An Assessment of the Degree of Implementation of the Lean Aerospace Initiative Principles and Practices within the US Aerospace and Defense Industry

This report is a formal documentation of the results of an assessment of the degree to which Lean Principles and Practices have been implemented in the US Aerospace and Defense Industry. An Industry Association team prepared it for the DCMA-DCAAIndustry Association “Crosstalk” Coalition in response to a “Crosstalk” meeting action request to the industry associations. The motivation of this request was provided by the many potential benefits to system product quality, affordability and industry responsiveness, which a high degree of industry Lean implementation can produce.

Benefits of Implementing Lean Practices and the Impact of the Lean Aerospace Initiative in the Defense Aerospace Industry and Government Agencies

In the 1980’s, many United States industrial organizations started developing new production processes to improve quality, reduce cost, and better respond to customer needs and the pressures of global competition. This new paradigm was coined Lean Production (or simply “Lean”) in the book The Machine That Changed The World published in 1990 by researchers from MIT’s International Motor Vehicle Program. In 1993, a consortium of US defense aerospace firms and the USAF Aeronautical Systems Center, together with the AFRL Materials and Manufacturing Directorate, started the Lean Aircraft Initiative (LAI) at MIT. With expansion in 1998 to include government space products, the program was renamed the Lean Aerospace Initiative. LAI’s vision is to “Significantly reduce the cost and cycle time for military aerospace products throughout the entire value chain while continuing to improve product performance.” By late 1998, 23 industry and 13 government organizations with paying memberships, along with MIT and the UAW were participating in the LAI.

Whither Japan's Economy?

The Japanese economy entered a long recession in spring 1997. Its economic growth has been much lower than in the US and the EU despite large fiscal stimulus packages, a monetary policy which has brought interest rates to zero since 1999, injections of public money to recapitalize banks, and programs of liberalization and deregulation. How could all these policies have failed to bring the Japanese economy back on a sustainable growth path? This paper argues that the failure of Japan's efforts to restore a sound economic environment is the result of having deliberately chosen inappropriate and inadequate monetary and fiscal instruments to tackle the macroeconomic and structural problems that have burdened the Japanese economy since the burst of the financial bubble at the beginning of the 90s. These choices were deliberate, since the "right" policies (in primis the resolution of the banking crisis) presented unbearable political costs, not only for the ruling parties, but also for the bureaucratic and business elites. The misfortunes of the Japanese economy during the long recession not only allow us to draw important economic policy lessons, but also stimulate reflections on the disruptive role on economic policies caused by powerful vested interests when an economy needs broad and deep structural changes. The final part of the paper focuses on ways to tackle Japan's banking crisis. In particular, it explores the Scandinavian solution, which, mutatis mutandis, might serve Japanese policy-makers well.

Personnel Practices in Japanese Government

This paper examines key aspects of Japanese Government personnel practices, and draws comparisons with the practices in the U.S. civil service and, as appropriate, with other U.S. models. Particular reference is made to the practices of two major agencies in Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). As appropriate, selected government businesses practices other than personnel practices are noted.