The political econmoy of state government debt : an analysis of constitutional limitations (1961-1990)

Over the past decade, scholarly interest concerning the use of limitations to constrain government spending and taxing has noticeably increased. The call for constitutional restrictions can be credited, in part, to Washington's apparent inability to legislate any significant reductions in government expenditures or in the size of the national debt. At the present time, the federal government is far from instituting any constitutional limitations on spending or borrowing; however, the states have incorporated many controls on revenues and expenditures, the oldest being strictures on full faith and credit borrowing. This dissertations examines the efficacy of these restrictions on borrowing across the states (excluding Alaska) for the period dating from 1961 to 1990 and also studies the limitations on taxing and spending synonymous with the Tax Revolt.

We include socio-economic information in our calculations to control for factors other than the institutional variables that affect state borrowing levels. Our results show that certain constitutional restrictions (in particular, the referendum requirement and the dollar debt limit) are more effective than others. The apparent ineffectiveness of other limitations, such as the flexible debt limit, seem related to the bindingness of the limitations in at least half of the cases. Other variables, such as crime rates, number of schoolage children, and state personal income do affect the levels of full faith and credit debt, but not as strongly as the limitations. While some degree of circumvention can be detected (the amount of full faith and credit debt does inversely affect the levels of nonguaranteed debt), it is so small when compared to the effectiveness of the constitutional restrictions that it is almost negligible. The examination of the tax revolt era limitations yielded quite similar conclusions, with the additional fact that constitutional restrictions appear more binding than statutory ones. Our research demonstrates that constitutional limitations on borrowing can be applied effectively to constrain excessive borrowing, but caution must be used. The efficacy of these restrictions decrease dramatically as the number of loopholes increase.

Cooperative and market-based solutions to pollution abatement problems

This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.