Essays on cooperation and reciprocity

This dissertation comprises three essays that use theory-based experiments to gain understanding of how cooperation and efficiency is affected by certain variables and institutions in different types of strategic interactions prevalent in our society.

Chapter 2 analyzes indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games with private information in the laboratory. Using a novel experimental design to implement a dynamic game with a stochastic jump signal process, this study provides insights into a relation where cooperation is without immediate reciprocity. The primary finding is that favor provision under these conditions is considerably less than under the most efficient equilibrium. Also, individuals do not engage in exact score-keeping of net favors, rather, the time since the last favor was provided affects decisions to stop or restart providing favors.

Evidence from experiments in Cournot duopolies is presented in Chapter 3 where players indulge in a form of pre-play communication, termed as revision phase, before playing the one-shot game. During this revision phase individuals announce their tentative quantities, which are publicly observed, and revisions are costless. The payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end under real time revision, whereas in a Poisson revision game, opportunities to revise arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and the tentative quantity corresponding to the last revision opportunity is implemented. Contrasting results emerge. While real time revision of quantities results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented in the Poisson revision games. This shows that partial cooperation can be sustained even when individuals interact only once.

Chapter 4 investigates the effect of varying the message space in a public good game with pre-play communication where player endowments are private information. We find that neither binary communication nor a larger finite numerical message space results in any efficiency gain relative to the situation without any form of communication. Payoffs and public good provision are higher only when participants are provided with a discussion period through unrestricted text chat.

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.

Quantum Interference and Entanglement of Surface Plasmons

Surface plasma waves arise from the collective oscillations of billions of electrons at the surface of a metal in unison. The simplest way to quantize these waves is by direct analogy to electromagnetic fields in free space, with the surface plasmon, the quantum of the surface plasma wave, playing the same role as the photon. It follows that surface plasmons should exhibit all of the same quantum phenomena that photons do, including quantum interference and entanglement.

Unlike photons, however, surface plasmons suffer strong losses that arise from the scattering of free electrons from other electrons, phonons, and surfaces. Under some circumstances, these interactions might also cause “pure dephasing,” which entails a loss of coherence without absorption. Quantum descriptions of plasmons usually do not account for these effects explicitly, and sometimes ignore them altogether. In light of this extra microscopic complexity, it is necessary for experiments to test quantum models of surface plasmons.

In this thesis, I describe two such tests that my collaborators and I performed. The first was a plasmonic version of the Hong-Ou-Mandel experiment, in which we observed two-particle quantum interference between plasmons with a visibility of 93 ± 1%. This measurement confirms that surface plasmons faithfully reproduce this effect with the same visibility and mutual coherence time, to within measurement error, as in the photonic case.

The second experiment demonstrated path entanglement between surface plasmons with a visibility of 95 ± 2%, confirming that a path-entangled state can indeed survive without measurable decoherence. This measurement suggests that elastic scattering mechanisms of the type that might cause pure dephasing must have been weak enough not to significantly perturb the state of the metal under the experimental conditions we investigated.

These two experiments add quantum interference and path entanglement to a growing list of quantum phenomena that surface plasmons appear to exhibit just as clearly as photons, confirming the predictions of the simplest quantum models.