Informal sanctions and conditional cooperation: : A natural experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good.

In a natural experiment, this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals’ voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers’ actual cash contributions in two ski resorts, one with and one without an informal sanctioning system, are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function, i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual’s own contribution. In contrast, the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others’ contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.

The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions

In public goods experiments, stochastic choice, censoring and motivational heterogeneity give scope for disagreement over the extent of unselfishness, and whether it is reciprocal or altruistic. We show that these problems can be addressed econometrically, by estimating a finite mixture model to isolate types, incorporating double censoring and a tremble term. Most subjects act selfishly, but a substantial proportion are reciprocal with altruism playing only a marginal role. Isolating reciprocators enables a test of Sugden’s model of voluntary contributions. We estimate that reciprocators display a self-serving bias relative to the model.

Further investigations of framing effects on cooperative choices in a provision point mechanism

We investigate whether framing effects of voluntary contributions are significant in a provision point mechanism. Our results show that framing significantly affects individuals of the same type: cooperative individuals appear to be more cooperative in the public bads game than in the public goods game, whereas individualistic subjects appear to be less cooperative in the public bads game than in the public goods game. At the aggregate level of pooling all individuals, the data suggests that framing effects are negligible, which is in contrast with the established result.

SUSTAINABILITY OF OPEN ACCESS SERVICES: Phase 3: The Collective Provision of Open Access Resources

The report ‘Sustainability of Open Access Services - Phase 3: The Collective Provision of Open Access Resources’ discusses the economic and institutional issues faced by those sustaining free infrastructure services. It also identifies strategies to coordinate the collective provision of infrastructure services. These considerations are valuable input for the phases 4 and 5 of the project ‘Sustainability of Open Access Services’. This body of work will lead to practical recommendations for funders and project planners to consider when initiating an infrastructure service. The report was written by Raym Crow and funded by SPARC. Several key messages from the report are of interest. Providing infrastructure services as a public good imposes specific requirements on the design of the sustainability model. The challenge is to get enough institutions to reveal their demand for the service and support this. Arguments for an institution to support can be altruism or reciprocity or there being sufficient benefit to the institution for supporting a service. Institutions can also work together on a service through collective action (collecting voluntary contributions) and cross subsidies (funding collected by offering exclusive benefits to contributors).

State and society in the English countryside: the rural community movement 1918-1939

This paper assesses the relationship between state and society in interwar rural England, focusing on the hitherto neglected role of the Rural Community Councils (RCCs). The rise of statutory social provision in the early twentieth century created new challenges and opportunities for voluntaryism, and the rural community movement was in part a response. The paper examines the early development of the movement, arguing that a crucial role was played by a close-knit group of academics and local government officials. While largely eschewing party politics, they shared a commitment to citizenship, democracy and the promotion of rural culture; many of them had been close associates of Sir Horace Plunkett. The RCCs engaged in a wide range of activities, including advisory work, adult education, local history, village hall provision, support for rural industries and an ambivalent engagement with parish councils. The paper concludes with an assessment of the achievements of the rural community movement, arguing that it was constrained by its financial dependence on voluntary contributions.

Retirement income policy and the taxation of superannuation in Australia

Superannuation is a form of savings for retirement. The savings are invested and earn income, but the proceeds are generally not available until the beneficiary reaches retirement age} The federal government's retirement income policy has three components, two of which relate to superannuation: the age pension, which provides income support to men aged 65 and over and to women aged 62 and over.2 The pension is means tested and does not depend on previous labour force participation or individual contributions; a compulsory superannuation scheme (under the Superannuation Guarantee Charge (Administration) Act 1992 (SGA Act)), which requires contributions to be made by employers on behalf of all employees, whether full-time, part-time or casual;3 and encouragement, through the taxation system, of voluntary contributions to approved superannuation funds.4 In May 2002, the government released a report, the "Intergenerational Report", 5 which identifies issues associated with Australia's ageing population and considers the fiscal implications of those changes. The Report noted that a steadily ageing population is likely to place significant pressure on government finances. It also noted that one of the key priorities for ensuring fiscal sustainability should be "maintaining a retirement income policy that encourages private saving for retirement and reduces the future demand for the Age Pension". 6 The main way the government has sought to encourage that private saving is through the tax system, primarily by the use of tax concessions. Over the past 20 years, however, the taxation of superannuation has grown in an extremely ad hoc manner and is now inequitable, inefficient and overly complex. This article suggests that the taxation of superannuation in Australia is in urgent need of a complete review. The article further asserts that, if an appropriate framework can be devised, changes could be introduced as budgetary pressures allow.

