An examination of strategic opportunities provided by the conference committee procedure in the U.S. Congress

Deference to committees in Congress has been a much studied phenomena for close to 100 years. This deference can be characterized as the unwillingness of a potentially winning coalition on the House floor to impose its will on a small minority, a standing committee. The congressional scholar is then faced with two problems: observing such deference to committees, and explaining it. Shepsle and Weingast have proposed the existence of an ex-post veto for standing committees as an explanation of committee deference. They claim that as conference reports in the House and Senate are considered under a rule that does not allow amendments, the conferees enjoy agenda-setting power. In this paper I describe a test of such a hypothesis (along with competing hypotheses regarding the effects of the conference procedure). A random-utility model is utilized to estimate legislators' ideal points on appropriations bills from 1973 through 1980. I prove two things: 1) that committee deference can not be said to be a result of the conference procedure; and moreover 2) that committee deference does not appear to exist at all.

A geometric analysis of convex demixing

Demixing is the task of identifying multiple signals given only their sum and prior information about their structures. Examples of demixing problems include (i) separating a signal that is sparse with respect to one basis from a signal that is sparse with respect to a second basis; (ii) decomposing an observed matrix into low-rank and sparse components; and (iii) identifying a binary codeword with impulsive corruptions. This thesis describes and analyzes a convex optimization framework for solving an array of demixing problems.

Our framework includes a random orientation model for the constituent signals that ensures the structures are incoherent. This work introduces a summary parameter, the statistical dimension, that reflects the intrinsic complexity of a signal. The main result indicates that the difficulty of demixing under this random model depends only on the total complexity of the constituent signals involved: demixing succeeds with high probability when the sum of the complexities is less than the ambient dimension; otherwise, it fails with high probability.

The fact that a phase transition between success and failure occurs in demixing is a consequence of a new inequality in conic integral geometry. Roughly speaking, this inequality asserts that a convex cone behaves like a subspace whose dimension is equal to the statistical dimension of the cone. When combined with a geometric optimality condition for demixing, this inequality provides precise quantitative information about the phase transition, including the location and width of the transition region.