Ethics in a Technological World : Framing the Questions and Three Approaches

This study addresses the following question: How to think about ethics in a technological world? The question is treated first thematically by framing central issues in the relationship between ethics and technology. This relationship has three distinct facets: i) technological advance poses new challenges for ethics, ii) traditional ethics may become poorly applicable in a technologically transformed world, and iii) the progress in science and technology has altered the concept of rationality in ways that undermine ethical thinking itself. The thematic treatment is followed by the description and analysis of three approaches to the questions framed. First, Hans Jonas s thinking on the ontology of life and the imperative of responsibility is studied. In Jonas s analysis modern culture is found to be nihilistic because it is unable to understand organic life, to find meaning in reality, and to justify morals. At the root of nihilism Jonas finds dualism, the traditional Western way of seeing consciousness as radically separate from the material world. Jonas attempts to create a metaphysical grounding for an ethic that would take the technologically increased human powers into account and make the responsibility for future generations meaningful and justified. The second approach is Albert Borgmann s philosophy of technology that mainly assesses the ways in which technological development has affected everyday life. Borgmann admits that modern technology has liberated humans from toil, disease, danger, and sickness. Furthermore, liberal democracy, possibilities for self-realization, and many of the freedoms we now enjoy would not be possible on a large scale without technology. Borgmann, however, argues that modern technology in itself does not provide a whole and meaningful life. In fact, technological conditions are often detrimental to the good life. Integrity in life, according to him, is to be sought among things and practices that evade technoscientific objectification and commodification. Larry Hickman s Deweyan philosophy of technology is the third approach under scrutiny. Central in Hickman s thinking is a broad definition of technology that is nearly equal to Deweyan inquiry. Inquiry refers to the reflective and experiential way humans adapt to their environment by modifying their habits and beliefs. In Hickman s work, technology consists of all kinds of activities that through experimentation and/or reflection aim at improving human techniques and habits. Thus, in addition to research and development, many arts and political reforms are technological for Hickman. He argues for recasting such distinctions as fact/value, poiesis/praxis/theoria, and individual/society. Finally, Hickman does not admit a categorical difference between ethics and technology: moral values and norms need to be submitted to experiential inquiry as well as all the other notions. This study mainly argues for an interdisciplinary approach to the ethics of technology. This approach should make use of the potentialities of the research traditions in applied ethics, the philosophy of technology, and the social studies on science and technology and attempt to overcome their limitations. This study also advocates an endorsement of mid-level ethics that concentrate on the practices, institutions, and policies of temporal human life. Mid-level describes the realm between the instantaneous and individualistic micro-level and the universal and global macro level.

Ethics of Justification : A Defence of Contractualism

In What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon formulated a new version of the ethical theory called contractualism. This theory took reasons considerations that count in favour of judgment-sensitive attitudes to be the fundamental normative notion. It then used normative reasons to first account for evaluative properties. For an object to be valuable, on this view, is for it to have properties that provide reasons to have favourable attitudes towards the bearer of value. Scanlon also used reasons to account for moral wrongness. His contractualism claims that an act is morally wrong if it is forbidden by any set of moral principles that no one could reasonably reject. My thesis consists of five previously published articles which attempt to clarify Scanlon s theory and to defend it against its critics. The first article defends the idea that normative reason-relations are fundamental against Joshua Gert. Gert argues that rationality is a more basic notion than reasons and that reasons can be analysed in terms of their rationally requiring and justifying dimensions. The second article explores the relationship between value and reasons. It defends Scanlon s view according to which reasons are the more basic than value against those who think that reasons are based on the evaluative realm. The last three articles defend Scanlon s views about moral wrongness. The first one of them discusses a classic objection to contractualist theories. This objection is that principles which no one could reasonably reject are redundant in accounting for wrongness. This is because we need a prior notion of wrongness to select those principles and because such principles are not required to make actions wrong or to provide reasons against wrong actions. The fourth article explores the distinctive reasons which contractualists claim there are for avoiding the wrong actions. The last article argues against the critics of contractualism who claim that contractualism has implausible normative consequences for situations related to the treatment of different-sized groups of people.

