Unemployment vs. mismatch of talents: Reconsidering unemployment benefits

We develop an equilibrium search-matching model with risk-neutral agentsand two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity. Unemployment insurance has thestandard effect of reducing employment, but also helps workers to get a suitable job. The predictions of our simple modelare consistent with the contrasting performance of the labor market in Europeand US in terms of unemployment, productivity growth and wage inequality.To show this, we construct two fictitious economies with calibratedparameters which only differ by the degree of unemployment insurance andassume that they are hit by a common technological shock which enhancesthe importance of mismatch. This shock reduces the proportion of jobs whichworkers regards as acceptable in the economy with unemployment insurance(Europe). As a result, unemployment doubles in this economy.In the laissez-faire economy (US), unemployment remains constant,but wage inequality increases more and productivity grows less due to largermismatch. The model can be used to address a number of normative issues.

Equilibrium Unemployment and the Duration of Unemployment Benefits

This paper uses microdata to evaluate the impact on the steady-state unemployment rate of an increase in maximum benefit duration. We evaluate a policy change in Austria that extended maximum benefit duration and use this policy change to estimate the causal impact of benefit duration on labor market flows. We find that the policy change leads to a significant increase in the steady-state unemployment rate and, surprisingly, most of this increase is due to an increase in the inflow into rather than the outflow from unemployment.

The effects of unemployment benefits on migration in lagging regions

[spa] En este trabajo se analizan los efectos sobre la movilidad geográfica de una política pública (SIPTEA) que aumenta la protección por desempleo en Extremadura y Andalucía. Utilizando la discontinuidad geográfica en la política estudiada y datos de los Censos de Población de 1981 y 1991 a nivel municipal, se estima el efecto de SIPTEA en el crecimiento de la población y en las probabilidades de emigrar e inmigrar en áreas rurales que experimentan elevadas tasas de paro y de emigración. Los resultados del trabajo indican que la política mitigó estas pérdidas de población aunque los efectos son cuantitativamente moderados. También se exploran los efectos de dicha política en el ámbito laboral, encontrándose un incremento de la tasa del desempleo asociado a la implementación de la política de entre 10 y 13 puntos porcentuales.

The effects of unemployment benefits on migration in lagging regions

[spa] En este trabajo se analizan los efectos sobre la movilidad geográfica de una política pública (SIPTEA) que aumenta la protección por desempleo en Extremadura y Andalucía. Utilizando la discontinuidad geográfica en la política estudiada y datos de los Censos de Población de 1981 y 1991 a nivel municipal, se estima el efecto de SIPTEA en el crecimiento de la población y en las probabilidades de emigrar e inmigrar en áreas rurales que experimentan elevadas tasas de paro y de emigración. Los resultados del trabajo indican que la política mitigó estas pérdidas de población aunque los efectos son cuantitativamente moderados. También se exploran los efectos de dicha política en el ámbito laboral, encontrándose un incremento de la tasa del desempleo asociado a la implementación de la política de entre 10 y 13 puntos porcentuales.

Unemployment benefits and family finances : a study of income and expenditures of beneficiaries and their families in Utica, New York, 1958 : report of findings from a survey conducted /

Sponsored by New York State Dept. of Labor, Division of Employment.

Financing unemployment benefits : summary of proceedings of the Council's first conference on employment security objectives, July 25-26, 1962.

Mode of access: Internet.

The long-range financing of unemployment benefits under state unemployment compensation laws. A report to the Interstate conference of employment security agencies...

Paul A. Raushenbush, chairman.

Partial unemployment; administrative studies of unemployment insurance and of the interrelation of partial and total unemployment benefits including reports submitted by the industrial commissioner to the Legislature during the 1939 and 1940 sessions. Bureau of research and statistics, Meredith B. Givine, director. Division of placement and unemployment insurance, Milton O. Loysen, executive director.

Part II also issued separately.

An exploratory memorandum on partial unemployment benefits in the state unemployment compensation systems,

Mode of access: Internet.

Benefits and drawbacks of European Unemployment Insurance. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/06, September 2014

The issue: Unemployment in Europe has increased to high levels and economic growth has remained subdued. A debate on additional policy instruments to address the situation is therefore warranted. Fiscal stabilisation mechanisms have not provided adequate fiscal stabilisation during the crisis in some countries nor in the euro area as a whole. Different preferences and historical developments mean that national labour markets are differently organised, which sometimes hinders the efficient working of the monetary union. European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) has been proposed as a measure to contribute to fiscal policy management and improve labour markets. | