How do different entitlements to unemployment benefits affect the transitions from unemployment into employment?

In Portugal duration of benefits is exclusively age determined while replacement rates are essentially uniform. We exploit differences in potential maximum duration of benefits for nearly matched pairs of individuals to determine the effects of benefit duration on job finding. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Unemployment Benefits and Reservation Wages: Key Elasticities from a Stripped-Down Job Search Approach

This paper exploits survey information on reservation wages and data on actual wages from the European Community Household Panel to deduce, in the manner of Lancaster and Chesher, additional parameters of a stylized structural search model; specifically, reservation wage and transition/duration elasticities. The informational requirements of this approach are minimal, thereby facilitating comparisons between countries. Further, its policy content is immediate in so far as the impact of unemployment benefit rules and measures increasing the arrival rate of job offers are concerned. These key elasticities are computed for the United Kingdom and 11 other European nations.

Unemployment benefits and family finances : a study of income and expenditures of beneficiaries and their families in Utica, New York, 1958 : report of findings from a survey conducted /

Sponsored by New York State Dept. of Labor, Division of Employment.

Financing unemployment benefits : summary of proceedings of the Council's first conference on employment security objectives, July 25-26, 1962.

Mode of access: Internet.

The long-range financing of unemployment benefits under state unemployment compensation laws. A report to the Interstate conference of employment security agencies...

Paul A. Raushenbush, chairman.

Partial unemployment; administrative studies of unemployment insurance and of the interrelation of partial and total unemployment benefits including reports submitted by the industrial commissioner to the Legislature during the 1939 and 1940 sessions. Bureau of research and statistics, Meredith B. Givine, director. Division of placement and unemployment insurance, Milton O. Loysen, executive director.

Part II also issued separately.

An exploratory memorandum on partial unemployment benefits in the state unemployment compensation systems,

Mode of access: Internet.

Benefits and drawbacks of European Unemployment Insurance. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/06, September 2014

The issue: Unemployment in Europe has increased to high levels and economic growth has remained subdued. A debate on additional policy instruments to address the situation is therefore warranted. Fiscal stabilisation mechanisms have not provided adequate fiscal stabilisation during the crisis in some countries nor in the euro area as a whole. Different preferences and historical developments mean that national labour markets are differently organised, which sometimes hinders the efficient working of the monetary union. European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) has been proposed as a measure to contribute to fiscal policy management and improve labour markets. | Read more at Bruegel http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/847-benefits-and-drawbacks-of-european-unemployment-insurance/

Institutional Moral Hazard in the Multi-tiered Regulation of Unemployment and Social Assistance Benefits. CEPS Special Report No. 137/April 2016 Wednesday, 27 April 2016

This paper studies eight countries in which the regulation of unemployment benefits and related benefits and the concomitant activation of unemployed individuals has a multi-tiered architecture. It assesses their experiences and tries to understand possible problems of ‘institutional moral hazard’ that may emerge in the context of a hypothetical European Unemployment Benefit Scheme.

Applicant Reference Guide For Individuals Filing For Unemployment Insurance Benefits

This guide gives important information about how to receive unemployment benefits. Topics include: Privacy Act, Equal Opportunity Statement, Income and Eligibility Verification Notice, Unemployment Insurance Benefits, Eligibility requirements, Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees, Employment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers,School Worker Claims, Pension Reduction, Official Court Appearances and Benefit eligibility, Benefits are Based on Wages Paid, Initial Determination, Benefit Year, Waiting Period, Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount, To Establish a Weekly Benefit Amount, Disqualification, Fraudulent claims, Requests for Reconsideration, Appeal Provisions, Standard and Alternate Base Period Explained, Partial Employment,Self-Employment, Students, Interstate Benefits, Benefits Will Be Taxable, Individual Benefits, Filing Your Weekly Claim, Filing Your Weekly Claim Online,Filing Your Weekly Claim by TelClaim and New Hires.

How Does the Unemployment Insurance System Shape the Time Profile of Jobless Duration?

This paper updates a sparse literature on the effects of unemployment benefits (UB) on the time profile of escape rates from unemployment. These effects, as well as those of other regressors, are found to vary profoundly over the course of unemployment.

Six ways to leave unemployment

This paper uses a unique Portuguese dataset to examine the effect of access to unemployment benefits (UBs) and their maximum potential duration on escape rates from unemployment. In examining the time profile of transitions out of unemployment, the principal contributions of the paper are twofold. First, it provides a detailed state space of potential outcomes: open-ended employment, fixed-term contracts, part-time work, government-provided jobs, self employment, and labour force withdrawal. Second, it is able to exploit major exogenous discontinuities in the maximum duration of unemployment benefits to identify disincentive effects. While confirming strong disincentive effects, it is shown that use of an aggregate hazard function regression model compounds very different and even contradictory effects of the determinants of unemployment.

How Effective are Unemployment Benefit Sanctions? Looking Beyond Unemployment Exit

This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of benefit sanctions on post-unemployment outcomes such as post-unemployment employment stability and earnings. We use rich register data which allow us to distinguish between a warning that a benefit reduction may take place in the near future and the actual withdrawal of unemployment benefits. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-unemployment earnings. Actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post-unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Does the unemployment benefit institution affect the productivity of workers? evidence from a field experiment

We investigate whether and how the type of unemployment benefit institution affects productivity. We designed a field experiment to compare workers’ productivity under a welfare system, where the unemployed receive an unconditional monetary transfer, with their productivity under a workfare system, where the transfer is received conditional on the unemployed spending some time on ancillary activities. First, we find that having an unemployment benefit institution, regardless of whether it makes transfers conditional or unconditional, increases workers’ productivity. Second, we find that productivity is higher under Welfare than under Workfare. Becoming unemployed under Welfare comes at the psychological cost of a drop in self-esteem, presumably due to the shame or stigma associated with receiving an unconditional unemployment benefit. We document the empirical relevance of precisely this channel. The differences we observe in productivity suggest that this psychological cost acts as an extra nonmonetary incentive for workers under Welfare to put a higher effort in their work.

Unemployment insurance an analysis of optimal mechanisms under aggregate shocks

The purpose of this work is to provide a brief overview of the literature on the optimal design of unemployment insurance systems by analyzing some of the most influential articles published over the last three decades on the subject and extend the main results to a multiple aggregate shocks environment. The properties of optimal contracts are discussed in light of the key assumptions commonly made in theoretical publications on the area. Moreover, the implications of relaxing each of these hypothesis is reckoned as well. The analysis of models of only one unemployment spell starts from the seminal work of Shavell and Weiss (1979). In a simple and common setting, unemployment benefits policies, wage taxes and search effort assignments are covered. Further, the idea that the UI distortion of the relative price of leisure and consumption is the only explanation for the marginal incentives to search for a job is discussed, putting into question the reduction in labor supply caused by social insurance, usually interpreted as solely an evidence of a dynamic moral hazard caused by a substitution effect. In addition, the paper presents one characterization of optimal unemployment insurance contracts in environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. Finally, an extension to multiple aggregate shocks environment is considered. The paper ends with a numerical analysis of the implications of i.i.d. shocks to the optimal unemployment insurance mechanism.