Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

The power of quantum Fourier sampling

How powerful are Quantum Computers? Despite the prevailing belief that Quantum Computers are more powerful than their classical counterparts, this remains a conjecture backed by little formal evidence. Shor's famous factoring algorithm [Shor97] gives an example of a problem that can be solved efficiently on a quantum computer with no known efficient classical algorithm. Factoring, however, is unlikely to be NP-Hard, meaning that few unexpected formal consequences would arise, should such a classical algorithm be discovered. Could it then be the case that any quantum algorithm can be simulated efficiently classically? Likewise, could it be the case that Quantum Computers can quickly solve problems much harder than factoring? If so, where does this power come from, and what classical computational resources do we need to solve the hardest problems for which there exist efficient quantum algorithms?

We make progress toward understanding these questions through studying the relationship between classical nondeterminism and quantum computing. In particular, is there a problem that can be solved efficiently on a Quantum Computer that cannot be efficiently solved using nondeterminism? In this thesis we address this problem from the perspective of sampling problems. Namely, we give evidence that approximately sampling the Quantum Fourier Transform of an efficiently computable function, while easy quantumly, is hard for any classical machine in the Polynomial Time Hierarchy. In particular, we prove the existence of a class of distributions that can be sampled efficiently by a Quantum Computer, that likely cannot be approximately sampled in randomized polynomial time with an oracle for the Polynomial Time Hierarchy.

Our work complements and generalizes the evidence given in Aaronson and Arkhipov's work [AA2013] where a different distribution with the same computational properties was given. Our result is more general than theirs, but requires a more powerful quantum sampler.