Contributions of parietal cortex to reach planning

Sensory-motor circuits course through the parietal cortex of the human and monkey brain. How parietal cortex manipulates these signals has been an important question in behavioral neuroscience. This thesis presents experiments that explore the contributions of monkey parietal cortex to sensory-motor processing, with an emphasis on the area's contributions to reaching. First, it is shown that parietal cortex is organized into subregions devoted to specific movements. Area LIP encodes plans to make saccadic eye movements. A nearby area, the parietal reach region (PRR), plans reaches. A series of experiments are then described which explore the contributions of PRR to reach planning. Reach plans are represented in an eye-centered reference frame in PRR. This representation is shown to be stable across eye movements. When a sequence of reaches is planned, only the impending movement is represented in PRR, showing that the area is more related to movement planning than to storing the memory of reach targets. PRR resembles area LIP in each of these properties: the two areas may provide a substrate for hand-eye coordination. These findings yield new perspectives on the functions of the parietal cortex and on the organization of sensory-motor processing in primate brains.

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.