Essays in mechanism design

This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, ”Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences”, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, ”Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources”, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism — the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism — when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, ”Vessel Buyback”, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.

Some theorems in classical elastodynamic

This investigation is concerned with various fundamental aspects of the linearized dynamical theory for mechanically homogeneous and isotropic elastic solids. First, the uniqueness and reciprocal theorems of dynamic elasticity are extended to unbounded domains with the aid of a generalized energy identity and a lemma on the prolonged quiescence of the far field, which are established for this purpose. Next, the basic singular solutions of elastodynamics are studied and used to generate systematically Love's integral identity for the displacement field, as well as an associated identity for the field of stress. These results, in conjunction with suitably defined Green's functions, are applied to the construction of integral representations for the solution of the first and second boundary-initial value problem. Finally, a uniqueness theorem for dynamic concentrated-load problems is obtained.