Factors influencing retirement savings intentions in Botswana

 This study identified and tested some factors that affect retirement savings decisions in Botswana. Subjective norms, financial literacy and attitude were found to have positive effects on intentions to make additional voluntary contributions (AVC) to retirement savings. With these results, targeted intervention efforts will aid policy formulation designed to induce additional voluntary retirement savings.

An Experimental Investigation into ‘Pledge and Review’ in Climate Negotiations

A novelty of the new Paris Agreement is the inclusion of a process for assessment and review of countries’ nationally determined pledges and contributions. The intent is to reveal whether similar countries are making comparable pledges, whether the totality of such pledges will achieve the global goal, and whether, over the coming years, the contributions actually made by countries will equal or exceed their pledges. The intent is also to provide an opportunity for countries to express their approval, or disapproval, of the pledges and contributions made by individual countries. Here we report the results of a lab experiment on the effects of such a process in a game in which players choose a group target, declare their individual pledges, and then make voluntary contributions to supply a public good. Our results show that a review process is more likely to affect targets and pledges than actual contributions. Even when a review process increases average contributions, the effect is relatively small. As the window for achieving the 2 °C goal will close soon, our results suggest that, rather than merely implement the Paris Agreement, negotiators should begin now to develop complementary approaches to limiting emissions, including the adoption of agreements that are designed differently than the one adopted in Paris.

Evidence for a reference frame transformation of vestibular contributions to voluntary reaching movements

Les estimations des mouvements de soi provenant des signaux vestibulaires contribuent à la planification et l’exécution des mouvements volontaires du bras lorsque le corps se déplace. Cependant, comme les senseurs vestibulaires sont fixés à la tête alors que le bras est fixé au corps, les signaux vestibulaires doivent être transformés d’un système de référence centré sur la tête à un système centré sur le corps pour pouvoir contribuer de façon appropriée au contrôle moteur du bras. Le but premier de ce travail était d’étudier l’évidence d’une telle transformation. La stimulation galvanique vestibulaire (SGV) a été utilisée pour activer les afférences vestibulaires et simuler une rotation autour d’un axe naso-occipital fixe pendant que des sujets humains faisaient des mouvements du bras dans le plan horizontal, avec la tête dans différentes orientations. Une transformation des signaux vestibulaires implique que la SVG devrait simuler une rotation autour d’un axe horizontal lorsque la tête est droite et autour d’un axe vertical lorsque la tête est en flexion antérieure. La SGV devrait ainsi perturber les mouvements du bras en fonction de l’orientation de la tête. Nos résultats démontrent que les signaux vestibulaires contribuant aux mouvements d’atteinte sont effectivement transformés en un système de référence centrée sur le corps. Le deuxième but de ce travail était d’explorer les mécanismes utilisant ces signaux vestibulaires transformés. En comparant les effets de la SGV appliquée avant ou pendant les mouvements d’atteinte nous avons montré que les signaux vestibulaires transformés contribuent à des mécanismes de compensation distincts durant la planification des mouvements d’atteinte comparativement à l’exécution.

Organisational decline and renewal in an Australian voluntary association

Voluntary associations are an integral fonn of social capital in democratic societies. These associations make vital contributions to community life. Many associations are successful in meeting the needs of their constituency and thrive over many decades. These long serving associations are not static vehicles, like all organisations, they are subject to internal and external pressures for change. It is a significant challenge for volunteer associations to maintain 'a watch' on the external environment whilst responding to the needs of their stakeholders. Previously vibrant associations may experience a decline in membership and social standing as a result of significant changes in society and technology. We track a nonprofit voluntary association from its inception in the 1960s through it responses to major environmental turbulence during the late 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s when the survival of
the organisation was in doubt. We outline the changes that took place from 2003 that reorientated, revitalised and reshaped the association including a major shift in focus from services to members to services to the community. This study provides academics and practitioners with an appreciation of the forces of organisational decline and a case study of successful change in a voluntary association.

A comparative study of effectiveness of peer assessment of individuals’ contributions to group projects in undergraduate construction management core units

In recent years, various forms of group work have been introduced in university courses across various subject domains, including construction management courses. Although the use of group work in higher education has sound pedagogical reasons and advantages, group work has its own drawbacks. Therefore, the acceptance by students and the success of group work critically depend on a fair and credible assessment of the group process. In this paper, the implementation of different approaches to peer assessment (PA) of individuals’ contributions to group projects in two core units in an undergraduate construction management course in an Australian university is reported. The effectiveness of the adopted PA approaches have been evaluated and validated by students. It has been found that contrary to doubts of the sufficiency of a simplistic approach to PAs, the fairness of a PA approach does not necessarily depend on its complexity. Besides, voluntary group discussions, learning and collaboration are found to aid in improving each of the group’s camaraderie. Hence, it is recommended that academics should develop both a structured methodology to progressively encourage group members to work cohesively in teams and effective PA approaches that measure individual member’s contribution.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.