Conditional independence in quantum many-body systems

In this thesis, I will discuss how information-theoretic arguments can be used to produce sharp bounds in the studies of quantum many-body systems. The main advantage of this approach, as opposed to the conventional field-theoretic argument, is that it depends very little on the precise form of the Hamiltonian. The main idea behind this thesis lies on a number of results concerning the structure of quantum states that are conditionally independent. Depending on the application, some of these statements are generalized to quantum states that are approximately conditionally independent. These structures can be readily used in the studies of gapped quantum many-body systems, especially for the ones in two spatial dimensions. A number of rigorous results are derived, including (i) a universal upper bound for a maximal number of topologically protected states that is expressed in terms of the topological entanglement entropy, (ii) a first-order perturbation bound for the topological entanglement entropy that decays superpolynomially with the size of the subsystem, and (iii) a correlation bound between an arbitrary local operator and a topological operator constructed from a set of local reduced density matrices. I also introduce exactly solvable models supported on a three-dimensional lattice that can be used as a reliable quantum memory.

Extractive institutions in colonial Africa

A common explanation for African current underdevelopment is the extractive character of institutions established during the colonial period. Yet, since colonial extraction is hard to quantify and its exact mechanisms are not well understood, we still do not know precisely how colonial institutions affect economic growth today. In this project, I study this issue by focusing on the peculiar structure of trade and labor policies employed by the French colonizers.

First, I analyze how trade monopsonies and coercive labor institutions reduced African gains from trade during the colonial period. By using new data on prices to agricultural producers and labor institutions in French Africa, I show that (1) the monopsonistic character of colonial trade implied a reduction in prices to producers far below world market prices; (2) coercive labor institutions allowed the colonizers to reduce prices even further; (3) as a consequence, colonial extraction cut African gains from trade by over 60%.

Given the importance of labor institutions, I then focus on their origin by analyzing the colonial governments' incentives to choose between coerced and free labor. I argue that the choice of institutions was affected more by the properties of exported commodities, such as prices and economies of scale, than by the characteristics of colonies, such indigenous population density and ease of settlement for the colonizers.

Finally, I study the long-term effects of colonial trade monopsonies and coercive labor institutions. By combining archival data on prices in the French colonies with maps of crop suitability, I show that the extent to which prices to agricultural producers were reduced with respect to world market prices is strongly negatively correlated with current regional development, as proxied by luminosity data from satellite images. The evidence suggests that colonial extraction affected subsequent growth by reducing development in rural areas in favor of a urban elite. The differential impact in rural and urban areas can be the reason why trade monopsonies and extractive institutions persisted long after independence.