Localization of sources of human evoked responses

The evoked response, a signal present in the electro-encephalogram when specific sense modalities are stimulated with brief sensory inputs, has not yet revealed as much about brain function as it apparently promised when first recorded in the late 1940's. One of the problems has been to record the responses at a large number of points on the surface of the head; thus in order to achieve greater spatial resolution than previously attained, a 50-channel recording system was designed to monitor experiments with human visually evoked responses.

Conventional voltage versus time plots of the responses were found inadequate as a means of making qualitative studies of such a large data space. This problem was solved by creating a graphical display of the responses in the form of equipotential maps of the activity at successive instants during the complete response. In order to ascertain the necessary complexity of any models of the responses, factor analytic procedures were used to show that models characterized by only five or six independent parameters could adequately represent the variability in all recording channels.

One type of equivalent source for the responses which meets these specifications is the electrostatic dipole. Two different dipole models were studied: the dipole in a homogeneous sphere and the dipole in a sphere comprised of two spherical shells (of different conductivities) concentric with and enclosing a homogeneous sphere of a third conductivity. These models were used to determine nonlinear least squares fits of dipole parameters to a given potential distribution on the surface of a spherical approximation to the head. Numerous tests of the procedures were conducted with problems having known solutions. After these theoretical studies demonstrated the applicability of the technique, the models were used to determine inverse solutions for the evoked response potentials at various times throughout the responses. It was found that reliable estimates of the location and strength of cortical activity were obtained, and that the two models differed only slightly in their inverse solutions. These techniques enabled information flow in the brain, as indicated by locations and strengths of active sites, to be followed throughout the evoked response.

Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games

In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.

Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.

We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.

We also provide an alternative characterization—all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose—they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.