The strategic behavior of rational novices

There is a growing amount of experimental evidence that suggests people often deviate from the predictions of game theory. Some scholars attempt to explain the observations by introducing errors into behavioral models. However, most of these modifications are situation dependent and do not generalize. A new theory, called the rational novice model, is introduced as an attempt to provide a general theory that takes account of erroneous behavior. The rational novice model is based on two central principals. The first is that people systematically make inaccurate guesses when they are evaluating their options in a game-like situation. The second is that people treat their decisions similar to a portfolio problem. As a result, non optimal actions in a game theoretic sense may be included in the rational novice strategy profile with positive weights.

The rational novice model can be divided into two parts: the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept. In a theoretical chapter, the mathematics of the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept are introduced. The existence of the equilibrium is established. In addition, the Nash equilibrium is shown to be a special case of the rational novice equilibrium. In another chapter, the rational novice model is applied to a voluntary contribution game. Numerical methods were used to obtain the solution. The model is estimated with data obtained from the Palfrey and Prisbrey experimental study of the voluntary contribution game. It is found that the rational novice model explains the data better than the Nash model. Although a formal statistical test was not used, pseudo R^2 analysis indicates that the rational novice model is better than a Probit model similar to the one used in the Palfrey and Prisbrey study.

The rational novice model is also applied to a first price sealed bid auction. Again, computing techniques were used to obtain a numerical solution. The data obtained from the Chen and Plott study were used to estimate the model. The rational novice model outperforms the CRRAM, the primary Nash model studied in the Chen and Plott study. However, the rational novice model is not the best amongst all models. A sophisticated rule-of-thumb, called the SOPAM, offers the best explanation of the data.

Investigations of group IVA transition metal mediated carbon-carbon bond forming reactions

Zirconocene aldehyde and ketone complexes were synthesized in high yield by treatment of zirconocene acyl complexes with trimethylaluminum or diisobutylaluminum hydride. These complexes, which are activated by dialkylaluminum chloride ligands, inserted unsaturated substrates such as alkynes, allenes, ethylene, nitriles, ketenes, aldehydes, ketones, lactones, and acid chlorides with moderate to high conversion. Insertion of aldehyde substrates yielded zirconocene diolate complexes with up to 20:1 (anti:syn) diastereoselectivity. The zirconocene diolates were hydrolyzed to afford unsymmetrical 1,2-diols in 40-80% isolated yield. Unsymmetrical ketones gave similar insertion yields with little or no diastereoselectivity. A high yielding one-pot method was developed that coupled carbonyl substrates with zirconocene aldehyde complexes that were derived from olefins by hydrozirconation and carbonylation. The zirconocene aldehyde complexes also inserted carbon monoxide and gave acyloins in 50% yield after hydrolysis.

The insertion reaction of aryl epoxides with the trimethylphoshine adduct of titanocene methylidene was examined. The resulting oxytitanacyclopentanes were carbonylated and oxidatively cleaved with dioxygen to afford y-lactones in moderate yields. Due to the instability and difficult isolation of titanocene methylidene trimethylphoshine adducts, a one-pot method involving the addition of catalytic amounts of trimethylphosphine to β,β-dimethyltitanacyclobutane was developed. A series of disubstituted aryl epoxides were examined which gave mixtures of diastereomeric insertion products. Based on these results, as well as earlier Hammett studies and labeling experiments, a biradical transition state intermediate is proposed. The method is limited to aryl substituted epoxide substrates with aliphatic examples showing no insertion reactivity.

The third study involved the use of magnesium chloride supported titanium catalysts for the Lewis acid catalyzed silyl group transfer condensation of enol silanes with aldehydes. The reaction resulted in silylated aldol products with as many as 140 catalytic turnovers before catalyst inactivation. Low diastereoselectivities favoring the anti-isomer were consistent with an open transition state involving a titanium atom bound to the catalyst surface. The catalysts were also used for the aldol group transfer polymerization of t-butyldimethylsilyloxy-1-ethene resulting in polymers with molecular weights of 5000-31,000 and molar mass dispersities of 1.5-2.8. Attempts to polymerize methylmethacrylate using GTP proved unsuccessful with these catalysts.

