Equilibrium in dynamic economic models

The main theme running through these three chapters is that economic agents are often forced to respond to events that are not a direct result of their actions or other agents actions. The optimal response to these shocks will necessarily depend on agents' understanding of how these shocks arise. The economic environment in the first two chapters is analogous to the classic chain store game. In this setting, the addition of unintended trembles by the agents creates an environment better suited to reputation building. The third chapter considers the competitive equilibrium price dynamics in an overlapping generations environment when there are supply and demand shocks.

The first chapter is a game theoretic investigation of a reputation building game. A sequential equilibrium model, called the "error prone agents" model, is developed. In this model, agents believe that all actions are potentially subjected to an error process. Inclusion of this belief into the equilibrium calculation provides for a richer class of reputation building possibilities than when perfect implementation is assumed.

In the second chapter, maximum likelihood estimation is employed to test the consistency of this new model and other models with data from experiments run by other researchers that served as the basis for prominent papers in this field. The alternate models considered are essentially modifications to the standard sequential equilibrium. While some models perform quite well in that the nature of the modification seems to explain deviations from the sequential equilibrium quite well, the degree to which these modifications must be applied shows no consistency across different experimental designs.

The third chapter is a study of price dynamics in an overlapping generations model. It establishes the existence of a unique perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium price path in a pure exchange economy with a finite time horizon when there are arbitrarily many shocks to supply or demand. One main reason for the interest in this equilibrium is that overlapping generations environments are very fruitful for the study of price dynamics, especially in experimental settings. The perfect foresight assumption is an important place to start when examining these environments because it will produce the ex post socially efficient allocation of goods. This characteristic makes this a natural baseline to which other models of price dynamics could be compared.

Essays on economics networks

This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest.

In Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium.

We point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the “global” structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more “local”. Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets.

As an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions.

Finally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout

This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.

Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.

In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.

Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.

I. The effect of N,N,N',N' -tetramethylethylenediamine on the Schlenk Equilibrium. II. The nature of the Di-Grignard reagent

I. The influence of N,N,N’,N’-tetramethylethylenediamine on the Schlenk equilibrium

The equilibrium between ethylmagnesium bromide, diethylmagnesium, and magnesium bromide has been studied by nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy. The interconversion of the species is very fast on the nmr time scale, and only an averaged spectrum is observed for the ethyl species. When N,N,N’,N’-tetramethylethylenediamine is added to solutions of these reagents in tetrahydrofuran, the rate of interconversion is reduced. At temperatures near -50°, two ethylmagnesium species have been observed. These are attributed to the different ethyl groups in ethylmagnesium bromide and diethylmagnesium, two of the species involved in the Schlenk equilibrium of Grignard reagents.

II. The nature of di-Grignard reagents

Di-Grignard reagents have been examined by nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy in an attempt to prove that dialkylmagnesium reagents are in equilibrium with alkylmagnesium halides. The di-Grignard reagents of compounds such as 1,4-dibromobutane have been investigated. The dialkylmagnesium form of this di-Grignard reagent can exist as an intramolecular cyclic species, tetramethylene-magnesium. This cyclic form would give an nmr spectrum different from that of the classical alkylmagnesium halide di-Grignard reagent. In dimethyl ether-tetrahydrofuran solutions of di-Grignard reagents containing N N,N,N’,N’-Tetramethylethylenediamine, evidence has been found for the existence of an intramolecular dialkylmagnesium species. This species is rapidly equilibrating with other forms, but at low temperatures, the rates of interconversion are reduced. Two species can be seen in the nmr spectrum at -50°. One is the cyclic species; the other is an open form.

Inversion of the carbon at the carbon-magnesium bond in di-Grignard reagents has also been studied. This process is much faster than in corresponding monofunctional Grignard reagents.

I. The structure and properties of closed circular duplex DNA. II. Chemically interacting systems at equilibrium in a buoyant density gradient

I. The binding of the intercalating dye ethidium bromide to closed circular SV 40 DNA causes an unwinding of the duplex structure and a simultaneous and quantitatively equivalent unwinding of the superhelices. The buoyant densities and sedimentation velocities of both intact (I) and singly nicked (II) SV 40 DNAs were measured as a function of free dye concentration. The buoyant density data were used to determine the binding isotherms over a dye concentration range extending from 0 to 600 µg/m1 in 5.8 M CsCl. At high dye concentrations all of the binding sites in II, but not in I, are saturated. At free dye concentrations less than 5.4 µg/ml, I has a greater affinity for dye than II. At a critical amount of dye bound I and II have equal affinities, and at higher dye concentration I has a lower affinity than II. The number of superhelical turns, τ, present in I is calculated at each dye concentration using Fuller and Waring's (1964) estimate of the angle of duplex unwinding per intercalation. The results reveal that SV 40 DNA I contains about -13 superhelical turns in concentrated salt solutions.

The free energy of superhelix formation is calculated as a function of τ from a consideration of the effect of the superhelical turns upon the binding isotherm of ethidium bromide to SV 40 DNA I. The value of the free energy is about 100 kcal/mole DNA in the native molecule. The free energy estimates are used to calculate the pitch and radius of the superhelix as a function of the number of superhelical turns. The pitch and radius of the native I superhelix are 430 Å and 135 Å, respectively.

A buoyant density method for the isolation and detection of closed circular DNA is described. The method is based upon the reduced binding of the intercalating dye, ethidium bromide, by closed circular DNA. In an application of this method it is found that HeLa cells contain in addition to closed circular mitochondrial DNA of mean length 4.81 microns, a heterogeneous group of smaller DNA molecules which vary in size from 0.2 to 3.5 microns and a paucidisperse group of multiples of the mitochondrial length.

II. The general theory is presented for the sedimentation equilibrium of a macromolecule in a concentrated binary solvent in the presence of an additional reacting small molecule. Equations are derived for the calculation of the buoyant density of the complex and for the determination of the binding isotherm of the reagent to the macrospecies. The standard buoyant density, a thermodynamic function, is defined and the density gradients which characterize the four component system are derived. The theory is applied to the specific cases of the binding of ethidium bromide to SV 40 DNA and of the binding of mercury and silver to DNA.