Characterization of the neural mechanisms supporting the implementation of cognitive control in human decision making

Humans are particularly adept at modifying their behavior in accordance with changing environmental demands. Through various mechanisms of cognitive control, individuals are able to tailor actions to fit complex short- and long-term goals. The research described in this thesis uses functional magnetic resonance imaging to characterize the neural correlates of cognitive control at two levels of complexity: response inhibition and self-control in intertemporal choice. First, we examined changes in neural response associated with increased experience and skill in response inhibition; successful response inhibition was associated with decreased neural response over time in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, a region widely implicated in cognitive control, providing evidence for increased neural efficiency with learned automaticity. We also examined a more abstract form of cognitive control using intertemporal choice. In two experiments, we identified putative neural substrates for individual differences in temporal discounting, or the tendency to prefer immediate to delayed rewards. Using dynamic causal models, we characterized the neural circuit between ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area involved in valuation, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a region implicated in self-control in intertemporal and dietary choice, and found that connectivity from dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to ventromedial prefrontal cortex increases at the time of choice, particularly when delayed rewards are chosen. Moreover, estimates of the strength of connectivity predicted out-of-sample individual rates of temporal discounting, suggesting a neurocomputational mechanism for variation in the ability to delay gratification. Next, we interrogated the hypothesis that individual differences in temporal discounting are in part explained by the ability to imagine future reward outcomes. Using a novel paradigm, we imaged neural response during the imagining of primary rewards, and identified negative correlations between activity in regions associated the processing of both real and imagined rewards (lateral orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, respectively) and the individual temporal discounting parameters estimated in the previous experiment. These data suggest that individuals who are better able to represent reward outcomes neurally are less susceptible to temporal discounting. Together, these findings provide further insight into role of the prefrontal cortex in implementing cognitive control, and propose neurobiological substrates for individual variation.

Neural and computational representations of decision variables

These studies explore how, where, and when representations of variables critical to decision-making are represented in the brain. In order to produce a decision, humans must first determine the relevant stimuli, actions, and possible outcomes before applying an algorithm that will select an action from those available. When choosing amongst alternative stimuli, the framework of value-based decision-making proposes that values are assigned to the stimuli and that these values are then compared in an abstract “value space” in order to produce a decision. Despite much progress, in particular regarding the pinpointing of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) as a region that encodes the value, many basic questions remain. In Chapter 2, I show that distributed BOLD signaling in vmPFC represents the value of stimuli under consideration in a manner that is independent of the type of stimulus it is. Thus the open question of whether value is represented in abstraction, a key tenet of value-based decision-making, is confirmed. However, I also show that stimulus-dependent value representations are also present in the brain during decision-making and suggest a potential neural pathway for stimulus-to-value transformations that integrates these two results.

More broadly speaking, there is both neural and behavioral evidence that two distinct control systems are at work during action selection. These two systems compose the “goal-directed system”, which selects actions based on an internal model of the environment, and the “habitual” system, which generates responses based on antecedent stimuli only. Computational characterizations of these two systems imply that they have different informational requirements in terms of input stimuli, actions, and possible outcomes. Associative learning theory predicts that the habitual system should utilize stimulus and action information only, while goal-directed behavior requires that outcomes as well as stimuli and actions be processed. In Chapter 3, I test whether areas of the brain hypothesized to be involved in habitual versus goal-directed control represent the corresponding theorized variables.

The question of whether one or both of these neural systems drives Pavlovian conditioning is less well-studied. Chapter 4 describes an experiment in which subjects were scanned while engaged in a Pavlovian task with a simple non-trivial structure. After comparing a variety of model-based and model-free learning algorithms (thought to underpin goal-directed and habitual decision-making, respectively), it was found that subjects’ reaction times were better explained by a model-based system. In addition, neural signaling of precision, a variable based on a representation of a world model, was found in the amygdala. These data indicate that the influence of model-based representations of the environment can extend even to the most basic learning processes.

Knowledge of the state of hidden variables in an environment is required for optimal inference regarding the abstract decision structure of a given environment and therefore can be crucial to decision-making in a wide range of situations. Inferring the state of an abstract variable requires the generation and manipulation of an internal representation of beliefs over the values of the hidden variable. In Chapter 5, I describe behavioral and neural results regarding the learning strategies employed by human subjects in a hierarchical state-estimation task. In particular, a comprehensive model fit and comparison process pointed to the use of "belief thresholding". This implies that subjects tended to eliminate low-probability hypotheses regarding the state of the environment from their internal model and ceased to update the corresponding variables. Thus, in concert with incremental Bayesian learning, humans explicitly manipulate their internal model of the generative process during hierarchical inference consistent with a serial hypothesis testing strategy.