How distributional preferences shape incentives on (experimental) markets for credence goods
Contribuinte(s) |
Botticini , Maristella Abbring, Jaap Biais, Bruno |
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Data(s) |
01/08/2013
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Resumo |
Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus-maximizing quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence indicates the opposite. We identify a lack of robustness of institutional design with respect to heterogeneity in distributional preferences as a possible cause and design new experiments that allow for parsimonious identification of sellers’ distributional types. Our results indicate that less than a fourth of the subjects behave according to standard theory’s assumption, the rest behaving either in line with non-standard selfish or in accordance with non-trivial other-regarding preferences. We discuss consequences of our findings for institutional design and agent selection. |
Formato |
application/pdf |
Identificador | |
Relação |
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/62825/1/Verifiability_5_2_2013.pdf__fP.pdf http://www.eea-esem.com/files/papers/EEA-ESEM/2013/1538/Verifiability%205%202%202013.pdf Kerschbamer, Rudolf, Sutter, Matthias, & Dulleck, Uwe (2013) How distributional preferences shape incentives on (experimental) markets for credence goods. In Botticini , Maristella , Abbring, Jaap, & Biais, Bruno (Eds.) Proceedings of EEA-ESEM2013, Gothenburg, Sweden, pp. 1-40. |
Direitos |
Copyright 2013 [please consult the author] |
Fonte |
QUT Business School; School of Economics & Finance |
Palavras-Chave | #Credence Goods #Expert services #Distributional preferences #Other-regarding preferences #Behavioural economics #Experimental economics |
Tipo |
Conference Paper |