3 resultados para Strategic implementation
em CaltechTHESIS
Resumo:
There is a growing amount of experimental evidence that suggests people often deviate from the predictions of game theory. Some scholars attempt to explain the observations by introducing errors into behavioral models. However, most of these modifications are situation dependent and do not generalize. A new theory, called the rational novice model, is introduced as an attempt to provide a general theory that takes account of erroneous behavior. The rational novice model is based on two central principals. The first is that people systematically make inaccurate guesses when they are evaluating their options in a game-like situation. The second is that people treat their decisions similar to a portfolio problem. As a result, non optimal actions in a game theoretic sense may be included in the rational novice strategy profile with positive weights.
The rational novice model can be divided into two parts: the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept. In a theoretical chapter, the mathematics of the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept are introduced. The existence of the equilibrium is established. In addition, the Nash equilibrium is shown to be a special case of the rational novice equilibrium. In another chapter, the rational novice model is applied to a voluntary contribution game. Numerical methods were used to obtain the solution. The model is estimated with data obtained from the Palfrey and Prisbrey experimental study of the voluntary contribution game. It is found that the rational novice model explains the data better than the Nash model. Although a formal statistical test was not used, pseudo R^2 analysis indicates that the rational novice model is better than a Probit model similar to the one used in the Palfrey and Prisbrey study.
The rational novice model is also applied to a first price sealed bid auction. Again, computing techniques were used to obtain a numerical solution. The data obtained from the Chen and Plott study were used to estimate the model. The rational novice model outperforms the CRRAM, the primary Nash model studied in the Chen and Plott study. However, the rational novice model is not the best amongst all models. A sophisticated rule-of-thumb, called the SOPAM, offers the best explanation of the data.
Resumo:
Deference to committees in Congress has been a much studied phenomena for close to 100 years. This deference can be characterized as the unwillingness of a potentially winning coalition on the House floor to impose its will on a small minority, a standing committee. The congressional scholar is then faced with two problems: observing such deference to committees, and explaining it. Shepsle and Weingast have proposed the existence of an ex-post veto for standing committees as an explanation of committee deference. They claim that as conference reports in the House and Senate are considered under a rule that does not allow amendments, the conferees enjoy agenda-setting power. In this paper I describe a test of such a hypothesis (along with competing hypotheses regarding the effects of the conference procedure). A random-utility model is utilized to estimate legislators' ideal points on appropriations bills from 1973 through 1980. I prove two things: 1) that committee deference can not be said to be a result of the conference procedure; and moreover 2) that committee deference does not appear to exist at all.
Resumo:
Humans are particularly adept at modifying their behavior in accordance with changing environmental demands. Through various mechanisms of cognitive control, individuals are able to tailor actions to fit complex short- and long-term goals. The research described in this thesis uses functional magnetic resonance imaging to characterize the neural correlates of cognitive control at two levels of complexity: response inhibition and self-control in intertemporal choice. First, we examined changes in neural response associated with increased experience and skill in response inhibition; successful response inhibition was associated with decreased neural response over time in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, a region widely implicated in cognitive control, providing evidence for increased neural efficiency with learned automaticity. We also examined a more abstract form of cognitive control using intertemporal choice. In two experiments, we identified putative neural substrates for individual differences in temporal discounting, or the tendency to prefer immediate to delayed rewards. Using dynamic causal models, we characterized the neural circuit between ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area involved in valuation, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a region implicated in self-control in intertemporal and dietary choice, and found that connectivity from dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to ventromedial prefrontal cortex increases at the time of choice, particularly when delayed rewards are chosen. Moreover, estimates of the strength of connectivity predicted out-of-sample individual rates of temporal discounting, suggesting a neurocomputational mechanism for variation in the ability to delay gratification. Next, we interrogated the hypothesis that individual differences in temporal discounting are in part explained by the ability to imagine future reward outcomes. Using a novel paradigm, we imaged neural response during the imagining of primary rewards, and identified negative correlations between activity in regions associated the processing of both real and imagined rewards (lateral orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, respectively) and the individual temporal discounting parameters estimated in the previous experiment. These data suggest that individuals who are better able to represent reward outcomes neurally are less susceptible to temporal discounting. Together, these findings provide further insight into role of the prefrontal cortex in implementing cognitive control, and propose neurobiological substrates for individual variation.