The political economy of exchange rate in Brazil

This paper reviews part of the political economy literature on exchange rate policy relevant to understanding the political motivations behind the Brazilian exchange rate policy. We shall first examine the distributive role of the exchange rate, and the way it unfolds in terms of the desired political goals. We will follow by analyzing exchange policy as indicative of government effciency prior to elections. Finally, we discuss fiscal policy from the point of view of political economy, in which the exchange rate results from the macroeconomic equilibrium. Over this review, the Brazilian exchange rate policy is discussed in light of the theories presented.

The political economy of global economic disgovernance

A Desgovernança Econômica Global, Mais do que a Governança Caracteriza Hoje a Economia Mundial. Dois Fatos Substanciam Essa Afirmativa: a Crise Recorrente do Balanço de Pagamentos nos Países em Desenvolvimento, e o Enorme Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos. as Crises nos Mercados Emergentes são Essencialmente Resultantes da Estratégia que o Norte Propõe para o Sul: a Estratégia de Crescimento com Poupança Externa. Dado o Fato de que a Entrada de Capital Aumenta a Taxa de Cambio, e que os Paises não Reconheceram as Principais Oportunidades de Investimento nos Anos 1990, Tal Estratégia Levou não ao Aumento das Taxas de Acumulação de Capital e ao Crescimento, Mas ao Aumento do Déficit em Conta Corrente e À Crise do Balanço de Pagamento (Financeiro). por Outro Lado, o Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos é um Problema Sério. Aquele Já é um País Devedor, Mas os Ajustes Continuam a ser Adiados. a Probabilidade de um Soft Landing (Desfecho Satisfatório) é Pequena. as Duas Fontes de Instabilidade Estão Relacionadas Aos Déficits em Conta Corrente e À Moeda Sobrevalorizada. a Política Econômica por Trás tem um Nome: Taxa de Câmbio Populista, uma das Duas Formas de Populismo Econômico (A Outra é o Populismo Fiscal). Isto não é Surpreendente em Países em Desenvolvimento, Mas Pode ser em um País Desenvolvido, como os Estados Unidos. Ainda Assim não é Surpreendente Quando se Considera a Recessão Política e Social que a Sociedade Americana Está Vivendo Desde o Fim da Segunda Guerra

The political economy of exchange rate policy in Brazil: 1964-1999

This paper was developed as part of a broader research program on the political economy of exchange rate policies in Latin America and the Caribbean. We are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from Jeff Frieden, Ernesto Stein, Jorge Streb, Marcelo Neri and seminar participants at Getulio Vargas Foundation, PUC-Rio, IDB workshop on The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean, and LACEA meeting in Buenos Aires. We thank René Garcia for providing us with a Fortran program for estimating the Markov Switching Model, Ilan Goldfajn for sending us updated estimates of the real exchange rate series of Goldfajn and Valdés (1996), Altamir Lopes and Ricardo Markwald for kindly furnishing data on Brazilian external accounts, and Carla Bernardes, Gabriela Domingues, Juliana Pessoa de Araújo, and, specially, Marcelo Pinheiro for excellent research assistant. Both authors thank CNPq for a research fellowship.

Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth

This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.

