Increasing Returns and Competitive Equilibrium--The Content and Development of Marshall's Theory

This paper reviews Alfred Marshall's attempts to reconcile increasing returns and competition from the early economic writings to the later editions of his Principles. It is shown that while Marshall's final solution to the problem involved naming external economies the cause of increasing returns in a regime of competition , both the life cycle of the firm and internal economies remained necessary to his argument. Their function was to give some operation al content to the elusive concept of external economies.

Competitive equilibrium hyperinflation under rational expectations

This paper shows that a competitive equilibrium model, where a representative agent maximizes welfare, expectations are rational and markets are in equilibrium can account for several hyperinflation stylized facts. The theory is built by combining two hypotheses, namely, a fiscal crisis that requires printing money to finance an increasing public deficit and a predicted change in an unsustainable fiscal regime.

Equilibrium in dynamic economic models

The main theme running through these three chapters is that economic agents are often forced to respond to events that are not a direct result of their actions or other agents actions. The optimal response to these shocks will necessarily depend on agents' understanding of how these shocks arise. The economic environment in the first two chapters is analogous to the classic chain store game. In this setting, the addition of unintended trembles by the agents creates an environment better suited to reputation building. The third chapter considers the competitive equilibrium price dynamics in an overlapping generations environment when there are supply and demand shocks.

The first chapter is a game theoretic investigation of a reputation building game. A sequential equilibrium model, called the "error prone agents" model, is developed. In this model, agents believe that all actions are potentially subjected to an error process. Inclusion of this belief into the equilibrium calculation provides for a richer class of reputation building possibilities than when perfect implementation is assumed.

In the second chapter, maximum likelihood estimation is employed to test the consistency of this new model and other models with data from experiments run by other researchers that served as the basis for prominent papers in this field. The alternate models considered are essentially modifications to the standard sequential equilibrium. While some models perform quite well in that the nature of the modification seems to explain deviations from the sequential equilibrium quite well, the degree to which these modifications must be applied shows no consistency across different experimental designs.

The third chapter is a study of price dynamics in an overlapping generations model. It establishes the existence of a unique perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium price path in a pure exchange economy with a finite time horizon when there are arbitrarily many shocks to supply or demand. One main reason for the interest in this equilibrium is that overlapping generations environments are very fruitful for the study of price dynamics, especially in experimental settings. The perfect foresight assumption is an important place to start when examining these environments because it will produce the ex post socially efficient allocation of goods. This characteristic makes this a natural baseline to which other models of price dynamics could be compared.

Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states

Radner (1968) proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium for differential information economies with finitely many states. We extend this result to economies with infinitely many states of nature.

Competitive equilibria in infinite-horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araújo, Páscoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) have shown that, without imposing either debt constraints or transversality conditions, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with default when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2008) subsequently show that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. They also claim that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is ensured. The objective of this paper is two fold. First, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2008), we show that moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme. Second, we provide an alternative condition on default penalties that is sufficient to rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium.

Approximate recursive equilibrium with minimal state space

This paper shows existence of approximate recursive equilibrium with minimal state space in an environment of incomplete markets. We prove that the approximate recursive equilibrium implements an approximate sequential equilibrium which is always close to a Magill and Quinzii equilibrium without short sales for arbitrarily small errors. This implies that the competitive equilibrium can be implemented by using forecast statistics with minimal state space provided that agents will reduce errors in their estimates in the long run. We have also developed an alternative algorithm to compute the approximate recursive equilibrium with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents through a procedure of iterating functional equations and without using the rst order conditions of optimality.

Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium

We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-regarding preferences. We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary and sufficient for one’s own demand to be independent of the allocations and characteristics of other agents in the economy. Given separability, it is impossible to identify other-regarding preferences from market behavior: agents be- have as if they had classical preferences that depend only on own consumption in competitive equilibrium. If preferences, in addition, depend only on the final allocation of consumption in society, the Sec- ond Welfare Theorem holds as long as an increase in resources can be distributed such that all agents are better off. Nevertheless, the First Welfare Theorem generally does not hold. Allowing agents to care about their own consumption and the distribution of consump- tion possibilities in the economy, we provide a condition under which agents have no incentive to make direct transfers, and show that this condition implies that competitive equilibria are efficient given prices.

Tendering theory revisited

This paper discusses the content, origin and development of Tendering Theory as a theory of price determination. It demonstrates how tendering theory determines market prices and how it is different from game and decision theories, and that in the tendering process, with non-cooperative, simultaneous, single sealed bids with individual private valuations, extensive public information, a large number of bidders and a long sequence of tendering occasions, there develops a competitive equilibrium. The development of a competitive equilibrium means that the concept of the tender as the sum of a valuation and a strategy, which is at the core of tendering theory, cannot be supported and that there are serious empirical, theoretical and methodological inconsistencies in the theory.

Essays on Russia's Economic Transition

This study comprises an introductory section and three essays analysing Russia's economic transition from the early 1990s up to the present. The papers present a combination of both theoretical and empirical analysis on some of the key issues Russia has faced during its somewhat troublesome transformation from state-controlled command economy to market-based economy. The first essay analyses fiscal competition for mobile capital between identical regions in a transition country. A standard tax competition framework is extended to account for two features of a transition economy: the presence of two sectors, old and new, which differ in productivity; and a non-benevolent regional decision-maker. It is shown that in very early phase of transition, when the old sector clearly dominates, consumers in a transition economy may be better off in a competitive equilibrium. Decision-makers, on the other hand, will prefer to coordinate their fiscal policies. The second essay uses annual data for 1992-2003 to examine income dispersion and convergence across 76 Russian regions. Wide disparities in income levels have indeed emerged during the transition period. Dispersion has increased most among the initially better-off regions, whereas for the initially poorer regions no clear trend of divergence or convergence could be established. Further, some - albeit not highly robust - evidence was found of both unconditional and conditional convergence, especially among the initially richer regions. Finally, it is observed that there is much less evidence of convergence after the economic crisis of 1998. The third essay analyses industrial firms' engagement in provision of infrastructure services, such as heating, electricity and road maintenance. Using a unique dataset of 404 large and medium-sized industrial enterprises in 40 regions of Russia, the essay examines public infrastructure provision by Russian industrial enterprises. It is found that to a large degree engagement in infrastructure provision, as proxied by district heating production, is a Soviet legacy. Secondly, firms providing district heating to users outside their plant area are more likely to have close and multidimensional relations with the local public sector.

Profit as Cost versus Profit as Surplus over Cost: A Case Study on Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics"

On the analysis of Varian’s textbook on Microeconomics, which I take to be a representative of the standard view, I argue that Varian provides two contrary notions of profit, namely, profit as surplus over cost and profit as cost. Varian starts by defining profit as the surplus of revenues over cost and, thus, as the part of the value of commodities that is not any cost; however, he provides a second definition of profit as a cost, namely, as the opportunity cost of capital. I also argue that the definition of competitive profit as the opportunity cost of capital involves a self-contradictory notion of opportunity cost.

Market allocations of location choice: an example

The purpose of this paper is to make an example which, first, illustrates Starret’s Spatial Imposibility Theorem, when agents have free mobility; and second, allowes us to get a competitive equilibrium with transportation when agents move only if there is a noticeable difference in utilities that justifies the change of location.

The hotelling model with multiple demands

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an elementary introduction to the non-renewable resource model with multiple demand curves. The theoretical literature following Hotelling (1931) assumed that all energy needs are satisfied by one type of resource (e.g. ‘oil’), extractible at different per-unit costs. This formulation implicitly assumes that all users are the same distance from each resource pool, that all users are subject to the same regulations, and that motorist users can switch as easily from liquid fossil fuels to coal as electric utilities can. These assumptions imply, as Herfindahl (1967) showed, that in competitive equilibrium all users will exhaust a lower cost resource completely before beginning to extract a higher cost resource: simultaneous extraction of different grades of oil or of oil and coal should never occur. In trying to apply the single-demand curve model during the last twenty years, several teams of authors have independently found a need to generalize it to account for users differing in their (1) location, (2) regulatory environment, or (3) resource needs. Each research team found that Herfindahl's strong, unrealistic conclusion disappears in the generalized model; in its place, a weaker Herfindahl result emerges. Since each research team focussed on a different application, however, it has not always been clear that everyone has been describing the same generalized model. Our goal is to integrate the findings of these teams and to exposit the generalized model in a form which is easily accessible.

Is it really good to annuitize?

Although rational consumers without bequest motives are better off investing exclusively with annuitized instruments in partial equilibrium, we demonstrate the welfare effect of annuitization is ambiguous in general equilibrium on account of pecuniary externalities. Absent institutional constraints like prices and budgets, the optimal consumption rule would have marginal utility increase at the preferential discount rate. In a rational competitive equilibrium where households fully annuitize, the growth rate of marginal utility will be the discount rate minus the interest rate, resulting in a consumption profile that is too flat. Accidental bequests transfer wealth from the old to the young, steepening the consumption profile and yielding a better equilibrium. If households are restricted to Keynesian consumption functions, the optimal irrational equilibrium with standard preferences can replicate observed consumption and macroeconomic behavior, and the equilibrium without annuities delivers higher utility than the equilibrium with annuities. Whereas preceding papers have merely hypothesized that households might engage in socially optimal, yet irrational behavior, the failure of households to annuitize is a real-world example of this. Policymakers should not take steps to encourage more annuitization by the public.

Large economies with differential information but without free disposal

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without freedisposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.