The impact of price expectations on consumer's behavior in frequently purchased goods markets: empirical evidence and implications

Este trabalho investiga como os padrões de compras de consumidores de bens estocáveis são afetados por suas expectativas de preços. Usando um modelo dinâmico padrão de maximização da utilidade, deriva-se uma expressão analítica para as compras dos consumidores como uma função das suas expectativas em relação aos preços futuros. Em seguida, uma versão mais tratável do modelo é construída, de forma a ilustrar graficamente como os diferentes tipos de expectativas de preços implicam diferentes padrões de compras dos consumidores. Além disso, na aplicação empírica, investigo qual o modelo de expectativas de preços, entre aqueles comumente utilizados na literatura, é consistente com os dados. Por fim, encontra-se suficiente heterogeneidade em expectativa de preços dos consumidores. Mostra-se que famílias de pequeno porte acreditam que os preços seguem um processo de Markov de primeira ordem, enquanto famílias de alta renda são racionais.

Experts vs. Discounters: Consumer Free Riding and Experts Withholding Advice in Markets for Credence Goods

This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable, and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis. The unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures. This makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters; we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free-riding on experts' advice; and we discuss policy options to solve the free-riding consumers–cheating experts problem.

The economics of credence goods: An experimental investigation of the role of verifiability, liability, competition and reputation in credence goods markets

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated.

Damaged goods: riskiness and LGBT young peoples’ interactions with police

For some time now, research has suggested lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) young people are ‘at-risk’ of victimisation and legally ‘risky’. Relatively few studies have examined how ‘risk factor’ research influences the everyday lives of LGBT young people. This paper reports how the experiences of police by 35 LGBT young people in Brisbane, Queensland reflected discourses about LGBT riskiness and how danger informed their interactions with police in public spaces. The participants specifically note how looking at-risk or looking risky affected their experiences of policing. The paper will conclude with recommendations for improved future policing practice.

Luxury fashion: The role of innovation as a key contributing factor in the development of luxury fashion goods and sustainable fashion design

Luxury is a quality that is difficult to define as the historical concept of luxury appears to be both dynamic and culturally specific. The everyday definition explains a ‘luxury’ in relation to a necessity: a luxury (product or service) is defined as something that consumers want rather than need. However, the growth of global markets has seen a boom in what are now referred to as ‘luxury brands’. This branding of products as luxury has resulted in a change in the way consumers understand luxury goods and services. In their attempts to characterize a luxury brand, Fionda & Moore in their article “The anatomy of a Luxury Brand” summarize a range of critical conditions that are in addition to product branding “... including product and design attributes of quality, craftsmanship and innovative, creative and unique products” (Fionda & Moore, 2009). For the purposes of discussing fashion design however, quality and craftsmanship are inseparable while creativity and innovation exist under different conditions. The terms ‘creative’ and ‘innovative’ are often used inter-changeably and are connected with most descriptions of the design process, defining ‘design’ and ‘fashion’ in many cases. Christian Marxt and Fredrik Hacklin identify this condition in their paper “Design, product development, innovation: all the same in the end?”(Marxt & Hacklin, 2005) and suggest that design communities should be aware that the distinction between these terms, whilst once quite definitive, is becoming narrow to a point where they will mean the same thing. In relation to theory building in the discipline this could pose significant problems. Brett Richards (2003) identifies innovation as different from creativity in that innovation aims to transform and implement rather than simply explore and invent. Considering this distinction, in particular relation to luxury branding, may affect the way in which design can contribute to a change in the way luxury fashion goods might be perceived in a polarised fashion market, namely suggesting that ‘luxury’ is what consumers need rather than the ‘pile it high, sell it cheap’ fashion that the current market dynamic would indicate they want. This paper attempts to explore the role of innovation as a key contributing factor in luxury concepts, in particular the relationship between innovation and creativity, the conditions which enable innovation, the role of craftsmanship in innovation and design innovation in relation to luxury fashion products. An argument is presented that technological innovation can be demonstrated as a common factor in the development of luxury fashion product and that the connection between designer and maker will play an important role in the development of luxury fashion goods for a sustainable fashion industry.

