Markets and microstructure

This document contains three papers examining the microstructure of financial interaction in development and market settings. I first examine the industrial organization of financial exchanges, specifically limit order markets. In this section, I perform a case study of Google stock surrounding a surprising earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009, uncovering parameters that describe information flows and liquidity provision. I then explore the disbursement process for community-driven development projects. This section is game theoretic in nature, using a novel three-player ultimatum structure. I finally develop econometric tools to simulate equilibrium and identify equilibrium models in limit order markets.

In chapter two, I estimate an equilibrium model using limit order data, finding parameters that describe information and liquidity preferences for trading. As a case study, I estimate the model for Google stock surrounding an unexpected good-news earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009. I find a substantial decrease in asymmetric information prior to the earnings announcement. I also simulate counterfactual dealer markets and find empirical evidence that limit order markets perform more efficiently than do their dealer market counterparts.

In chapter three, I examine Community-Driven Development. Community-Driven Development is considered a tool empowering communities to develop their own aid projects. While evidence has been mixed as to the effectiveness of CDD in achieving disbursement to intended beneficiaries, the literature maintains that local elites generally take control of most programs. I present a three player ultimatum game which describes a potential decentralized aid procurement process. Players successively split a dollar in aid money, and the final player--the targeted community member--decides between whistle blowing or not. Despite the elite capture present in my model, I find conditions under which money reaches targeted recipients. My results describe a perverse possibility in the decentralized aid process which could make detection of elite capture more difficult than previously considered. These processes may reconcile recent empirical work claiming effectiveness of the decentralized aid process with case studies which claim otherwise.

In chapter four, I develop in more depth the empirical and computational means to estimate model parameters in the case study in chapter two. I describe the liquidity supplier problem and equilibrium among those suppliers. I then outline the analytical forms for computing certainty-equivalent utilities for the informed trader. Following this, I describe a recursive algorithm which facilitates computing equilibrium in supply curves. Finally, I outline implementation of the Method of Simulated Moments in this context, focusing on Indirect Inference and formulating the pseudo model.

Analysis of a transcriptional network involving PU.1, Notch, and Gata3 in the lymphomyeloid lineage decision during early T-cell development

Hematopoiesis is a well-established system used to study developmental choices amongst cells with multiple lineage potentials, as well as the transcription factor network interactions that drive these developmental paths. Multipotent progenitors travel from the bone marrow to the thymus where T-cell development is initiated and these early T-cell precursors retain lineage plasticity even after initiating a T-cell program. The development of these early cells is driven by Notch signaling and the combinatorial expression of many transcription factors, several of which are also involved in the development of other cell lineages. The ETS family transcription factor PU.1 is involved in the development of progenitor, myeloid, and lymphoid cells, and can divert progenitor T-cells from the T-lineage to a myeloid lineage. This diversion of early T-cells by PU.1 can be blocked by Notch signaling. The PU.1 and Notch interaction creates a switch wherein PU.1 in the presence of Notch promotes T-cell identity and PU.1 in the absence of Notch signaling promotes a myeloid identity. Here we characterized an early T-cell cell line, Scid.adh.2c2, as a good model system for studying the myeloid vs. lymphoid developmental choice dependent on PU.1 and Notch signaling. We then used the Scid.adh.2c2 system to identify mechanisms mediating PU.1 and Notch signaling interactions during early T-cell development. We show that the mechanism by which Notch signaling is protecting pro-T cells is neither degradation nor modification of the PU.1 protein. Instead we give evidence that Notch signaling is blocking the PU.1-driven inhibition of a key set of T-regulatory genes including Myb, Tcf7, and Gata3. We show that the protection of Gata3 from PU.1-mediated inhibition, by Notch signaling and Myb, is important for retaining a T-lineage identity. We also discuss a PU.1-driven mechanism involving E-protein inhibition that leads to the inhibition of Notch target genes. This is mechanism may be used as a lockdown mechanism in pro-T-cells that have made the decision to divert to the myeloid pathway.