Relating thermodynamics to information theory : the equality of free energy and mutual information

In this thesis we uncover a new relation which links thermodynamics and information theory. We consider time as a channel and the detailed state of a physical system as a message. As the system evolves with time, ever present noise insures that the "message" is corrupted. Thermodynamic free energy measures the approach of the system toward equilibrium. Information theoretical mutual information measures the loss of memory of initial state. We regard the free energy and the mutual information as operators which map probability distributions over state space to real numbers. In the limit of long times, we show how the free energy operator and the mutual information operator asymptotically attain a very simple relationship to one another. This relationship is founded on the common appearance of entropy in the two operators and on an identity between internal energy and conditional entropy. The use of conditional entropy is what distinguishes our approach from previous efforts to relate thermodynamics and information theory.

Essays in mechanism design

This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, ”Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences”, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, ”Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources”, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism — the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism — when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, ”Vessel Buyback”, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.