Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

Mechanisms of substrate selection by the signal recognition particle

The signal recognition particle (SRP) targets membrane and secretory proteins to their correct cellular destination with remarkably high fidelity. Previous studies have shown that multiple checkpoints exist within this targeting pathway that allows ‘correct cargo’ to be quickly and efficiently targeted and for ‘incorrect cargo’ to be promptly rejected. In this work, we delved further into understanding the mechanisms of how substrates are selected or discarded by the SRP. First, we discovered the role of the SRP fingerloop and how it activates the SRP and SRP receptor (SR) GTPases to target and unload cargo in response to signal sequence binding. Second, we learned how an ‘avoidance signal’ found in the bacterial autotransporter, EspP, allows this protein to escape the SRP pathway by causing the SRP and SR to form a ‘distorted’ complex that is inefficient in delivering the cargo to the membrane. Lastly, we determined how Trigger Factor, a co-translational chaperone, helps SRP discriminate against ‘incorrect cargo’ at three distinct stages: SRP binding to RNC; targeting of RNC to the membrane via SRP-FtsY assembly; and stronger antagonism of SRP targeting of ribosomes bearing nascent polypeptides that exceed a critical length. Overall, results delineate the rich underlying mechanisms by which SRP recognizes its substrates, which in turn activates the targeting pathway and provides a conceptual foundation to understand how timely and accurate selection of substrates is achieved by this protein targeting machinery.

Optimal procurement and contracting with research and development

Government procurement of a new good or service is a process that usually includes basic research, development, and production. Empirical evidences indicate that investments in research and development (R and D) before production are significant in many defense procurements. Thus, optimal procurement policy should not be only to select the most efficient producer, but also to induce the contractors to design the best product and to develop the best technology. It is difficult to apply the current economic theory of optimal procurement and contracting, which has emphasized production, but ignored R and D, to many cases of procurement.

In this thesis, I provide basic models of both R and D and production in the procurement process where a number of firms invest in private R and D and compete for a government contract. R and D is modeled as a stochastic cost-reduction process. The government is considered both as a profit-maximizer and a procurement cost minimizer. In comparison to the literature, the following results derived from my models are significant. First, R and D matters in procurement contracting. When offering the optimal contract the government will be better off if it correctly takes into account costly private R and D investment. Second, competition matters. The optimal contract and the total equilibrium R and D expenditures vary with the number of firms. The government usually does not prefer infinite competition among firms. Instead, it prefers free entry of firms. Third, under a R and D technology with the constant marginal returns-to-scale, it is socially optimal to have only one firm to conduct all of the R and D and production. Fourth, in an independent private values environment with risk-neutral firms, an informed government should select one of four standard auction procedures with an appropriate announced reserve price, acting as if it does not have any private information.

Scalable Methods for Deterministic Integration of Quantum Emitters in Photonic Crystal Cavities

We investigated four unique methods for achieving scalable, deterministic integration of quantum emitters into ultra-high Q{V photonic crystal cavities, including selective area heteroepitaxy, engineered photoemission from silicon nanostructures, wafer bonding and dimensional reduction of III-V quantum wells, and cavity-enhanced optical trapping. In these areas, we were able to demonstrate site-selective heteroepitaxy, size-tunable photoluminescence from silicon nanostructures, Purcell modification of QW emission spectra, and limits of cavity-enhanced optical trapping designs which exceed any reports in the literature and suggest the feasibility of capturing- and detecting nanostructures with dimensions below 10 nm. In addition to process scalability and the requirement for achieving accurate spectral- and spatial overlap between the emitter and cavity, these techniques paid specific attention to the ability to separate the cavity and emitter material systems in order to allow optimal selection of these independently, and eventually enable monolithic integration with other photonic and electronic circuitry.

We also developed an analytic photonic crystal design process yielding optimized cavity tapers with minimal computational effort, and reported on a general cavity modification which exhibits improved fabrication tolerance by relying exclusively on positional- rather than dimensional tapering. We compared several experimental coupling techniques for device characterization. Significant efforts were devoted to optimizing cavity fabrication, including the use of atomic layer deposition to improve surface quality, exploration into factors affecting the design fracturing, and automated analysis of SEM images. Using optimized fabrication procedures, we experimentally demonstrated 1D photonic crystal nanobeam cavities exhibiting the highest Q/V reported on substrate. Finally, we analyzed the bistable behavior of the devices to quantify the nonlinear optical response of our cavities.