Cooperative and market-based solutions to pollution abatement problems

This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.

Friction and heat transfer coefficients in smooth and rough pipes with dilute polymer solutions

Measurements of friction and heat transfer coefficients were obtained with dilute polymer solutions flowing through electrically heated smooth and rough tubes. The polymer used was "Polyox WSR-301", and tests were performed at concentrations of 10 and 50 parts per million. The rough tubes contained a close-packed, granular type of surface with roughness-height-to-diameter ratios of 0.0138 and 0.0488 respectively. A Prandtl number range of 4.38 to 10.3 was investigated which was obtained by adjusting the bulk temperature of the solution. The Reynolds numbers in the experiments were varied from =10,000 (Pr= 10.3) to 250,000 (Pr= 4.38).

Friction reductions as high as 73% in smooth tubes and 83% in rough tubes were observed, accompanied by an even more drastic heat transfer reduction (as high as 84% in smooth tubes and 93% in rough tubes). The heat transfer coefficients with Polyox can be lower for a rough tube than for a smooth one.

The similarity rules previously developed for heat transfer with a Newtonian fluid were extended to dilute polymer solution pipe flows. A velocity profile similar to the one proposed by Deissler was taken as a model to interpret the friction and heat transfer data in smooth tubes. It was found that the observed results could be explained by assuming that the turbulent diffusivities are reduced in smooth tubes in the vicinity of the wall, which brings about a thickening of the viscous layer. A possible mechanism describing the effect of the polymer additive on rough pipe flow is also discussed.