Experimental study study of antiproton-proton annihilation into a pair of charged Pi-Mesons or K-Mesons for incident antiproton mementa in the range from 0.72 GeV/c to 2.62 GeV/c

The cross sections for the two antiproton-proton annihilation-in-flight modes,

ˉp + p → π⁺ + π^-

ˉp + p → k⁺ + k^-

were measured for fifteen laboratory antiproton beam momenta ranging from 0.72 to 2.62 GeV/c. No magnets were used to determine the charges in the final state. As a result, the angular distributions were obtained in the form [dσ/dΩ (Θ_C.M.) + dσ/dΩ (π – Θ_C.M.)] for 45 ≲ Θ_C.M. ≲ 135°.

A hodoscope-counter system was used to discriminate against events with final states having more than two particles and antiproton-proton elastic scattering events. One spark chamber was used to record the track of each of the two charged final particles. A total of about 40,000 pictures were taken. The events were analyzed by measuring the laboratory angle of the track in each chamber. The value of the square of the mass of the final particles was calculated for each event assuming the reaction

ˉp + p → a pair of particles with equal masses.

About 20,000 events were found to be either annihilation into π ^±-pair or k ^±-pair events. The two different charged meson pair modes were also distinctly separated.

The average differential cross section of ˉp + p → π⁺ + π^- varied from ~ 25 µb/sr at antiproton beam momentum 0.72 GeV/c (total energy in center-of-mass system, √s = 2.0 GeV) to ~ 2 µb/sr at beam momentum 2.62 GeV/c (√s = 2.64 GeV). The most striking feature in the angular distribution was a peak at Θ_C.M. = 90° (cos Θ_C.M. = 0) which increased with √s and reached a maximum at √s ~ 2.1 GeV (beam momentum ~ 1.1 GeV/c). Then it diminished and seemed to disappear completely at √s ~ 2.5 GeV (beam momentum ~ 2.13 GeV/c). A valley in the angular distribution occurred at cos Θ_C.M. ≈ 0.4. The differential cross section then increased as cos Θ_C.M. approached 1.

The average differential cross section for ˉp + p → k⁺ + k^- was about one third of that of the π^±-pair mode throughout the energy range of this experiment. At the lower energies, the angular distribution, unlike that of the π^±-pair mode, was quite isotropic. However, a peak at Θ_C.M. = 90° seemed to develop at √s ~ 2.37 GeV (antiproton beam momentum ~ 1.82 GeV/c). No observable change was seen at that energy in the π^±-pair cross section.

The possible connection of these features with the observed meson resonances at 2.2 GeV and 2.38 GeV, and its implications, were discussed.

On the Mumford-Tate conjecture for Abelian varieties with reduction conditions

In this thesis we study Galois representations corresponding to abelian varieties with certain reduction conditions. We show that these conditions force the image of the representations to be "big," so that the Mumford-Tate conjecture (:= MT) holds. We also prove that the set of abelian varieties satisfying these conditions is dense in a corresponding moduli space.

The main results of the thesis are the following two theorems.

Theorem A: Let A be an absolutely simple abelian variety, End° (A) = k : imaginary quadratic field, g = dim(A). Assume either dim(A) ≤ 4, or A has bad reduction at some prime ϕ, with the dimension of the toric part of the reduction equal to 2r, and gcd(r,g) = 1, and (r,g) ≠ (15,56) or (m -1, m(m+1)/2). Then MT holds.

Theorem B: Let M be the moduli space of abelian varieties with fixed polarization, level structure and a k-action. It is defined over a number field F. The subset of M(Q) corresponding to absolutely simple abelian varieties with a prescribed stable reduction at a large enough prime ϕ of F is dense in M(C) in the complex topology. In particular, the set of simple abelian varieties having bad reductions with fixed dimension of the toric parts is dense.

Besides this we also established the following results:

(1) MT holds for some other classes of abelian varieties with similar reduction conditions. For example, if A is an abelian variety with End° (A) = Q and the dimension of the toric part of its reduction is prime to dim( A), then MT holds.

(2) MT holds for Ribet-type abelian varieties.

(3) The Hodge and the Tate conjectures are equivalent for abelian 4-folds.

(4) MT holds for abelian 4-folds of type II, III, IV (Theorem 5.0(2)) and some 4-folds of type I.

(5) For some abelian varieties either MT or the Hodge conjecture holds.

Cooperative and market-based solutions to pollution abatement problems

This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.