A geometric analysis of convex demixing

Demixing is the task of identifying multiple signals given only their sum and prior information about their structures. Examples of demixing problems include (i) separating a signal that is sparse with respect to one basis from a signal that is sparse with respect to a second basis; (ii) decomposing an observed matrix into low-rank and sparse components; and (iii) identifying a binary codeword with impulsive corruptions. This thesis describes and analyzes a convex optimization framework for solving an array of demixing problems.

Our framework includes a random orientation model for the constituent signals that ensures the structures are incoherent. This work introduces a summary parameter, the statistical dimension, that reflects the intrinsic complexity of a signal. The main result indicates that the difficulty of demixing under this random model depends only on the total complexity of the constituent signals involved: demixing succeeds with high probability when the sum of the complexities is less than the ambient dimension; otherwise, it fails with high probability.

The fact that a phase transition between success and failure occurs in demixing is a consequence of a new inequality in conic integral geometry. Roughly speaking, this inequality asserts that a convex cone behaves like a subspace whose dimension is equal to the statistical dimension of the cone. When combined with a geometric optimality condition for demixing, this inequality provides precise quantitative information about the phase transition, including the location and width of the transition region.

An examination of strategic opportunities provided by the conference committee procedure in the U.S. Congress

Deference to committees in Congress has been a much studied phenomena for close to 100 years. This deference can be characterized as the unwillingness of a potentially winning coalition on the House floor to impose its will on a small minority, a standing committee. The congressional scholar is then faced with two problems: observing such deference to committees, and explaining it. Shepsle and Weingast have proposed the existence of an ex-post veto for standing committees as an explanation of committee deference. They claim that as conference reports in the House and Senate are considered under a rule that does not allow amendments, the conferees enjoy agenda-setting power. In this paper I describe a test of such a hypothesis (along with competing hypotheses regarding the effects of the conference procedure). A random-utility model is utilized to estimate legislators' ideal points on appropriations bills from 1973 through 1980. I prove two things: 1) that committee deference can not be said to be a result of the conference procedure; and moreover 2) that committee deference does not appear to exist at all.