Cooperative and market-based solutions to pollution abatement problems

This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.

Essays in revealed preference theory and behavioral economics

Time, risk, and attention are all integral to economic decision making. The aim of this work is to understand those key components of decision making using a variety of approaches: providing axiomatic characterizations to investigate time discounting, generating measures of visual attention to infer consumers' intentions, and examining data from unique field settings.

Chapter 2, co-authored with Federico Echenique and Kota Saito, presents the first revealed-preference characterizations of exponentially-discounted utility model and its generalizations. My characterizations provide non-parametric revealed-preference tests. I apply the tests to data from a recent experiment, and find that the axiomatization delivers new insights on a dataset that had been analyzed by traditional parametric methods.

Chapter 3, co-authored with Min Jeong Kang and Colin Camerer, investigates whether "pre-choice" measures of visual attention improve in prediction of consumers' purchase intentions. We measure participants' visual attention using eyetracking or mousetracking while they make hypothetical as well as real purchase decisions. I find that different patterns of visual attention are associated with hypothetical and real decisions. I then demonstrate that including information on visual attention improves prediction of purchase decisions when attention is measured with mousetracking.

Chapter 4 investigates individuals' attitudes towards risk in a high-stakes environment using data from a TV game show, Jeopardy!. I first quantify players' subjective beliefs about answering questions correctly. Using those beliefs in estimation, I find that the representative player is risk averse. I then find that trailing players tend to wager more than "folk" strategies that are known among the community of contestants and fans, and this tendency is related to their confidence. I also find gender differences: male players take more risk than female players, and even more so when they are competing against two other male players.

Chapter 5, co-authored with Colin Camerer, investigates the dynamics of the favorite-longshot bias (FLB) using data on horse race betting from an online exchange that allows bettors to trade "in-play." I find that probabilistic forecasts implied by market prices before start of the races are well-calibrated, but the degree of FLB increases significantly as the events approach toward the end.