Studying conscious and unconscious vision with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging : the BOLD promise

Waking up from a dreamless sleep, I open my eyes, recognize my wife’s face and am filled with joy. In this thesis, I used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to gain insights into the mechanisms involved in this seemingly simple daily occurrence, which poses at least three great challenges to neuroscience: how does conscious experience arise from the activity of the brain? How does the brain process visual input to the point of recognizing individual faces? How does the brain store semantic knowledge about people that we know? To start tackling the first question, I studied the neural correlates of unconscious processing of invisible faces. I was unable to image significant activations related to the processing of completely invisible faces, despite existing reports in the literature. I thus moved on to the next question and studied how recognition of a familiar person was achieved in the brain; I focused on finding invariant representations of person identity – representations that would be activated any time we think of a familiar person, read their name, see their picture, hear them talk, etc. There again, I could not find significant evidence for such representations with fMRI, even in regions where they had previously been found with single unit recordings in human patients (the Jennifer Aniston neurons). Faced with these null outcomes, the scope of my investigations eventually turned back towards the technique that I had been using, fMRI, and the recently praised analytical tools that I had been trusting, Multivariate Pattern Analysis. After a mostly disappointing attempt at replicating a strong single unit finding of a categorical response to animals in the right human amygdala with fMRI, I put fMRI decoding to an ultimate test with a unique dataset acquired in the macaque monkey. There I showed a dissociation between the ability of fMRI to pick up face viewpoint information and its inability to pick up face identity information, which I mostly traced back to the poor clustering of identity selective units. Though fMRI decoding is a powerful new analytical tool, it does not rid fMRI of its inherent limitations as a hemodynamics-based measure.

Social saliency : visual psychophysics and single-neuron recordings in humans

My thesis studies how people pay attention to other people and the environment. How does the brain figure out what is important and what are the neural mechanisms underlying attention? What is special about salient social cues compared to salient non-social cues? In Chapter I, I review social cues that attract attention, with an emphasis on the neurobiology of these social cues. I also review neurological and psychiatric links: the relationship between saliency, the amygdala and autism. The first empirical chapter then begins by noting that people constantly move in the environment. In Chapter II, I study the spatial cues that attract attention during locomotion using a cued speeded discrimination task. I found that when the motion was expansive, attention was attracted towards the singular point of the optic flow (the focus of expansion, FOE) in a sustained fashion. The more ecologically valid the motion features became (e.g., temporal expansion of each object, spatial depth structure implied by distribution of the size of the objects), the stronger the attentional effects. However, compared to inanimate objects and cues, people preferentially attend to animals and faces, a process in which the amygdala is thought to play an important role. To directly compare social cues and non-social cues in the same experiment and investigate the neural structures processing social cues, in Chapter III, I employ a change detection task and test four rare patients with bilateral amygdala lesions. All four amygdala patients showed a normal pattern of reliably faster and more accurate detection of animate stimuli, suggesting that advantageous processing of social cues can be preserved even without the amygdala, a key structure of the “social brain”. People not only attend to faces, but also pay attention to others’ facial emotions and analyze faces in great detail. Humans have a dedicated system for processing faces and the amygdala has long been associated with a key role in recognizing facial emotions. In Chapter IV, I study the neural mechanisms of emotion perception and find that single neurons in the human amygdala are selective for subjective judgment of others’ emotions. Lastly, people typically pay special attention to faces and people, but people with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) might not. To further study social attention and explore possible deficits of social attention in autism, in Chapter V, I employ a visual search task and show that people with ASD have reduced attention, especially social attention, to target-congruent objects in the search array. This deficit cannot be explained by low-level visual properties of the stimuli and is independent of the amygdala, but it is dependent on task demands. Overall, through visual psychophysics with concurrent eye-tracking, my thesis found and analyzed socially salient cues and compared social vs. non-social cues and healthy vs. clinical populations. Neural mechanisms underlying social saliency were elucidated through electrophysiology and lesion studies. I finally propose further research questions based on the findings in my thesis and introduce my follow-up studies and preliminary results beyond the scope of this thesis in the very last section, Future Directions.

