Cooperative and market-based solutions to pollution abatement problems

This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.

A study of the proposed Diamond Creek Reservoir

Politically the Colorado river is an interstate as well as an international stream. Physically the basin divides itself distinctly into three sections. The upper section from head waters to the mouth of San Juan comprises about 40 percent of the total of the basin and affords about 87 percent of the total runoff, or an average of about 15 000 000 acre feet per annum. High mountains and cold weather are found in this section. The middle section from the mouth of San Juan to the mouth of the Williams comprises about 35 percent of the total area of the basin and supplies about 7 percent of the annual runoff. Narrow canyons and mild weather prevail in this section. The lower third of the basin is composed of mainly hot arid plains of low altitude. It comprises some 25 percent of the total area of the basin and furnishes about 6 percent of the average annual runoff.

The proposed Diamond Creek reservoir is located in the middle section and is wholly within the boundary of Arizona. The site is at the mouth of Diamond Creek and is only 16 m. from Beach Spring, a station on the Santa Fe railroad. It is solely a power project with a limited storage capacity. The dam which creats the reservoir is of the gravity type to be constructed across the river. The walls and foundation are of granite. For a dam of 290 feet in height, the back water will be about 25 m. up the river.

The power house will be placed right below the dam perpendicular to the axis of the river. It is entirely a concrete structure. The power installation would consist of eighteen 37 500 H.P. vertical, variable head turbines, directly connected to 28 000 kwa. 110 000 v. 3 phase, 60 cycle generators with necessary switching and auxiliary apparatus. Each unit is to be fed by a separate penstock wholly embedded into the masonry.

Concerning the power market, the main electric transmission lines would extend to Prescott, Phoenix, Mesa, Florence etc. The mining regions of the mountains of Arizona would be the most adequate market. The demand of power in the above named places might not be large at present. It will, from the observation of the writer, rapidly increase with the wonderful advancement of all kinds of industrial development.

All these things being comparatively feasible, there is one difficult problem: that is the silt. At the Diamond Creek dam site the average annual silt discharge is about 82 650 acre feet. The geographical conditions, however, will not permit silt deposites right in the reservoir. So this design will be made under the assumption given in Section 4.

The silt condition and the change of lower course of the Colorado are much like those of the Yellow River in China. But one thing is different. On the Colorado most of the canyon walls are of granite, while those on the Yellow are of alluvial loess: so it is very hard, if not impossible, to get a favorable dam site on the lower part. As a visitor to this country, I should like to see the full development of the Colorado: but how about THE YELLOW!