On the Mumford-Tate conjecture for Abelian varieties with reduction conditions

In this thesis we study Galois representations corresponding to abelian varieties with certain reduction conditions. We show that these conditions force the image of the representations to be "big," so that the Mumford-Tate conjecture (:= MT) holds. We also prove that the set of abelian varieties satisfying these conditions is dense in a corresponding moduli space.

The main results of the thesis are the following two theorems.

Theorem A: Let A be an absolutely simple abelian variety, End° (A) = k : imaginary quadratic field, g = dim(A). Assume either dim(A) ≤ 4, or A has bad reduction at some prime ϕ, with the dimension of the toric part of the reduction equal to 2r, and gcd(r,g) = 1, and (r,g) ≠ (15,56) or (m -1, m(m+1)/2). Then MT holds.

Theorem B: Let M be the moduli space of abelian varieties with fixed polarization, level structure and a k-action. It is defined over a number field F. The subset of M(Q) corresponding to absolutely simple abelian varieties with a prescribed stable reduction at a large enough prime ϕ of F is dense in M(C) in the complex topology. In particular, the set of simple abelian varieties having bad reductions with fixed dimension of the toric parts is dense.

Besides this we also established the following results:

(1) MT holds for some other classes of abelian varieties with similar reduction conditions. For example, if A is an abelian variety with End° (A) = Q and the dimension of the toric part of its reduction is prime to dim( A), then MT holds.

(2) MT holds for Ribet-type abelian varieties.

(3) The Hodge and the Tate conjectures are equivalent for abelian 4-folds.

(4) MT holds for abelian 4-folds of type II, III, IV (Theorem 5.0(2)) and some 4-folds of type I.

(5) For some abelian varieties either MT or the Hodge conjecture holds.

Cooperative and market-based solutions to pollution abatement problems

This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.