Neural and computational representations of decision variables

These studies explore how, where, and when representations of variables critical to decision-making are represented in the brain. In order to produce a decision, humans must first determine the relevant stimuli, actions, and possible outcomes before applying an algorithm that will select an action from those available. When choosing amongst alternative stimuli, the framework of value-based decision-making proposes that values are assigned to the stimuli and that these values are then compared in an abstract “value space” in order to produce a decision. Despite much progress, in particular regarding the pinpointing of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) as a region that encodes the value, many basic questions remain. In Chapter 2, I show that distributed BOLD signaling in vmPFC represents the value of stimuli under consideration in a manner that is independent of the type of stimulus it is. Thus the open question of whether value is represented in abstraction, a key tenet of value-based decision-making, is confirmed. However, I also show that stimulus-dependent value representations are also present in the brain during decision-making and suggest a potential neural pathway for stimulus-to-value transformations that integrates these two results.

More broadly speaking, there is both neural and behavioral evidence that two distinct control systems are at work during action selection. These two systems compose the “goal-directed system”, which selects actions based on an internal model of the environment, and the “habitual” system, which generates responses based on antecedent stimuli only. Computational characterizations of these two systems imply that they have different informational requirements in terms of input stimuli, actions, and possible outcomes. Associative learning theory predicts that the habitual system should utilize stimulus and action information only, while goal-directed behavior requires that outcomes as well as stimuli and actions be processed. In Chapter 3, I test whether areas of the brain hypothesized to be involved in habitual versus goal-directed control represent the corresponding theorized variables.

The question of whether one or both of these neural systems drives Pavlovian conditioning is less well-studied. Chapter 4 describes an experiment in which subjects were scanned while engaged in a Pavlovian task with a simple non-trivial structure. After comparing a variety of model-based and model-free learning algorithms (thought to underpin goal-directed and habitual decision-making, respectively), it was found that subjects’ reaction times were better explained by a model-based system. In addition, neural signaling of precision, a variable based on a representation of a world model, was found in the amygdala. These data indicate that the influence of model-based representations of the environment can extend even to the most basic learning processes.

Knowledge of the state of hidden variables in an environment is required for optimal inference regarding the abstract decision structure of a given environment and therefore can be crucial to decision-making in a wide range of situations. Inferring the state of an abstract variable requires the generation and manipulation of an internal representation of beliefs over the values of the hidden variable. In Chapter 5, I describe behavioral and neural results regarding the learning strategies employed by human subjects in a hierarchical state-estimation task. In particular, a comprehensive model fit and comparison process pointed to the use of "belief thresholding". This implies that subjects tended to eliminate low-probability hypotheses regarding the state of the environment from their internal model and ceased to update the corresponding variables. Thus, in concert with incremental Bayesian learning, humans explicitly manipulate their internal model of the generative process during hierarchical inference consistent with a serial hypothesis testing strategy.

Real-World Social Cognition: Context Effects in Face and Threat Processing

As borne out by everyday social experience, social cognition is highly dependent on context, modulated by a host of factors that arise from the social environment in which we live. While streamlined laboratory research provides excellent experimental control, it can be limited to telling us about the capabilities of the brain under artificial conditions, rather than elucidating the processes that come into play in the real world. Consideration of the impact of ecologically valid contextual cues on social cognition will improve the generalizability of social neuroscience findings also to pathology, e.g., to psychiatric illnesses. To help bridge between laboratory research and social cognition as we experience it in the real world, this thesis investigates three themes: (1) increasing the naturalness of stimuli with richer contextual cues, (2) the potentially special contextual case of social cognition when two people interact directly, and (3) a third theme of experimental believability, which runs in parallel to the first two themes. Focusing on the first two themes, in work with two patient populations, we explore neural contributions to two topics in social cognition. First, we document a basic approach bias in rare patients with bilateral lesions of the amygdala. This finding is then related to the contextual factor of ambiguity, and further investigated together with other contextual cues in a sample of healthy individuals tested over the internet, finally yielding a hierarchical decision tree for social threat evaluation. Second, we demonstrate that neural processing of eye gaze in brain structures related to face, gaze, and social processing is differently modulated by the direct presence of another live person. This question is investigated using fMRI in people with autism and controls. Across a range of topics, we demonstrate that two themes of ecological validity — integration of naturalistic contextual cues, and social interaction — influence social cognition, that particular brain structures mediate this processing, and that it will be crucial to study interaction in order to understand disorders of social interaction such as autism.