An exploratory study on how to improve the economy of American Samoa

Deep in the South Pacific region about 2,300 miles southwest of the Hawaiian islands1 lies a United States territory that many Americans have never heard of nor known anything about. However, some famous Americans such as Troy Polamalu of the Pittsburgh Steelers, semi retired professional wrestler Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson, and Hawaii Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard have genealogical roots there. More importantly, many of the Territory’s sons and daughters have served and lost their lives for the United States flag and the cause of freedom around the world. This place is called American Samoa, a collection of seven islands that if glued together would have a total landmass of approximately 76 square miles, just a tad bigger than the capital city of the United States. According to the United States Census Bureau, there were 55,519 residents of American Samoa in 2010.1 The majority of them are ethnic Samoans, a Polynesian sect that traces its history back to early migrants from Southeast Asia who settled the islands around 1500 B.C.2 3 The climate is warm all year long and the forests along the mountains are ripe with vegetation. The main island is Tutuila with its beautiful and coveted landlocked harbor that was used as a coaling station by the United States naval ships during World War II. In fact, it was the Pago Pago Harbor that diminished the impact of the 2009 Tsunami that devastated the Samoan islands by channeling the waters of the Pacific Ocean towards the end of the harbor instead of flooding many other villages surrounding the Pago Pago Bay area. Lives and property were destroyed near the end of the Harbor but it could have been worse for the entire Bay area. Locally grown foods include coconut, taro, banana, guava, sugar cane, papaya, yam, pineapple, and breadfruit. It is completely surrounded by the Pacific Ocean from which the locals obtain a variety of seafood. There is a popular saying in Samoa that goes, “In Samoa, it is impossible to starve 1 American Samoa Department of Commerce, 2012 Statistical Yearbook, http://www.doc.as/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/2012-Statistical-Yearbook-1.pdf 2 U.S. Census Bureau News, U.S. Census Bureau Releases 2010 Census Population Counts for American Samoa, http://www.census.gov/2010census/news/releases/operations/cb11-cn177.html (Aug. 24, 2011). 3 3 J. Robert Shaffer, American Samoa: 100 Years Under the United States Flag (Honolulu, Hawaii: Island Heritage Publishing, 2000), 34. 4 because people live off of the land’s and the ocean’s abundant resources.” To the west of American Samoa lies a larger group of four islands that make up the Sovereign State of Samoa, which became independent from New Zealand in 1962. Samoa and American Samoa share the same language, culture, and religion but are divided by government and political systems. The focus of this study will be on American Samoa, which became a United States territory in 1900 when the principal chiefs of Tutuila (the largest island in American Samoa) ceded the islands to the United States.

The economy of technology and adaptation (Dublado)

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A economia política da corrupção: o escândalo do orçamento

A abertura democrática no Brasil criou um otimismo com a possibilidade do resolver seus problemas crônicos como inflação e corrupção. Foi feita uma panacéia sobre democracia; da democracia surgiriam as soluções para todos os males. Entretanto, a história recente mostra que a democracia não coincide com a eliminação da corrupção e inflação crônicas. Ao contrário, a corrupção causou danos a algumas instituições fundamentais da democracia como o Presidente e o Congresso. Infelizmente, a corrupção é muito perigosa para a democracia. Como observou Tocqueville, com sua perspicácia natural, o povo ate tolera a corrupção numa tirania, por ser um fato comum neste tipo de governo. Não obstante, em uma democracia, a corrupção e inaceitável porque pessoas comuns são eleitas para representar cidadãos, e não para trabalhar contra eles. Os últimos escândalos envolvendo corrupção no Brasil, como o caso Collor e principalmente o uso "inadequado" do orçamento nacional foram importantes porque mostraram a incapacidade da sociedade para controlar este fator de risco institucional. É interessante notar que em outros grandes casos de corrupção na América Latina, como no Gráu, Cuba, Portillo, México ou mesmo na Venezuela, durante os eufóricos anos 70, a situação econômica e até mesmo política não eram ruins. Entretanto, no Brasil, aparentemente, a corrupção política cresceu num período de crises estruturais. Infelizmente este fato tem um resultado considerável: o crescente pessimismo do homem comum sobre o futuro. Entretanto a corrupção pode ser estudada cientificamente. Pode ser vista como uma escolha racional de comportamento compelido por instituições e esquemas de incentivos. Talvez alguns resultados interessantes possam emergir deste tipo de especulação histórica e teórica sobre o comportamento corrupto. Este é o maior objetivo deste estudo.

Área de Livre-Comércio das Américas: incentivos econômicos e políticos

O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar a economia política da Área de Livre Comércio das Américas a partir de um jogo político seqüencial não-cooperativo de Stackelberg entre uma grande economia e uma pequena economia, onde a disputa política entre grupos lobistas rivais define as preferências unilaterais dos governos no primeiro estágio e o equilíbrio "coalition-proof" de Stackelberg define o formato do acordo de livre comércio no segundo estágio. Finalmente, discutese algumas modificações na estrutura inicial do jogo que possam aumentar o poder de negociação da pequena economia.

State ownership and corporate governance

State ownership of publicly-traded corporations remains pervasive around the world, and has been increasing in recent years. Existing literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for corporate governance and performance at the firm level. This Article, by contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. Drawing from historical experiments with government ownership in the United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency. It thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy of corporate governance by incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership structures and legal investor protection. Finally, this Article explores the promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations.