O problema do ethos científico no novo modo de produção da ciência contemporânea

Nosso trabalho tem como objetivo central mostrar que as mudanças ocorridas no modo de produção da ciência contemporânea possuem implicações, tanto para os aspectos sociológicos da ciência quanto para os seus princípios filosóficos, que ainda apontam para uma necessidade de uma análise da relação entre ciência e sociedade. Baseamos nossa tese no trabalho desenvolvido pelo físico e epistemólogo da ciência John Michael Ziman F. R. S. (1925-2005), que defende que as mudanças ocorridas nos últimos 60 anos, relacionadas a uma nova forma de organizar, gerir e financiar a prática científica, i.e., a uma nova forma de prática científica, levaram ao surgimento de uma ciência pós-acadêmica ou pós-industrial. Sua consequência mais grave é a incorporação de um novo ethos científico, que tem como base princípios gerenciais, em detrimento do ethos mertoniano, cujo objetivo principal seria a manutenção de princípios que foram histórica e socialmente defendidos pelos cientistas em um ideal de ciência acadêmica, tais como os de objetividade, busca da verdade e autonomia, ainda que como ideais reguladores. Contudo, mostraremos que Ziman não adere à interpretação tradicional do ethos mertoniano, que o associa a uma epistemologia fundacionista. Além disso, ele reformula, seguindo as novas filosofia e sociologia da ciência, os ideais epistêmicos preconizados pelas tendências positivistas e neopositivistas, em especial a noção da objetividade. Para Ziman, a ciência ainda produz conhecimento confiável, pois possui um mecanismo cooperativo de produção, que tem como base a crítica entre os pares.

Pensamento científico, integridade de caráter e coletividade: uma leitura sobre a ética da crença de William Kingdon Clifford

Nesta tese abordamos alguns aspectos das inter-relações entre conhecimento, ética e valores dentro da atividade científica segundo as ideias do matemático-filósofo vitoriano William Clifford. O nosso tema geral coloca em jogo o envolvimento da produção, da avaliação e da transmissão de conhecimento científico com os comportamentos, as responsabilidades e os traços de caráter do investigador. Nosso objetivo é oferecer uma introdução ao pensamento e a algumas produções intelectuais de Clifford, um autor pouco familiar ao público filosófico brasileiro, bem como uma descrição comentada de seu escrito mais famoso, intitulado A Ética da Crença. Mediante esse objetivo, extraímos suas concepções a respeito das características e consequências éticas do empreendimento científico. As questões que orientam a tese são as seguintes: de que maneira a produção de conhecimento estaria condicionada à personalidade e ao comportamento ético de quem se lança àquela prática? Em que medida essa prática promove o cultivo de características pessoais socialmente desejáveis e favoráveis? Quais as conseqüências para a sociedade dessa inter-relação entre o caráter do investigador e os valores epistêmicos que estes colocam em ação e, sem os quais parece não ser possível a obtenção de conhecimento confiável?

Um estudo sobre os diferentes valores modais do verbo 'poder' em entrevistas jornalísticas do espanhol

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Early years teachers’ epistemic beliefs and beliefs about children’s moral learning

There is strong political and social interest in values education both internationally and across Australia. Investment in young children is recognised as important for the development of moral values for a cohesive society; however, little is known about early years teachers’ beliefs about moral values teaching and learning. The aim of the current study was to investigate the relationships between Australian early years teachers’ epistemic beliefs and their beliefs about children’s moral learning. Three hundred and seventy-nine teachers completed a survey about their personal epistemic beliefs and their beliefs about children’s moral learning. Results indicated that teachers with more sophisticated epistemic beliefs viewed children as capable of taking responsibility for their own moral learning. Conversely, teachers who held more naive or simplistic personal epistemic beliefs agreed that children need to learn morals through learning the rules for behaviour. Results are discussed in terms of the implications for moral pedagogy in the classroom and teacher professional development. It is suggested that in conjunction with explicitly reflecting on epistemic beliefs, professional development may need to assist teachers to ascertain how their beliefs might relate to their moral pedagogies in order to make any adjustments.

Epistemic beliefs and beliefs about teaching practices for moral learning in the early years of school : relationships and complexities

While investment in young children is recognised as important for the development of moral values for a cohesive society, little is known about early years teaching practices that promote learning of moral values. This paper reports on observations and interviews with 11 Australian teachers, focusing on their epistemic beliefs and beliefs about teaching practices for moral education with children aged 5 to 8 years. The analysis revealed three main patterns of thinking about moral education: following others, reflecting on points of view, and informing reflection for action. These patterns suggest a relationship between epistemic beliefs and beliefs about teaching practices for moral learning which have implications for teacher professional development concerning experiences in moral education.

Representing the epistemic nature of teachers’ practical knowledge : The case of class teachers’ general pedagogy

The present study addressed the epistemology of teachers’ practical knowledge. Drawing from the literature, teachers’ practical knowledge is defined as all teachers’ cognitions (e.g., beliefs, values, motives, procedural knowing, and declarative knowledge) that guide their practice of teaching. The teachers’ reasoning that lies behind their practical knowledge is addressed to gain insight into its epistemic nature. I studied six class teachers’ practical knowledge; they teach in the metropolitan region of Helsinki. Relying on the assumptions of the phenomenographic inquiry, I collected and analyzed the data. I analyzed the data in two stages where the first stage involved an abductive procedure, and the second stage an inductive procedure for interpretation, and thus developed the system of categories. In the end, a quantitative analysis nested into the qualitative findings to study the patterns of the teachers’’ reasoning. The results indicated that teachers justified their practical knowledge based on morality and efficiency of action; efficiency of action was found to be presented in two different ways: authentic efficiency and naïve efficiency. The epistemic weight of morality was embedded in what I call “moral care”. The core intention of teachers in the moral care was the commitment that they felt about the “whole character” of students. From this perspective the “dignity” and the moral character of the students should not replaced for any other “instrumental price”. “Caring pedagogy” was the epistemic value of teachers’ reasoning in the authentic efficiency. The central idea in the caring pedagogy was teachers’ intentions to improve the “intellectual properties” of “all or most” of the students using “flexible” and “diverse” pedagogies. However, “regulating pedagogy” was the epistemic condition of practice in the cases corresponding to naïve efficiency. Teachers argued that an effective practical knowledge should regulate and manage the classroom activities, but the targets of the practical knowledge were mainly other “issues “or a certain percentage of the students. In these cases, the teachers’ arguments were mainly based on the notion of “what worked” regardless of reflecting on “what did not work”. Drawing from the theoretical background and the data, teachers’ practical knowledge calls for “praxial knowledge” when they used the epistemic conditions of “caring pedagogy” and “moral care”. It however calls for “practicable” epistemic status when teachers use the epistemic condition of regulating pedagogy. As such, praxial knowledge with the dimensions of caring pedagogy and moral care represents the “normative” perspective on teachers’ practical knowledge, and thus reflects a higher epistemic status in comparison to “practicable” knowledge, which represents a “descriptive” perception toward teachers’ practical knowledge and teaching.

Risk-informed decision-making in the presence of epistemic uncertainty

An important issue in risk analysis is the distinction between epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. In this paper, the use of distinct representation formats for aleatory and epistemic uncertainties is advocated, the latter being modelled by sets of possible values. Modern uncertainty theories based on convex sets of probabilities are known to be instrumental for hybrid representations where aleatory and epistemic components of uncertainty remain distinct. Simple uncertainty representation techniques based on fuzzy intervals and p-boxes are used in practice. This paper outlines a risk analysis methodology from elicitation of knowledge about parameters to decision. It proposes an elicitation methodology where the chosen representation format depends on the nature and the amount of available information. Uncertainty propagation methods then blend Monte Carlo simulation and interval analysis techniques. Nevertheless, results provided by these techniques, often in terms of probability intervals, may be too complex to interpret for a decision-maker and we, therefore, propose to compute a unique indicator of the likelihood of risk, called confidence index. It explicitly accounts for the decisionmaker’s attitude in the face of ambiguity. This step takes place at the end of the risk analysis process, when no further collection of evidence is possible that might reduce the ambiguity due to epistemic uncertainty. This last feature stands in contrast with the Bayesian methodology, where epistemic uncertainties on input parameters are modelled by single subjective probabilities at the beginning of the risk analysis process.