Ethics and Aesthetics : Intersections in Iris Murdoch's Philosophy

The study addresses the question concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. The main argument is that Murdoch s philosophy cannot be accurately understood without an understanding of the relationship she sees between the aesthetic experience and morality. Reading Murdoch s philosophy with this relationship in mind shows that it must be considered as a relevant alternative to the main forms of aesthetic-ethical theories. The study consists of seven previously published articles and a summary. It shows that Murdoch belongs to a tradition of philosophers who seek to broaden the scope of ethics by reference to aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. She sees an attitude responsible for aesthetic experiences as relevant for morality. However, she does not collapse morality into aesthetic experience. The two meet on the level of the subject s attitude towards its object, but there is a distinction between the experiences that accompany the attitudes. Aesthetic experiences can function as a clue to morals in that they present in a pleasing manner moral truths which otherwise might be psychologically too difficult to face. Murdoch equates the aesthetic attitude with virtuous love characterized by unselfish attention to its object. The primary object of such love is in Murdoch s account another human individual in her particularity. She compares the recognition of the other person as a particular existence to the experience of the Kantian sublime and offers her own version of the true sublime which is the experience of awe in the face of the infinity of the task of understanding others. One of the most central claims in Murdoch s philosophy is that human consciousness is evaluatively structured. This claim challenges the distinction between facts and values which has had an immense influence on modern moral philosophy. One argument with which Murdoch supports her claim is the nature of great literature. According to her, the standard of greatness in literature is the authors awareness of the independent existence of individuals in the particularity of their evaluative consciousnesses. The analysis of the standard of greatness in literature is also Murdoch s only argument for the claim that the primary object of the loving unselfish attention is the other particular individual. She is convinced that great literature reveals a deep truth about the human condition with its capacity to capture the particular. Abstract philo¬sophical discourse cannot compete with this capacity but it should take truths revealed by literature seriously in its theorising. Recognising this as Murdoch s stand on the question of the relation between philosophy and literature as forms of human discourse settles whether she is part of what has been called philosophy s turn to literature. The answer is yes.

Temporality of the Face-to-Face in Levinas' Ethics

This thesis focuses on a connection between temporality and ethics in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. I argue that Levinas understanding of temporality is rooted in the function of pra-impression which in its turn does not belong to the intentional consciousness but reveals a subject as being open to the Other. In the face-to-face situation with the Other the pra-impression is an essential and constitutive force: it fractures the moment of the present, questions subjectivity and generates a new meaning of temporality. As a result a responsible subject is revealed; responsibility for the Other marks a latent birth of the subject which is prior to any origin of subjectivity, it discloses a meaning of time that does not belong to the subject but is found in the Other. In this study I suggest that pra-impression finds its productive force in language, the function of the feminine, and what Levinas calls the other in the same .

The EU and Institutional Twinning in Morocco - An inquiry into the motives of cooperation through discourse ethics

This study examines Institutional Twinning in Morocco as a case of EU cooperation through the pragmatic, ethical and moral logics of reason in Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics. As a former accession tool, Twinning was introduced in 2004 for legal approximation in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy. Twinning is a unique instrument in development cooperation from a legal perspective. With its long historical and cultural ties to Europe, Morocco presents an interesting case study of this new form of cooperation. We will analyse motives behind the Twinning projects on illegal immigration, environment legislation and customs reform. As Twinning is a new policy instrument within the ENP context, there is relatively little preceding research, which, in itself, constitutes a reason to inquire into the subject. While introducing useful categories, the approaches discussing “normative power Europe” do not offer methodological tools precise enough to analyse the motives of the Twinning cooperation from a broad ethical standpoint. Helene Sjursen as well as Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués have elaborated on Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics in determining the extent of altruism in the ENP in general. Situating the analysis in the process-oriented framework of Critical Theory, discourse ethics provides the methodological framework for our research. The case studies reveal that the context in which they operate affects the pragmatic, ethical and moral aspirations of the actors. The utilitarian notion of profit maximization is quite pronounced both in terms of the number of Twinning projects in the economic sphere and the pragmatic logics of reason instrumental to security and trade-related issues. The historical background as well internal processes, however, contribute to defining areas of mutual interest to the actors as well as the motives Morocco and the EU sometimes described as the external projection of internal values. Through its different aspects, Twinning cooperation portrays the functioning of the pragmatic, ethical and moral logics of reason in international relations.

Major Events and the European Code of Police Ethics

Examines the symbolic significance of major events and their security provision in the historical and contemporary context of the European Code of Police Ethics. Stresses the potential of major events to set new practical policing and security standards of technology and in doing so necessitiate the maintenance of professional ethical standards for policing in Europe.

Despairing Justice and the Ethics of Legal Interpretation

This study discusses legal interpretation. The question is how legal texts, for instance laws, statutes and regulations, can and do have meaning. Language makes interpretation difficult as it holds no definite meanings. When the theoretical connection between semantics and legal meaning is loosened and we realise that language cannot be a means of justifying legal decisions, the responsibility inherent in legal interpretation can be seen in full. We are thus compelled to search for ways to analyse this responsibility. The main argument of the book is that the responsibility of legal interpretation contains a responsibility towards the text that is interpreted (and through the mediation of the text also towards the legal system), but not only this. It is not simply a responsibility to read and read well, but it transcends on a broader scale. It includes responsibility for the effects of the interpretation in a particular situation and with regard to the people whose case is decided. Ultimately, it is a responsibility to do justice. These two aspects of responsibility are conceptualised here as the two dimensions of the ethics of legal interpretation: the textual and the situational. The basic conception of language presented here is provided by Ludwig Wittgenstein s later philosophy, but the argument is not committed to only one philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein can be counterpointed in interesting ways by Jacques Derrida s ideas on language and meaning. Derrida s work also functions as a contrast to hermeneutic theories. It is argued that the seed to an answer to the question of meaning lies in the inter-personal and situated activity of interpretation and communication, an idea that can be discerned in different ways in the works of Wittgenstein, Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This way the question of meaning naturally leads us to think about ethics, which is approached here through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. His thinking, focusing on topics such as otherness, friendship and hospitality, provides possibilities for answering some of the questions posed in this book. However, at the same time we move inside a normativity where ethics and politics come together in many ways. The responsibility of legal interpretation is connected to the political and this has to be acknowledged lest we forget that law always implies force. But it is argued here that the political can be explored in positive terms as it does not have to mean only power or violence.

The EU and Institutional Twinning in Morocco - An inquiry into the motives of cooperation through discourse ethics

This study examines Institutional Twinning in Morocco as a case of EU cooperation through the pragmatic, ethical and moral logics of reason in Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics. As a former accession tool, Twinning was introduced in 2004 for legal approximation in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy. Twinning is a unique instrument in development cooperation from a legal perspective. With its long historical and cultural ties to Europe, Morocco presents an interesting case study of this new form of cooperation. We will analyse motives behind the Twinning projects on illegal immigration, environment legislation and customs reform. As Twinning is a new policy instrument within the ENP context, there is relatively little preceding research, which, in itself, constitutes a reason to inquire into the subject. While introducing useful categories, the approaches discussing “normative power Europe” do not offer methodological tools precise enough to analyse the motives of the Twinning cooperation from a broad ethical standpoint. Helene Sjursen as well as Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués have elaborated on Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics in determining the extent of altruism in the ENP in general. Situating the analysis in the process-oriented framework of Critical Theory, discourse ethics provides the methodological framework for our research. The case studies reveal that the context in which they operate affects the pragmatic, ethical and moral aspirations of the actors. The utilitarian notion of profit maximization is quite pronounced both in terms of the number of Twinning projects in the economic sphere and the pragmatic logics of reason instrumental to security and trade-related issues. The historical background as well internal processes, however, contribute to defining areas of mutual interest to the actors as well as the motives Morocco and the EU sometimes described as the external projection of internal values. Through its different aspects, Twinning cooperation portrays the functioning of the pragmatic, ethical and moral logics of reason in international relations.

Patents, Ethics and Stem Cell Research : The Case of hESC Innovation in Australia, Europe and the United States

