812 resultados para withholding and withdrawing treatment
Resumo:
The law recognises the right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment even if this will lead to death. Guardianship and other legislation also facilitates the making of decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in certain circumstances. Despite this apparent endorsement that such decisions can be lawful, doubts have been raised in Queensland about whether decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment would contravene the criminal law, and particularly the duty imposed by the Criminal Code (Qld) to provide the “necessaries of life”. This article considers this tension in the law and examines various arguments that might allow for such decisions to be made lawfully. It ultimately concludes, however, that criminal responsibility may still arise and so reform is needed.
Resumo:
• At common law, a competent adult can refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, either contemporaneously or through an advance directive which will operate at a later time when the adult’s capacity is lost. • Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions also provides for a competent adult to complete an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. • At common law, a court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction can consent to, or authorise, the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment from an adult or child who lacks capacity if that is in the best interests of the person. A court may also declare that the withholding or withdrawal of treatment is lawful. • Guardianship legislation in most jurisdictions allows a substitute decision-maker, in an appropriate case, to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an adult who lacks capacity. • In terms of children, a parent may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for his or her child if it is in the child’s best interests. • While a refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment by a competent child may be valid, this decision can be overturned by a court. • At common law and generally under guardianship statutes, demand for futile treatment need not be complied with by doctors.
Resumo:
Disputes about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment are increasingly coming before Australian Supreme Courts. Such cases are generally heard in the parens patriae jurisdiction where the test applied is what is in the patient’s “best interests”. However, the application of the “best interests” test, and its meaning, remains unclear in this context. To shed light on this emerging body of jurisprudence, this article analyses the Australian superior court decisions that consider an adult’s best interests in the context of decisions about life-sustaining treatment. We identify a number of themes from the current body of cases and consider how these themes may guide future decision-making. After then considering the law in the United Kingdom, we suggest an approach for assessing best interests that could be adopted by Australian Supreme Courts. We argue that the suggested approach will lead to a more structured and systematic decision-making process that better promotes the best interests of the patient.
Resumo:
• At common law, a competent adult can refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, either contemporaneously or through an advance directive which will operate at a later time when the adult’s capacity is lost. • Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions also provides for a competent adult to complete an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. • At common law, a court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction can consent to, or authorise, the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment from an adult or child who lacks capacity if that is in the best interests of the person. A court may also declare that the withholding or withdrawal of treatment is lawful. • Guardianship legislation in all jurisdictions allows a substitute decision-maker, in an appropriate case, to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an adult who lacks capacity. • In terms of children, a parent may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for his or her child if it is in the child’s best interests. • While a refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment by a competent child may be valid, this decision can be overturned by a court. • At common law and generally under guardianship statutes, demand for futile treatment need not be complied with by doctors.
Resumo:
Objectives To examine the level of knowledge of doctors about the law on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack decision-making capacity, and factors associated with a higher level of knowledge. Design, setting and participants Postal survey of all specialists in emergency medicine, geriatric medicine, intensive care, medical oncology, palliative medicine, renal medicine and respiratory medicine on the AMPCo Direct database in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. Survey initially posted to participants on 18 July 2012 and closed on 31 January 2013. Main outcome measures Medical specialists’ levels of knowledge about the law, based on their responses to two survey questions. Results Overall response rate was 32%. For the seven statements contained in the two questions about the law, the mean knowledge score was 3.26 out of 7. State and specialty were the strongest predictors of legal knowledge. Conclusions Among doctors who practise in the end-of-life field, there are some significant knowledge gaps about the law on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack decision-making capacity. Significant consequences for both patients and doctors can flow from a failure to comply with the law. Steps should be taken to improve doctors’ legal knowledge in this area and to harmonise the law across Australia.
Resumo:
•Intractable disputes about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity are rare but challenging. Judicial resolution may be needed in some of these cases. •A central concept for judicial (and clinical) decision making in this area is a patient's “best interests”. Yet what this term means is contested. •There is an emerging Supreme Court jurisprudence that sheds light on when life-sustaining treatment will, or will not, be judged to be in a patient's best interests. •Treatment that is either futile or overly burdensome is not in a patient's best interests. Although courts will consider patient and family wishes, they have generally deferred to the views of medical practitioners about treatment decisions.
Resumo:
My aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end of life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. My argument is that this assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be indefensible. I then provide a clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions which proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are commonly advanced for the converse view. This enables me, in conclusion, to clarify important conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining measures on the one hand, and assisted suicide and euthanasia, on the other.
Resumo:
BACKGROUND Law is increasingly involved in clinical practice, particularly at the end of life, but undergraduate and postgraduate education in this area remains unsystematic. We hypothesised that attitudes to and knowledge of the law governing withholding/withdrawing treatment from adults without capacity (the WWLST law) would vary and demonstrate deficiencies among medical specialists. AIMS We investigated perspectives, knowledge and training of medical specialists in the three largest (populations and medical workforces) Australian states, concerning the WWLST law. METHODS Following expert legal review, specialist focus groups, pre-testing and piloting in each state, seven specialties involved with end-of-life care were surveyed, with a variety of statistical analyses applied to the responses. RESULTS Respondents supported the need to know and follow the law. There were mixed views about its helpfulness in medical decision-making. Over half the respondents conceded poor knowledge of the law; this was mirrored by critical gaps in knowledge that varied by specialty. There were relatively low but increasing rates of education from the undergraduate to continuing professional development (CPD) stages. Mean knowledge score did not vary significantly according to undergraduate or immediate postgraduate training, but CPD training, particularly if recent, resulted in greater knowledge. Case-based workshops were the preferred CPD instruction method. CONCLUSIONS Teaching of current and evolving law should be strengthened across all stages of medical education. This should improve understanding of the role of law, ameliorate ambivalence towards the law, and contribute to more informed deliberation about end-of-life issues with patients and families.
Resumo:
In this paper, we propose law reform with respect to the unilateral withholding or withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment in Australia and New Zealand. That is, where a doctor withholds or withdraws potentially life-sustaining treatment without consent from a patient or a patient’s substitute decision-maker (where the patient lacks capacity), or authorisation from a court or tribunal, or by operation of a statute or justifiable government or institutional policy. Our proposal is grounded in the core values that do (or should) underpin a regulatory framework on an issue such as this; these values are drawn from existing commitments made by Australia and New Zealand through legislation, the common law, and conventions and treaties. It is also grounded in a critical review of the law on unilateral withholding and withdrawal as well as the legal context within which this issue sits in Australasia. We argue that the current law is inconsistent with the core values and develop a proposal for a legal response to this issue that more closely aligns with the core values it is supposed to serve.
Resumo:
Recent years have seen a growing recognition that dementia is a terminal illness and that patients with advanced dementia nearing the end of life do not currently receive adequate palliative care. However, research into palliative care for these patients has thus far been limited. Furthermore, there has been little discussion in the literature regarding medication use in patients with advanced dementia who are nearing the end of life, and discontinuation of medication has not been well studied despite its potential to reduce the burden on the patient and to improve quality of life. There is limited, and sometimes contradictory, evidence available in the literature to guide evidence-based discontinuation of drugs such as acetylcholinesterase inhibitors, antipsychotic agents, HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors (statins), antibacterials, antihypertensives, antihyperglycaemic drugs and anticoagulants. Furthermore, end-of-life care of patients with advanced dementia may be complicated by difficulties in accurately estimating life expectancy, ethical considerations regarding withholding or withdrawing treatment, and the wishes of the patient and/or their family. Significant research must be undertaken in the area of medication discontinuation in patients with advanced dementia nearing the end of life to determine how physicians currently decide whether medications should be discontinued, and also to develop the evidence base and provide guidance on systematic medication discontinuation.
Resumo:
The principle of autonomy is at the heart of the right of a competent individual to make an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, and to have that directive complied with by medical professionals. That right is protected by both the common law and, to an extent, by legislation that has been enacted in the United Kingdom and many jurisdictions in Australia. The courts have a critical role in protecting that autonomy, both in those jurisdictions in which the common law continues to operate, and in those jurisdictions which are now governed by statute, and in which judicial determinations will need to be made about legislative provisions. The problem explored in this article is that while the judiciary espouses the importance of autonomy in its judgments, that rhetoric is frequently not reflected in the decisions that are reached. In the United Kingdom and Australia, there is a relatively small number of decisions that consider the validity and applicability of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. This article critically evaluates all of the publicly available decisions and concludes that there is cause for concern. In some cases, there has been an unprincipled evolution of common law principles, while in others there has been inappropriate adjudication through operational irregularities or failure to apply correct legal principles. Further, some decisions appear to be based on a strained interpretation of the facts of the case. The apparent reluctance of some members of the judiciary to give effect to advance directives that refuse treatment is also evidenced by the language used in the judgments. While the focus of this article is on common law decisions, reference will also be made to legislation and the extent to which it has addressed some of the problems identified in this article.
Resumo:
The principle of autonomy underpins legal regulation of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. The primacy of autonomy in this domain is recognised expressly in the case law, through judicial pronouncement, and implicitly in most Australian jurisdictions, through enactment into statute of the right to make an advance directive. This article seeks to justify autonomy as an appropriate principle for regulating advance directives and relies on three arguments: the necessity of autonomy in a liberal democracy; the primacy of autonomy in medical ethics discourse; and the uncontested importance of autonomy in the law on contemporaneous refusal of medical treatment. This article also responds to key criticisms that autonomy is not an appropriate organising principle to underpin legal regulation of advance directives.
Resumo:
When should a person who has a heart attack not be resuscitated? When should a patient no longer be kept alive on a ventilator, or be provided with food and water by a tube? When should a person not be given a blood transfusion they need to stay alive? The answers to these questions depend on a number of factors including the mental or physical condition of the patient and any wishes they have expressed prior to losing the ability to make this decision, as well as the requirements of good medical practice. This video is a record of a public lecture held on 7 July 2004 by the Faculty of Law at the Queensland University of Technology, in association with the Faculty of Health, the Centre for Palliative Care Research and Education, and Palliative Care Queensland.
Resumo:
What do emergency physicians think of law? Do they know the law? What role does it have in the practice of emergency medicine? Emergency physicians in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland are being asked about these issues in a study by the Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia, titled ‘Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity: The role of law in medical practice’. The study aims to examine the role that law plays in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity.