Characterization of the neural mechanisms supporting the implementation of cognitive control in human decision making

Humans are particularly adept at modifying their behavior in accordance with changing environmental demands. Through various mechanisms of cognitive control, individuals are able to tailor actions to fit complex short- and long-term goals. The research described in this thesis uses functional magnetic resonance imaging to characterize the neural correlates of cognitive control at two levels of complexity: response inhibition and self-control in intertemporal choice. First, we examined changes in neural response associated with increased experience and skill in response inhibition; successful response inhibition was associated with decreased neural response over time in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, a region widely implicated in cognitive control, providing evidence for increased neural efficiency with learned automaticity. We also examined a more abstract form of cognitive control using intertemporal choice. In two experiments, we identified putative neural substrates for individual differences in temporal discounting, or the tendency to prefer immediate to delayed rewards. Using dynamic causal models, we characterized the neural circuit between ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area involved in valuation, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a region implicated in self-control in intertemporal and dietary choice, and found that connectivity from dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to ventromedial prefrontal cortex increases at the time of choice, particularly when delayed rewards are chosen. Moreover, estimates of the strength of connectivity predicted out-of-sample individual rates of temporal discounting, suggesting a neurocomputational mechanism for variation in the ability to delay gratification. Next, we interrogated the hypothesis that individual differences in temporal discounting are in part explained by the ability to imagine future reward outcomes. Using a novel paradigm, we imaged neural response during the imagining of primary rewards, and identified negative correlations between activity in regions associated the processing of both real and imagined rewards (lateral orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, respectively) and the individual temporal discounting parameters estimated in the previous experiment. These data suggest that individuals who are better able to represent reward outcomes neurally are less susceptible to temporal discounting. Together, these findings provide further insight into role of the prefrontal cortex in implementing cognitive control, and propose neurobiological substrates for individual variation.

Essays in Behavioral Decision Theory

This thesis studies decision making under uncertainty and how economic agents respond to information. The classic model of subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating is often at odds with empirical and experimental results; people exhibit systematic biases in information processing and often exhibit aversion to ambiguity. The aim of this work is to develop simple models that capture observed biases and study their economic implications.

In the first chapter I present an axiomatic model of cognitive dissonance, in which an agent's response to information explicitly depends upon past actions. I introduce novel behavioral axioms and derive a representation in which beliefs are directionally updated. The agent twists the information and overweights states in which his past actions provide a higher payoff. I then characterize two special cases of the representation. In the first case, the agent distorts the likelihood ratio of two states by a function of the utility values of the previous action in those states. In the second case, the agent's posterior beliefs are a convex combination of the Bayesian belief and the one which maximizes the conditional value of the previous action. Within the second case a unique parameter captures the agent's sensitivity to dissonance, and I characterize a way to compare sensitivity to dissonance between individuals. Lastly, I develop several simple applications and show that cognitive dissonance contributes to the equity premium and price volatility, asymmetric reaction to news, and belief polarization.

The second chapter characterizes a decision maker with sticky beliefs. That is, a decision maker who does not update enough in response to information, where enough means as a Bayesian decision maker would. This chapter provides axiomatic foundations for sticky beliefs by weakening the standard axioms of dynamic consistency and consequentialism. I derive a representation in which updated beliefs are a convex combination of the prior and the Bayesian posterior. A unique parameter captures the weight on the prior and is interpreted as the agent's measure of belief stickiness or conservatism bias. This parameter is endogenously identified from preferences and is easily elicited from experimental data.

The third chapter deals with updating in the face of ambiguity, using the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler. There is no consensus on the correct way way to update a set of priors. Current methods either do not allow a decision maker to make an inference about her priors or require an extreme level of inference. In this chapter I propose and axiomatize a general model of updating a set of priors. A decision maker who updates her beliefs in accordance with the model can be thought of as one that chooses a threshold that is used to determine whether a prior is plausible, given some observation. She retains the plausible priors and applies Bayes' rule. This model includes generalized Bayesian updating and maximum likelihood updating as special cases.