Embryonic stem cells offer potentially a ground-breaking insight into health and diseases and are said to offer hope in discovering cures for many ailments unimaginable few years ago. Human embryonic stem cells are undifferentiated, immature cells that possess an amazing ability to develop into almost any body cell such as heart muscle, bone, nerve and blood cells and possibly even organs in due course. This remarkable feature, enabling embryonic stem cells to proliferate indefinitely in vitro (in a test tube), has branded them as a so-called miracle cure . Their potential use in clinical applications provides hope to many sufferers of debilitating and fatal medical conditions. However, the emergence of stem cell research has resulted in intense debates about its promises and dangers. On the one hand, advocates hail its potential, ranging from alleviating and even curing fatal and debilitating diseases such as Parkinson s, diabetes, heart ailments and so forth. On the other hand, opponents decry its dangers, drawing attention to the inherent risks of human embryo destruction, cloning for research purposes and reproductive cloning eventually. Lately, however, the policy battles surrounding human embryonic stem cell innovation have shifted from being a controversial research to scuffles within intellectual property rights. In fact, the ability to obtain patents represents a pivotal factor in the economic success or failure of this new biotechnology. Although, stem cell patents tend to more or less satisfy the standard patentability requirements, they also raise serious ethical and moral questions about the meaning of the exclusions on ethical or moral grounds as found in European and to an extent American and Australian patent laws. At present there is a sort of a calamity over human embryonic stem cell patents in Europe and to an extent in Australia and the United States. This in turn has created a sense of urgency to engage all relevant parties in the discourse on how best to approach patenting of this new form of scientific innovation. In essence, this should become a highly favoured patenting priority. To the contrary, stem cell innovation and its reliance on patent protection risk turmoil, uncertainty, confusion and even a halt on not only stem cell research but also further emerging biotechnology research and development. The patent system is premised upon the fundamental principle of balance which ought to ensure that the temporary monopoly awarded to the inventor equals that of the social benefit provided by the disclosure of the invention. Ensuring and maintaining this balance within the patent system when patenting human embryonic stem cells is of crucial contemporary relevance. Yet, the patenting of human embryonic stem cells raises some fundamental moral, social and legal questions. Overall, the present approach of patenting human embryonic stem cell related inventions is unsatisfactory and ineffective. This draws attention to a specific question which provides for a conceptual framework for this work. That question is the following: how can the investigated patent offices successfully deal with patentability of human embryonic stem cells? This in turn points at the thorny issue of application of the morality clause in this field. In particular, the interpretation of the exclusions on ethical or moral grounds as found in Australian, American and European legislative and judicial precedents. The Thesis seeks to compare laws and legal practices surrounding patentability of human embryonic stem cells in Australia and the United States with that of Europe. By using Europe as the primary case study for lessons and guidance, the central goal of the Thesis then becomes the determination of the type of solutions available to Europe with prospects to apply such to Australia and the United States. The Dissertation purports to define the ethical implications that arise with patenting human embryonic stem cells and intends to offer resolutions to the key ethical dilemmas surrounding patentability of human embryonic stem cells and other morally controversial biotechnology inventions. In particular, the Thesis goal is to propose a functional framework that may be used as a benchmark for an informed discussion on the solution to resolving ethical and legal tensions that come with patentability of human embryonic stem cells in Australian, American and European patent worlds. Key research questions that arise from these objectives and which continuously thread throughout the monograph are: 1. How do common law countries such as Australia and the United States approach and deal with patentability of human embryonic stem cells in their jurisdictions? These practices are then compared to the situation in Europe as represented by the United Kingdom (first two chapters), the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Patent Office decisions (Chapter 3 onwards) in order to obtain a full picture of the present patenting procedures on the European soil. 2. How are ethical and moral considerations taken into account at patent offices investigated when assessing patentability of human embryonic stem cell related inventions? In order to assess this part, the Thesis evaluates how ethical issues that arise with patent applications are dealt with by: a) Legislative history of the modern patent system from its inception in 15th Century England to present day patent laws. b) Australian, American and European patent offices presently and in the past, including other relevant legal precedents on the subject matter. c) Normative ethical theories. d) The notion of human dignity used as the lowest common denominator for the interpretation of the European morality clause. 3. Given the existence of the morality clause in form of Article 6(1) of the Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions which corresponds to Article 53(a) European Patent Convention, a special emphasis is put on Europe as a guiding principle for Australia and the United States. Any room for improvement of the European morality clause and Europe s current manner of evaluating ethical tensions surrounding human embryonic stem cell inventions is examined. 4. A summary of options (as represented by Australia, the United States and Europe) available as a basis for the optimal examination procedure of human embryonic stem cell inventions is depicted, whereas the best of such alternatives is deduced in order to create a benchmark framework. This framework is then utilised on and promoted as a tool to assist Europe (as represented by the European Patent Office) in examining human embryonic stem cell patent applications. This method suggests a possibility of implementing an institution solution. 5. Ultimately, a question of whether such reformed European patent system can be used as a founding stone for a potential patent reform in Australia and the United States when examining human embryonic stem cells or other morally controversial inventions is surveyed. The author wishes to emphasise that the guiding thought while carrying out this work is to convey the significance of identifying, analysing and clarifying the ethical tensions surrounding patenting human embryonic stem cells and ultimately present a solution that adequately assesses patentability of human embryonic stem cell inventions and related biotechnologies. In answering the key questions above, the Thesis strives to contribute to the broader stem cell debate about how and to which extent ethical and social positions should be integrated into the patenting procedure in pluralistic and morally divided democracies of Europe and subsequently Australia and the United States.