Essays on cooperation and reciprocity

This dissertation comprises three essays that use theory-based experiments to gain understanding of how cooperation and efficiency is affected by certain variables and institutions in different types of strategic interactions prevalent in our society.

Chapter 2 analyzes indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games with private information in the laboratory. Using a novel experimental design to implement a dynamic game with a stochastic jump signal process, this study provides insights into a relation where cooperation is without immediate reciprocity. The primary finding is that favor provision under these conditions is considerably less than under the most efficient equilibrium. Also, individuals do not engage in exact score-keeping of net favors, rather, the time since the last favor was provided affects decisions to stop or restart providing favors.

Evidence from experiments in Cournot duopolies is presented in Chapter 3 where players indulge in a form of pre-play communication, termed as revision phase, before playing the one-shot game. During this revision phase individuals announce their tentative quantities, which are publicly observed, and revisions are costless. The payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end under real time revision, whereas in a Poisson revision game, opportunities to revise arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and the tentative quantity corresponding to the last revision opportunity is implemented. Contrasting results emerge. While real time revision of quantities results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented in the Poisson revision games. This shows that partial cooperation can be sustained even when individuals interact only once.

Chapter 4 investigates the effect of varying the message space in a public good game with pre-play communication where player endowments are private information. We find that neither binary communication nor a larger finite numerical message space results in any efficiency gain relative to the situation without any form of communication. Payoffs and public good provision are higher only when participants are provided with a discussion period through unrestricted text chat.

Extractive institutions in colonial Africa

A common explanation for African current underdevelopment is the extractive character of institutions established during the colonial period. Yet, since colonial extraction is hard to quantify and its exact mechanisms are not well understood, we still do not know precisely how colonial institutions affect economic growth today. In this project, I study this issue by focusing on the peculiar structure of trade and labor policies employed by the French colonizers.

First, I analyze how trade monopsonies and coercive labor institutions reduced African gains from trade during the colonial period. By using new data on prices to agricultural producers and labor institutions in French Africa, I show that (1) the monopsonistic character of colonial trade implied a reduction in prices to producers far below world market prices; (2) coercive labor institutions allowed the colonizers to reduce prices even further; (3) as a consequence, colonial extraction cut African gains from trade by over 60%.

Given the importance of labor institutions, I then focus on their origin by analyzing the colonial governments' incentives to choose between coerced and free labor. I argue that the choice of institutions was affected more by the properties of exported commodities, such as prices and economies of scale, than by the characteristics of colonies, such indigenous population density and ease of settlement for the colonizers.

Finally, I study the long-term effects of colonial trade monopsonies and coercive labor institutions. By combining archival data on prices in the French colonies with maps of crop suitability, I show that the extent to which prices to agricultural producers were reduced with respect to world market prices is strongly negatively correlated with current regional development, as proxied by luminosity data from satellite images. The evidence suggests that colonial extraction affected subsequent growth by reducing development in rural areas in favor of a urban elite. The differential impact in rural and urban areas can be the reason why trade monopsonies and extractive institutions persisted long after independence.