The strategic behavior of rational novices

There is a growing amount of experimental evidence that suggests people often deviate from the predictions of game theory. Some scholars attempt to explain the observations by introducing errors into behavioral models. However, most of these modifications are situation dependent and do not generalize. A new theory, called the rational novice model, is introduced as an attempt to provide a general theory that takes account of erroneous behavior. The rational novice model is based on two central principals. The first is that people systematically make inaccurate guesses when they are evaluating their options in a game-like situation. The second is that people treat their decisions similar to a portfolio problem. As a result, non optimal actions in a game theoretic sense may be included in the rational novice strategy profile with positive weights.

The rational novice model can be divided into two parts: the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept. In a theoretical chapter, the mathematics of the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept are introduced. The existence of the equilibrium is established. In addition, the Nash equilibrium is shown to be a special case of the rational novice equilibrium. In another chapter, the rational novice model is applied to a voluntary contribution game. Numerical methods were used to obtain the solution. The model is estimated with data obtained from the Palfrey and Prisbrey experimental study of the voluntary contribution game. It is found that the rational novice model explains the data better than the Nash model. Although a formal statistical test was not used, pseudo R^2 analysis indicates that the rational novice model is better than a Probit model similar to the one used in the Palfrey and Prisbrey study.

The rational novice model is also applied to a first price sealed bid auction. Again, computing techniques were used to obtain a numerical solution. The data obtained from the Chen and Plott study were used to estimate the model. The rational novice model outperforms the CRRAM, the primary Nash model studied in the Chen and Plott study. However, the rational novice model is not the best amongst all models. A sophisticated rule-of-thumb, called the SOPAM, offers the best explanation of the data.

An examination of strategic opportunities provided by the conference committee procedure in the U.S. Congress

Deference to committees in Congress has been a much studied phenomena for close to 100 years. This deference can be characterized as the unwillingness of a potentially winning coalition on the House floor to impose its will on a small minority, a standing committee. The congressional scholar is then faced with two problems: observing such deference to committees, and explaining it. Shepsle and Weingast have proposed the existence of an ex-post veto for standing committees as an explanation of committee deference. They claim that as conference reports in the House and Senate are considered under a rule that does not allow amendments, the conferees enjoy agenda-setting power. In this paper I describe a test of such a hypothesis (along with competing hypotheses regarding the effects of the conference procedure). A random-utility model is utilized to estimate legislators' ideal points on appropriations bills from 1973 through 1980. I prove two things: 1) that committee deference can not be said to be a result of the conference procedure; and moreover 2) that committee deference does not appear to exist at all.

Structural Design under Seismic Risk Using Multiple Performance Objectives

Structural design is a decision-making process in which a wide spectrum of requirements, expectations, and concerns needs to be properly addressed. Engineering design criteria are considered together with societal and client preferences, and most of these design objectives are affected by the uncertainties surrounding a design. Therefore, realistic design frameworks must be able to handle multiple performance objectives and incorporate uncertainties from numerous sources into the process.

In this study, a multi-criteria based design framework for structural design under seismic risk is explored. The emphasis is on reliability-based performance objectives and their interaction with economic objectives. The framework has analysis, evaluation, and revision stages. In the probabilistic response analysis, seismic loading uncertainties as well as modeling uncertainties are incorporated. For evaluation, two approaches are suggested: one based on preference aggregation and the other based on socio-economics. Both implementations of the general framework are illustrated with simple but informative design examples to explore the basic features of the framework.

The first approach uses concepts similar to those found in multi-criteria decision theory, and directly combines reliability-based objectives with others. This approach is implemented in a single-stage design procedure. In the socio-economics based approach, a two-stage design procedure is recommended in which societal preferences are treated through reliability-based engineering performance measures, but emphasis is also given to economic objectives because these are especially important to the structural designer's client. A rational net asset value formulation including losses from uncertain future earthquakes is used to assess the economic performance of a design. A recently developed assembly-based vulnerability analysis is incorporated into the loss estimation.

The presented performance-based design framework allows investigation of various design issues and their impact on a structural design. It is a flexible one that readily allows incorporation of new methods and concepts in seismic hazard specification, structural analysis, and loss estimation.