On the Complexity of Strong and Epistemic Credal Networks

Credal networks are graph-based statistical models whose parameters take values on a set, instead of being sharply specified as in traditional statistical models (e.g., Bayesian networks). The result of inferences with such models depends on the irrelevance/independence concept adopted. In this paper, we study the computational complexity of inferences under the concepts of epistemic irrelevance and strong independence. We strengthen complexity results by showing that inferences with strong independence are NP-hard even in credal trees with ternary variables, which indicates that tractable algorithms, including the existing one for epistemic trees, cannot be used for strong independence. We prove that the polynomial time of inferences in credal trees under epistemic irrelevance is not likely to extend to more general models, because the problem becomes NP-hard even in simple polytrees. These results draw a definite line between networks with efficient inferences and those where inferences are hard, and close several open questions regarding the computational complexity of such models.

Addressing deficits and injustices : the potential epistemic contributions of patients to research

Acknowledgments The research for this paper was primarily funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) grant (DP120101092), How do we know what works? Ethics and evidence in surgical research. Katrina Hutchison’s research was also partly funded by the ARC Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science, where she has worked since June 2015. Discussions about the paper were facilitated by Macquarie University funding of a visit by Vikki A. Entwistle to participate in a Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics (CAVE) seminar on Capabilities Approaches to Justice. The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for a number of helpful comments.

The Weight of Language and Action: Epistemic Stance, Methodological Action,and Theoretical Perspective in Knowledge Organization

Knowledge organization (KO) research is a field of scholarship concerned with the design, study and critique of the processes of organizing and representing documents that societies see as worthy of preserving (Tennis, 2008). In this context we are concerned with the relationship between language and action.On the one hand, we are concerned with what language can and does do for our knowledge organization systems (KOS). For example, how do the words NEGRO or INDIAN work in historical and contemporary indexing languages? In relation to this, we are also concerned with how we know about knowledge organization (KO) and its languages. On the other hand, we are concerned with how to act given this knowledge. That is, how do we carry out research and how do we design, implement, and evaluate KO systems?It is important to consider these questions in the context of our work because we are delegated by society to disseminate cultural memory. We are endowed with a perspective, prepared by an education, and granted positions whereby society asks us to ensure that documentary material is accessible to future generations. There is a social value in our work, and as such there is a social imperative to our work. We must act with good conscience, and use language judiciously, for the memory of the world is a heavy burden.In this paper, I explore these two weights of language and action that bear down on KO researchers. I first summarize what extant literature says about the knowledge claims we make with regard to KO practices and systems. To make it clear what it is that I think we know, I create a schematic that will link claims (language) to actions in advising, implementing, or evaluating information practices and systems.I will then contrast this with what we do not know, that is, what the unanswered questions might be (Gnoli, 2008 ; Dahlberg, 2011), and I will discuss them in relation to the two weights in our field of KO.Further, I will try to provide a systematic overview of possible ways to address these open questions in KO research. I will draw on the concept of elenchus - the forms of epistemology, theory, and methodology in KO (Tennis, 2008), and framework analysis which are structures, work practice, and discourses of KO systems (Tennis, 2006). In so doing, I will argue for a Neopragmatic stance on the weight of language and action in KO (Rorty, 1982 ; 2000). I will close by addressing the lacuna left in Neopragmatic thought – the ethical imperative to use language and action in a particular good and moral way. That is, I will address the ethical imperative of KO given its weights, epistemologies, theories, and methods. To do this, I will review a sample of relevant work on deontology in both western and eastern philosophical schools (e.g., Harvey, 1995).The perspective I want to communicate in this section is that the good in carrying out KO research may begin with epistemic stances (cf., language), but ultimately stands on ethical actions. I will present an analysis describing the micro and the macro ethical concerns in relation to KO research and its advice on practice. I hope this demonstrates that the direction of epistemology, theory, and methodology in KO, while burdened with the dual weights of language and action, is clear when provided an ethical sounding board. We know how to proceed when we understand how our work can benefit the world.KO is an important, if not always understood, division of labor in a society that values its documentary heritage and memory institutions. Being able to do good requires us to understand how to balance the weights of language and action. We must understand where we stand and be able to chart a path forward, one that does not cause harm, but adds value to the world and those that want to access recorded knowledge.