3 resultados para Destination weddings
em CaltechTHESIS
Resumo:
The signal recognition particle (SRP) and its receptor (SR) are universally conserved protein machineries that deliver nascent peptides to their proper destination. The SRP RNA is a universally conserved and essential component of SRP, which serves as the “catalyst” of the protein targeting cycle. The SRP RNA accelerates SRP-SR complex formation at the beginning of the protein targeting reaction, and triggers GTP hydrolysis and SRP-SR complex disassembly at the end. Here we combined biochemical and biophysical approaches to investigate the molecular mechanism of the functions of the SRP RNA. We found that two functional ends in the SRP RNA mediate distinct functions. The tetraloop end facilitates initial assembly of SRP and SR by mediating an electrostatic interaction with the Lys399 receptor, which ensures efficient and accurate substrate targeting. At the later stage of the SRP cycle, the SRP-SR complex relocalizes ~ 100 Angstrom to the 5’,3’-distal end of the RNA, a conformation crucial for GTPase activation and cargo handover. These results, combined with recent structural work, elucidate the functions of the SRP RNA during the protein targeting reaction.
Resumo:
This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest.
In Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium.
We point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the “global” structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more “local”. Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets.
As an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions.
Finally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.
Resumo:
The signal recognition particle (SRP) targets membrane and secretory proteins to their correct cellular destination with remarkably high fidelity. Previous studies have shown that multiple checkpoints exist within this targeting pathway that allows ‘correct cargo’ to be quickly and efficiently targeted and for ‘incorrect cargo’ to be promptly rejected. In this work, we delved further into understanding the mechanisms of how substrates are selected or discarded by the SRP. First, we discovered the role of the SRP fingerloop and how it activates the SRP and SRP receptor (SR) GTPases to target and unload cargo in response to signal sequence binding. Second, we learned how an ‘avoidance signal’ found in the bacterial autotransporter, EspP, allows this protein to escape the SRP pathway by causing the SRP and SR to form a ‘distorted’ complex that is inefficient in delivering the cargo to the membrane. Lastly, we determined how Trigger Factor, a co-translational chaperone, helps SRP discriminate against ‘incorrect cargo’ at three distinct stages: SRP binding to RNC; targeting of RNC to the membrane via SRP-FtsY assembly; and stronger antagonism of SRP targeting of ribosomes bearing nascent polypeptides that exceed a critical length. Overall, results delineate the rich underlying mechanisms by which SRP recognizes its substrates, which in turn activates the targeting pathway and provides a conceptual foundation to understand how timely and accurate selection of substrates is achieved by this protein targeting machinery.