The Voting Rights Act, Shelby County, and Redistricting: Improving Estimates of Racially Polarized Voting in a Multiple-Election Context

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County has severely limited the power of the Voting Rights Act. I argue that Congressional attempts to pass a new coverage formula are unlikely to gain the necessary Republican support. Instead, I propose a new strategy that takes a “carrot and stick” approach. As the stick, I suggest amending Section 3 to eliminate the need to prove that discrimination was intentional. For the carrot, I envision a competitive grant program similar to the highly successful Race to the Top education grants. I argue that this plan could pass the currently divided Congress.

Without Congressional action, Section 2 is more important than ever before. A successful Section 2 suit requires evidence that voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized. Accurately and objectively assessing the level of polarization has been and continues to be a challenge for experts. Existing ecological inference methods require estimating polarization levels in individual elections. This is a problem because the Courts want to see a history of polarization across elections.

I propose a new 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-election context. The procedure builds upon the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) multinomial-Dirichlet model. After obtaining election-specific estimates, I suggest regressing those results on election-specific variables, namely candidate quality, incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice. This allows researchers to estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test whether the ethnicity of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots.

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

Awakening a sleeping giant: The riddle of Latino political participation

For some time now, the Latino voice has been gradually gaining strength in American politics, particularly in such states as California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas, where large numbers of Latino immigrants have settled and large numbers of electoral votes are at stake. Yet the issues public officials in these states espouse and the laws they enact often do not coincide with the interests and preferences of Latinos. The fact that Latinos in California and elsewhere have not been able to influence the political agenda in a way that is commensurate with their numbers may reflect their failure to participate fully in the political process by first registering to vote and then consistently turning out on election day to cast their ballots.

To understand Latino voting behavior, I first examine Latino political participation in California during the ten general elections of the 1980s and 1990s, seeking to understand what percentage of the eligible Latino population registers to vote, with what political party they register, how many registered Latinos to go the polls on election day, and what factors might increase their participation in politics. To ensure that my findings are not unique to California, I also consider Latino voter registration and turnout in Texas for the five general elections of the 1990s and compare these results with my California findings.

I offer a new approach to studying Latino political participation in which I rely on county-level aggregate data, rather than on individual survey data, and employ the ecological inference method of generalized bounds. I calculate and compare Latino and white voting-age populations, registration rates, turnout rates, and party affiliation rates for California's fifty-eight counties. Then, in a secondary grouped logit analysis, I consider the factors that influence these Latino and white registration, turnout, and party affiliation rates.

I find that California Latinos register and turn out at substantially lower rates than do whites and that these rates are more volatile than those of whites. I find that Latino registration is motivated predominantly by age and education, with older and more educated Latinos being more likely to register. Motor voter legislation, which was passed to ease and simplify the registration process, has not encouraged Latino registration . I find that turnout among California's Latino voters is influenced primarily by issues, income, educational attainment, and the size of the Spanish-speaking communities in which they reside. Although language skills may be an obstacle to political participation for an individual, the number of Spanish-speaking households in a community does not encourage or discourage registration but may encourage turnout, suggesting that cultural and linguistic assimilation may not be the entire answer.

With regard to party identification, I find that Democrats can expect a steady Latino political identification rate between 50 and 60 percent, while Republicans attract 20 to 30 percent of Latino registrants. I find that education and income are the dominant factors in determining Latino political party identification, which appears to be no more volatile than that of the larger electorate.

Next, when I consider registration and turnout in Texas, I find that Latino registration rates are nearly equal to those of whites but that Texas Latino turnout rates are volatile and substantially lower than those of whites.

Low turnout rates among Latinos and the volatility of these rates may explain why Latinos in California and Texas have had little influence on the political agenda even though their numbers are large and increasing. Simply put, the voices of Latinos are little heard in the halls of government because they do not turn out consistently to cast their votes on election day.

While these findings suggest that there may not be any short-term or quick fixes to Latino participation, they also suggest that Latinos should be encouraged to participate more fully in the political process and that additional education may be one means of achieving this goal. Candidates should speak more directly to the issues that concern Latinos. Political parties should view Latinos as crossover voters rather than as potential converts. In other words, if Latinos were "a sleeping giant," they may now be a still-drowsy leviathan waiting to be wooed by either party's persuasive political messages and relevant issues.

Digested sludge: delineation and modeling for ocean disposal

Experimental work was performed to delineate the system of digested sludge particles and associated trace metals and also to measure the interactions of sludge with seawater. Particle-size and particle number distributions were measured with a Coulter Counter. Number counts in excess of 10¹² particles per liter were found in both the City of Los Angeles Hyperion mesophilic digested sludge and the Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts (LACSD) digested primary sludge. More than 90 percent of the particles had diameters less than 10 microns.

Total and dissolved trace metals (Ag, Cd, Cr, Cu, Fe, Mn, Ni, Pb, and Zn) were measured in LACSD sludge. Manganese was the only metal whose dissolved fraction exceeded one percent of the total metal. Sedimentation experiments for several dilutions of LACSD sludge in seawater showed that the sedimentation velocities of the sludge particles decreased as the dilution factor increased. A tenfold increase in dilution shifted the sedimentation velocity distribution by an order of magnitude. Chromium, Cu, Fe, Ni, Pb, and Zn were also followed during sedimentation. To a first approximation these metals behaved like the particles.

Solids and selected trace metals (Cr, Cu, Fe, Ni, Pb, and Zn) were monitored in oxic mixtures of both Hyperion and LACSD sludges for periods of 10 to 28 days. Less than 10 percent of the filterable solids dissolved or were oxidized. Only Ni was mobilized away from the particles. The majority of the mobilization was complete in less than one day.

The experimental data of this work were combined with oceanographic, biological, and geochemical information to propose and model the discharge of digested sludge to the San Pedro and Santa Monica Basins. A hydraulic computer simulation for a round buoyant jet in a density stratified medium showed that discharges of sludge effluent mixture at depths of 730 m would rise no more than 120 m. Initial jet mixing provided dilution estimates of 450 to 2600. Sedimentation analyses indicated that the solids would reach the sediments within 10 km of the point discharge.

Mass balances on the oxidizable chemical constituents in sludge indicated that the nearly anoxic waters of the basins would become wholly anoxic as a result of proposed discharges. From chemical-equilibrium computer modeling of the sludge digester and dilutions of sludge in anoxic seawater, it was predicted that the chemistry of all trace metals except Cr and Mn will be controlled by the precipitation of metal sulfide solids. This metal speciation held for dilutions up to 3000.

The net environmental impacts of this scheme should be salutary. The trace metals in the sludge should be immobilized in the anaerobic bottom sediments of the basins. Apparently no lifeforms higher than bacteria are there to be disrupted. The proposed deep-water discharges would remove the need for potentially expensive and energy-intensive land disposal alternatives and would end the discharge to the highly productive water near the ocean surface.