Reducing SCADA System Nuisance Alarms in the Water Industry in Northern Ireland

The advancement of telemetry control for the water industry has increased the difficulty of 14 managing large volumes of nuisance alarms (i.e. alarms that do not require a response). The aim 15 of this study was to identify and reduce the number of nuisance alarms that occur for Northern 16 Ireland (NI) Water by carrying-out alarm duration analysis to determine the appropriate length of 17 persistence (an advanced alarm management tool) that could be applied. All data was extracted 18 from TelemWeb (NI Water’s telemetry monitoring system) and analysed in Excel. Over a 6 19 week period, an average of 40,000 alarms occurred per week. The alarm duration analysis, which 20 has never been implemented before by NI Water, found that an average of 57% of NI Water 21 alarms had a duration of <5 minutes. Applying 5 minute persistence; therefore, could prevent an 22 average 26,816 nuisance alarms per week. Most of these alarms were from wastewater assets.

The poetics of corporate reporting:evidence from the UK water industry

This paper is predicated upon the assumption that the annual accounts of companies constitute important corporate artefacts in their own right that are both image and rhetoric intensive. The objective is to import concepts from structural poetics and bring them to bear on annual corporate reports. The understanding of the poetics of corporate reporting in this manner is of importance as it allows the consideration of the relationship between the audience and the authors of the script to be explored. We do this by analysing the annual reports of various water companies in the UK.

Regulatory price performance, excess cost indexes and profitability:how effective is price cap regulation in the water industry?

In this study we apply an index number approach to allow for cross sectional comparisons of relative profitability, productivity and price performance of the regulated Water and Sewerage companies (WaSCs) in England and Wales during the years 1991-2008. In order to better analyse the impact of regulation on WaSC performance, we decompose actual economic profits into spatial multilateral Fisher productivity (TFP) index, the inverse of which is demonstrated to be a regulatory excess cost index that measures the deviation of a firm’s actual costs from benchmark costs, and a newly developed regulatory total price performance (TPP) index, which measures the excess of regulated revenues relative to benchmark costs. Increases (decreases) in regulatory price performance are indicative of the loosening (tightening) of price cap regulation. Moreover, we also show that the relationship between actual economic profitability, regulatory excess costs and regulatory price performance indices can be used to categorize regulatory price caps as “weak”, “powerful” or “catch-up promoting”. The results indicated that throughout the entire 1991-2008 period, price caps were never “powerful”, in the sense that they required less productive firms to immediately and fully catch-up to the most productive firm to regain economic profitability. More specifically, during the years 1991-2000 price caps were “weak” as prices were high enough for the firms to achieve economic profits despite their low productivity levels. However, after 2001 prices became “catch up promoting” as they required less productive companies to eliminate at least some excess costs in order to eliminate economic losses. Finally, we emphasize that as our results also clearly demonstrated a much closer alignment between allowed revenues and benchmark costs after 2001, Ofwat’s approach during this period was not only appropriate, but should also be continued in the 2009 price review.

Productivity change in the water industry in England and Wales:application of the meta-Malmquist Index

This paper uses a meta-Malmquist index for measuring productivity change of the water industry in England and Wales and compares this to the traditional Malmquist index. The meta-Malmquist index computes productivity change with reference to a meta-frontier, it is computationally simpler and it is circular. The analysis covers all 22 UK water companies in existence in 2007, using data over the period 1993–2007. We focus on operating expenditure in line with assessments in this field, which treat operating and capital expenditure as lacking substitutability. We find important improvements in productivity between 1993 and 2005, most of which were due to frontier shifts rather than catch up to the frontier by companies. After 2005, the productivity shows a declining trend. We further use the meta-Malmquist index to compare the productivities of companies at the same and at different points in time. This shows some interesting results relating to the productivity of each company relative to that of other companies over time, and also how the performance of each company relative to itself over 1993–2007 has evolved. The paper is grounded in the broad theory of methods for measuring productivity change, and more specifically on the use of circular Malmquist indices for that purpose. In this context, the contribution of the paper is methodological and applied. From the methodology perspective, the paper demonstrates the use of circular meta-Malmquist indices in a comparative context not only across companies but also within company across time. This type of within-company assessment using Malmquist indices has not been applied extensively and to the authors’ knowledge not to the UK water industry. From the application perspective, the paper throws light on the performance of UK water companies and assesses the potential impact of regulation on their performance. In this context, it updates the relevant literature using more recent data.

Scale and scope economies and the efficient vertical and horizontal configuration of the water industry:a survey of the literature

This paper surveys the literature on scale and scope economies in the water and sewerage industry. The magnitude of scale and scope economies determines the cost efficient configuration of any industry. In the case of a regulated sector, reliable estimates of these economies are relevant to inform reform proposals that promote vertical (un)bundling and mergers. The empirical evidence allows some general conclusions. First, there is considerable evidence for the existence of vertical scope economies between upstream water production and distribution. Second, there is only mixed evidence on the existence of (dis)economies of scope between water and sewerage activities. Third, economies of scale exist up to certain output level, and diseconomies of scale arise if the company increases its size beyond this level. However, the optimal scale of utilities also appears to vary considerably between countries. Finally, we briefly consider the implications of our findings for water pricing and point to several directions for necessary future empirical research on the measurement of these economies, and explaining their cross country variation.