The decline of ameriquest : a case study

In the subprime lending market, Ameriquest Mortgage Company is one of the leading lenders. It is widely known for its advertising slogan of “proud sponsor of the American dream.” Yet in 2006, an investigation into unlawful mortgage lending practices and the subsequent $325 million multi-State settlement brought even more attention to this company. What caused this lawsuit which brought irreparable damage to its reputation and financial loss for Ameriquest? This study focuses on the Information System Security management of the company. The study first introduces Ameriquest, and then briefly describes the lawsuit and settlement, and then discusses the IS security control in Ameriquest. The discussion will cover the internal control, external control, and technical controls of the company.

Household portfolio allocation, risk attitudes and credit constraints : evidence from the eurozone

Mestrado em Economia Monetária e Financeira

"Policy externalisation" inherent failure : international financial institutions' conditionality in developing countries

Conditionalities – i.e. ‘exchanging finance for policy reform’ in an asymmetrical relationship between the ‘donor’ and the ‘recipient’ – are central mechanisms of the reform programmes of international financial institutions (IFIs). As they are imposed by outside entities, they can also be viewed as ‘policy externalisation’, which is paradoxically a massive intrusion in the shaping of a country’s domestic policies. The resilience of such devices is remarkable, however. Indeed, in the early 1980s, many developing countries were facing balance of payments difficulties and called upon these international financial institutions for financial relief. In exchange for this relief, they devised economic reforms (fiscal, financial, monetary), which were the conditions for their lending. These reforms were not associated with better economic performance, and this led the IFIs to devise in the 1990s different reforms, which this time targeted the functioning of the government and its ‘governance’, economic problems being explained by governments’ characteristics (e.g., rent-seekers). The paper demonstrates the limitations of the device of conditionality, which is a crucial theoretical and policy issue given its stability across time and countries. These limitations stem from: i) the concept of conditionality per se - the mechanism of exchanging finance for reform; ii) the contents of the prescribed reforms given developing countries economic structure (typically commodity-based export structures) and the weakness of the concept of ‘governance’ in view of these countries’ political economies; and iii) the intrinsic linkages between economic and political conditionalities, whose limitations thus retroact on each other, in particular regarding effectiveness and credibility.