Distributed optimization in power networks and general multi-agent systems

The dissertation studies the general area of complex networked systems that consist of interconnected and active heterogeneous components and usually operate in uncertain environments and with incomplete information. Problems associated with those systems are typically large-scale and computationally intractable, yet they are also very well-structured and have features that can be exploited by appropriate modeling and computational methods. The goal of this thesis is to develop foundational theories and tools to exploit those structures that can lead to computationally-efficient and distributed solutions, and apply them to improve systems operations and architecture.

Specifically, the thesis focuses on two concrete areas. The first one is to design distributed rules to manage distributed energy resources in the power network. The power network is undergoing a fundamental transformation. The future smart grid, especially on the distribution system, will be a large-scale network of distributed energy resources (DERs), each introducing random and rapid fluctuations in power supply, demand, voltage and frequency. These DERs provide a tremendous opportunity for sustainability, efficiency, and power reliability. However, there are daunting technical challenges in managing these DERs and optimizing their operation. The focus of this dissertation is to develop scalable, distributed, and real-time control and optimization to achieve system-wide efficiency, reliability, and robustness for the future power grid. In particular, we will present how to explore the power network structure to design efficient and distributed market and algorithms for the energy management. We will also show how to connect the algorithms with physical dynamics and existing control mechanisms for real-time control in power networks.

The second focus is to develop distributed optimization rules for general multi-agent engineering systems. A central goal in multiagent systems is to design local control laws for the individual agents to ensure that the emergent global behavior is desirable with respect to the given system level objective. Ideally, a system designer seeks to satisfy this goal while conditioning each agent’s control on the least amount of information possible. Our work focused on achieving this goal using the framework of game theory. In particular, we derived a systematic methodology for designing local agent objective functions that guarantees (i) an equivalence between the resulting game-theoretic equilibria and the system level design objective and (ii) that the resulting game possesses an inherent structure that can be exploited for distributed learning, e.g., potential games. The control design can then be completed by applying any distributed learning algorithm that guarantees convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium. One main advantage of this game theoretic approach is that it provides a hierarchical decomposition between the decomposition of the systemic objective (game design) and the specific local decision rules (distributed learning algorithms). This decomposition provides the system designer with tremendous flexibility to meet the design objectives and constraints inherent in a broad class of multiagent systems. Furthermore, in many settings the resulting controllers will be inherently robust to a host of uncertainties including asynchronous clock rates, delays in information, and component failures.

Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games

In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.

Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.

We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.

We also provide an alternative characterization—all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose—they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.

Optimal design of building structures using genetic algorithms

A general framework for multi-criteria optimal design is presented which is well-suited for automated design of structural systems. A systematic computer-aided optimal design decision process is developed which allows the designer to rapidly evaluate and improve a proposed design by taking into account the major factors of interest related to different aspects such as design, construction, and operation.

The proposed optimal design process requires the selection of the most promising choice of design parameters taken from a large design space, based on an evaluation using specified criteria. The design parameters specify a particular design, and so they relate to member sizes, structural configuration, etc. The evaluation of the design uses performance parameters which may include structural response parameters, risks due to uncertain loads and modeling errors, construction and operating costs, etc. Preference functions are used to implement the design criteria in a "soft" form. These preference functions give a measure of the degree of satisfaction of each design criterion. The overall evaluation measure for a design is built up from the individual measures for each criterion through a preference combination rule. The goal of the optimal design process is to obtain a design that has the highest overall evaluation measure - an optimization problem.

Genetic algorithms are stochastic optimization methods that are based on evolutionary theory. They provide the exploration power necessary to explore high-dimensional search spaces to seek these optimal solutions. Two special genetic algorithms, hGA and vGA, are presented here for continuous and discrete optimization problems, respectively.

The methodology is demonstrated with several examples involving the design of truss and frame systems. These examples are solved by using the proposed hGA and vGA.

Structural Design under Seismic Risk Using Multiple Performance Objectives

Structural design is a decision-making process in which a wide spectrum of requirements, expectations, and concerns needs to be properly addressed. Engineering design criteria are considered together with societal and client preferences, and most of these design objectives are affected by the uncertainties surrounding a design. Therefore, realistic design frameworks must be able to handle multiple performance objectives and incorporate uncertainties from numerous sources into the process.

In this study, a multi-criteria based design framework for structural design under seismic risk is explored. The emphasis is on reliability-based performance objectives and their interaction with economic objectives. The framework has analysis, evaluation, and revision stages. In the probabilistic response analysis, seismic loading uncertainties as well as modeling uncertainties are incorporated. For evaluation, two approaches are suggested: one based on preference aggregation and the other based on socio-economics. Both implementations of the general framework are illustrated with simple but informative design examples to explore the basic features of the framework.

The first approach uses concepts similar to those found in multi-criteria decision theory, and directly combines reliability-based objectives with others. This approach is implemented in a single-stage design procedure. In the socio-economics based approach, a two-stage design procedure is recommended in which societal preferences are treated through reliability-based engineering performance measures, but emphasis is also given to economic objectives because these are especially important to the structural designer's client. A rational net asset value formulation including losses from uncertain future earthquakes is used to assess the economic performance of a design. A recently developed assembly-based vulnerability analysis is incorporated into the loss estimation.

The presented performance-based design framework allows investigation of various design issues and their impact on a structural design. It is a flexible one that readily allows incorporation of new methods and concepts in seismic hazard specification, structural analysis, and loss estimation.