Luxury fashion : the significance of luxury fashion goods for sustainable fashion design

This paper extends the work of “Luxury fashion : the role of innovation as a key contributing factor in the development of luxury fashion goods and sustainable fashion design” (Finn, 2011). The discussion here begins with the observation that post consumer textile waste remains a major obstacle in realising a model of sustainable fashion design and production however, amongst the millions of tonnes of textile and clothing sent to landfill each year there is little evidence of authentic luxury branded goods ending life as landfill. The sustainable fashion movement often support approaches such as fashion up-cycle, re-cycle and cradle to cradle solutions. This paper argues that the priority should be to break the cycle of consumerism as an immediate intervention in ongoing unsustainable (and in some cases unethical) practices involved in the production of fashion goods. The connections between maker and consumer are explored through object analysis and the findings raise questions of the separation between luxury fashion goods and fashion goods that bear luxury fashion branding. This paper suggests that unethical and subversive exploitation of these connections may be used to promote increased consumerism while at the same time purporting exclusivity and superior craftsmanship.

Verifiability in Markets for Credence Goods

Theory predicts that efficiency prevails on credence goods markets if customers are able to verify which quality they receive from an expert seller. In a series of experiments with endogenous prices we observe that variability fails to result in efficient provision behavior and leads to very similar results as a setting without variability. Some sellers always provide appropriate treatment even if own money maximization calls for over- or undertreatment. Overall our endogenous price-results suggests that both inequality aversion and a taste for efficiency play an important role for experts provision behavior. We contrast the implications of those two motivations theoretically and discriminate between them empirically using a �xed-price design. We then classify experimental experts according to their provision behavior.

Tax concessions for charities : competitive neutrality, the tax base and "public goods" choice

It is argued that concerns arise about the integrity and fairness of the taxation regime where charitable organizations, which avail themselves of the tax exemption status while undertaking commercial activities, compete directly with the for-profit sector. The appropriateness of the tax concessions granted to charitable organizations is considered in respect of income derived from commercial activities. It is principally argued that the traditional line of reasoning for imposing limitations on tax concessions focuses on an incorrect underlying inquiry. Traditionally, it is argued that limitations should be imposed because of unfair competition, lack of competitive neutrality, or an arbitrary decision relating to a lack of deserving. However, it is argued that a more appropriate question from which to base any limitations is one which considers the value attached to the integrity of the taxation regime as a whole, and the tax base specifically compared to the public good of charities. When the correct underlying question is asked, sound taxation policy ensues, as a less arbitrary approach may be adopted to limit the scope of tax concessions available to charitable organizations.

How distributional preferences shape incentives on (experimental) markets for credence goods

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus-maximizing quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence indicates the opposite. We identify a lack of robustness of institutional design with respect to heterogeneity in distributional preferences as a possible cause and design new experiments that allow for parsimonious identification of sellers’ distributional types. Our results indicate that less than a fourth of the subjects behave according to standard theory’s assumption, the rest behaving either in line with non-standard selfish or in accordance with non-trivial other-regarding preferences. We discuss consequences of our findings for institutional design and agent selection.

Contracting for infrastructure projects as credence goods

Large infrastructure projects are a major responsibility of urban and regional governments, who usually lack expertise to fully specify the demanded projects. Contractors, typically experts on such projects due to experience with similar projects elsewhere, advise of the needed design in their bids. Producing the right design is nevertheless costly. We model such infrastructure projects taking into account their credence goods feature and the costly design effort they require and examine the performance of commonly used contracting methods. We show that when building costs are homogeneous and public information, multi-stage competitive bidding involving shortlisting of two contractors and contingent compensation of both contractors on design efforts outperforms sequential search and the traditional Design-and-Build approach. If building costs are private information of the contractors and are revealed to them after design cost is sunk, sequential search may be superior to the other two methods.

The economics of credence goods : an experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)

Contracting for infrastructure projects as credence goods

Large infrastructure projects are a major responsibility of urban and regional governments, who usually lack expertise to fully specify the demanded projects. Contractors, typically experts on such projects due to experience with similar projects,advise of the needed design as well as the cost of construction in their bids. Producing the right design is costly. We model such infrastructure projects taking into account their credence goods feature and the costly design effort they require and examine the performance of commonly used contracting methods. We show that when building costs are homogeneous and public information, simultaneous bidding involving shortlisting of two contractors and contingent compensation of both contractors on design efforts outperforms sequential search. If building costs are private information of the contractors and are revealed to them after design cost is sunk,sequential search may be superior to simultaneous bidding.