Descriptive set theory and the ergodic theory of countable groups

The primary focus of this thesis is on the interplay of descriptive set theory and the ergodic theory of group actions. This incorporates the study of turbulence and Borel reducibility on the one hand, and the theory of orbit equivalence and weak equivalence on the other. Chapter 2 is joint work with Clinton Conley and Alexander Kechris; we study measurable graph combinatorial invariants of group actions and employ the ultraproduct construction as a way of constructing various measure preserving actions with desirable properties. Chapter 3 is joint work with Lewis Bowen; we study the property MD of residually finite groups, and we prove a conjecture of Kechris by showing that under general hypotheses property MD is inherited by a group from one of its co-amenable subgroups. Chapter 4 is a study of weak equivalence. One of the main results answers a question of Abért and Elek by showing that within any free weak equivalence class the isomorphism relation does not admit classification by countable structures. The proof relies on affirming a conjecture of Ioana by showing that the product of a free action with a Bernoulli shift is weakly equivalent to the original action. Chapter 5 studies the relationship between mixing and freeness properties of measure preserving actions. Chapter 6 studies how approximation properties of ergodic actions and unitary representations are reflected group theoretically and also operator algebraically via a group's reduced C^*-algebra. Chapter 7 is an appendix which includes various results on mixing via filters and on Gaussian actions.

Yang-Mills theory in six-dimensional superspace

The superspace approach provides a manifestly supersymmetric formulation of supersymmetric theories. For N= 1 supersymmetry one can use either constrained or unconstrained superfields for such a formulation. Only the unconstrained formulation is suitable for quantum calculations. Until now, all interacting N>1 theories have been written using constrained superfields. No solutions of the nonlinear constraint equations were known.

In this work, we first review the superspace approach and its relation to conventional component methods. The difference between constrained and unconstrained formulations is explained, and the origin of the nonlinear constraints in supersymmetric gauge theories is discussed. It is then shown that these nonlinear constraint equations can be solved by transforming them into linear equations. The method is shown to work for N=1 Yang-Mills theory in four dimensions.

N=2 Yang-Mills theory is formulated in constrained form in six-dimensional superspace, which can be dimensionally reduced to four-dimensional N=2 extended superspace. We construct a superfield calculus for six-dimensional superspace, and show that known matter multiplets can be described very simply. Our method for solving constraints is then applied to the constrained N=2 Yang-Mills theory, and we obtain an explicit solution in terms of an unconstrained superfield. The solution of the constraints can easily be expanded in powers of the unconstrained superfield, and a similar expansion of the action is also given. A background-field expansion is provided for any gauge theory in which the constraints can be solved by our methods. Some implications of this for superspace gauge theories are briefly discussed.

Essays in Behavioral Decision Theory

This thesis studies decision making under uncertainty and how economic agents respond to information. The classic model of subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating is often at odds with empirical and experimental results; people exhibit systematic biases in information processing and often exhibit aversion to ambiguity. The aim of this work is to develop simple models that capture observed biases and study their economic implications.

In the first chapter I present an axiomatic model of cognitive dissonance, in which an agent's response to information explicitly depends upon past actions. I introduce novel behavioral axioms and derive a representation in which beliefs are directionally updated. The agent twists the information and overweights states in which his past actions provide a higher payoff. I then characterize two special cases of the representation. In the first case, the agent distorts the likelihood ratio of two states by a function of the utility values of the previous action in those states. In the second case, the agent's posterior beliefs are a convex combination of the Bayesian belief and the one which maximizes the conditional value of the previous action. Within the second case a unique parameter captures the agent's sensitivity to dissonance, and I characterize a way to compare sensitivity to dissonance between individuals. Lastly, I develop several simple applications and show that cognitive dissonance contributes to the equity premium and price volatility, asymmetric reaction to news, and belief polarization.

The second chapter characterizes a decision maker with sticky beliefs. That is, a decision maker who does not update enough in response to information, where enough means as a Bayesian decision maker would. This chapter provides axiomatic foundations for sticky beliefs by weakening the standard axioms of dynamic consistency and consequentialism. I derive a representation in which updated beliefs are a convex combination of the prior and the Bayesian posterior. A unique parameter captures the weight on the prior and is interpreted as the agent's measure of belief stickiness or conservatism bias. This parameter is endogenously identified from preferences and is easily elicited from experimental data.

The third chapter deals with updating in the face of ambiguity, using the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler. There is no consensus on the correct way way to update a set of priors. Current methods either do not allow a decision maker to make an inference about her priors or require an extreme level of inference. In this chapter I propose and axiomatize a general model of updating a set of priors. A decision maker who updates her beliefs in accordance with the model can be thought of as one that chooses a threshold that is used to determine whether a prior is plausible, given some observation. She retains the plausible priors and applies Bayes' rule. This model includes generalized Bayesian updating and maximum likelihood updating as special cases.