease (≈8 Gyr) preceded by slow in fall (≈7.5 Gyr).

An integrated design approach to power systems : from power flows to electricity markets

Power system is at the brink of change. Engineering needs, economic forces and environmental factors are the main drivers of this change. The vision is to build a smart electrical grid and a smarter market mechanism around it to fulfill mandates on clean energy. Looking at engineering and economic issues in isolation is no longer an option today; it needs an integrated design approach. In this thesis, I shall revisit some of the classical questions on the engineering operation of power systems that deals with the nonconvexity of power flow equations. Then I shall explore some issues of the interaction of these power flow equations on the electricity markets to address the fundamental issue of market power in a deregulated market environment. Finally, motivated by the emergence of new storage technologies, I present an interesting result on the investment decision problem of placing storage over a power network. The goal of this study is to demonstrate that modern optimization and game theory can provide unique insights into this complex system. Some of the ideas carry over to applications beyond power systems.

Representing measures on the Royden boundary for solutions of Δu=Pu on a Riemannian manifold

Consider the Royden compactification R* of a Riemannian n-manifold R, Γ = R*\R its Royden boundary, Δ its harmonic boundary and the elliptic differential equation Δu = Pu, P ≥ 0 on R. A regular Borel measure m^P can be constructed on Γ with support equal to the closure of Δ^P = {q ϵ Δ : q has a neighborhood U in R* with _U^ʃ_ᴖR^{P ˂ ∞} }. Every enegy-finite solution to u (i.e. E(u) = D(u) + ^ʃ_Rup>2P ˂ ∞, where D(u) is the Dirichlet integral of u) can be represented by u(z) = ^ʃ_Γu(q)K(z,q)dm^P(q) where K(z,q) is a continuous function on ^Rx Γ . A _P^~_E-function is a nonnegative solution which is the infimum of a downward directed family of energy-finite solutions. A nonzero _P^~_E-function is called _P^~_E-minimal if it is a constant multiple of every nonzero _P^~_E-function dominated by it. THEOREM. There exists a _P^~_E-minimal function if and only if there exists a point in q ϵ Γ such that m^P(q) > 0. THEOREM. For q ϵ Δ^P , m^P(q) > 0 if and only if m⁰(q) > 0 .