Argumentos duales: el principio de dualidad como una estructura argumentativa
| Contribuinte(s) |
Cardona, Carlos Alberto |
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| Data(s) |
25/05/2016
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| Resumo |
El objetivo de la tesis es identificar una familia de argumentos que comparten una estructura con el principio de dualidad de la geometría proyectiva. Esta familia la denomino "argumentos duales". Para lograr este objetivo, tomo cuatro argumentos importantes de la filosofía analítica e identifico en ellos la estructura que comparten. Los cuatro argumentos son: (i) el acertijo de la inducción de Goodman; (ii) la indeterminación de la referencia Putnam; (iii) la indeterminación de la traducción de Quine; (iv) la paradoja del seguimiento de reglas de Wittgenstein. The main purpose is to identify a family of arguments that share a structure that resembles to the principle of duality of projective geometry. I call this family "dual arguments". To accomplish this goal, I take four important arguments in analytic philosophy and I identify the structure that they share. These arguments are: (i) the new riddle of induction from Goodman; (ii) the indeterminacy of reference from Putnam; (iii) the indeterminacy of translation from Quine; (iii) the rule-following paradox from Wittgenstein. |
| Formato |
application/pdf |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
spa |
| Publicador |
Escuela de Ciencias Humanas |
| Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Fonte |
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Barcelona: Crítica Quine, W. O (1998). “Naturalism” (pp. 15-26); “Semantic Agreement” (pp. 69-84). From Stimulus to Science. Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press Russell, Bertrand (1959). “Hume” (pp. 659-674). A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster. Shoemaker, Sindney (1975). “On projecting the unprojectible”. The Philosophical Review. Vol. 84, No. 2, pp. 178-219. Van Fraassen, Bas C. (1997) “Putnam’s Paradox: Metaphysical Realism Revamped and Evaded”. En Noûs. Vol. 31, pp. 17-42. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953/2003). Investigaciones Filosóficas. México D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. |
| Palavras-Chave | #Filosofía #Razonamiento -- Aspectos filosóficos #Argumentación -- Aspectos filosóficos #100 #Principle of duality #Putnam's indeterminacy of reference #Quine's indeterminacy of translation #Goodman's new riddle of induction #Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |
