Ghosts of order on the frontier of chaos

What kinds of motion can occur in classical mechanics? We address this question by looking at the structures traced out by trajectories in phase space; the most orderly, completely integrable systems are characterized by phase trajectories confined to low-dimensional, invariant tori. The KAM theory examines what happens to the tori when an integrable system is subjected to a small perturbation and finds that, for small enough perturbations, most of them survive.

The KAM theory is mute about the disrupted tori, but, for two-dimensional systems, Aubry and Mather discovered an astonishing picture: the broken tori are replaced by "cantori," tattered, Cantor-set remnants of the original invariant curves. We seek to extend Aubry and Mather's picture to higher dimensional systems and report two kinds of studies; both concern perturbations of a completely integrable, four-dimensional symplectic map. In the first study we compute some numerical approximations to Birkhoff periodic orbits; sequences of such orbits should approximate any higher dimensional analogs of the cantori. In the second study we prove converse KAM theorems; that is, we use a combination of analytic arguments and rigorous, machine-assisted computations to find perturbations so large that no KAM tori survive. We are able to show that the last few of our Birkhoff orbits exist in a regime where there are no tori.

Extractive institutions in colonial Africa

A common explanation for African current underdevelopment is the extractive character of institutions established during the colonial period. Yet, since colonial extraction is hard to quantify and its exact mechanisms are not well understood, we still do not know precisely how colonial institutions affect economic growth today. In this project, I study this issue by focusing on the peculiar structure of trade and labor policies employed by the French colonizers.

First, I analyze how trade monopsonies and coercive labor institutions reduced African gains from trade during the colonial period. By using new data on prices to agricultural producers and labor institutions in French Africa, I show that (1) the monopsonistic character of colonial trade implied a reduction in prices to producers far below world market prices; (2) coercive labor institutions allowed the colonizers to reduce prices even further; (3) as a consequence, colonial extraction cut African gains from trade by over 60%.

Given the importance of labor institutions, I then focus on their origin by analyzing the colonial governments' incentives to choose between coerced and free labor. I argue that the choice of institutions was affected more by the properties of exported commodities, such as prices and economies of scale, than by the characteristics of colonies, such indigenous population density and ease of settlement for the colonizers.

Finally, I study the long-term effects of colonial trade monopsonies and coercive labor institutions. By combining archival data on prices in the French colonies with maps of crop suitability, I show that the extent to which prices to agricultural producers were reduced with respect to world market prices is strongly negatively correlated with current regional development, as proxied by luminosity data from satellite images. The evidence suggests that colonial extraction affected subsequent growth by reducing development in rural areas in favor of a urban elite. The differential impact in rural and urban areas can be the reason why trade monopsonies and extractive institutions persisted long after independence.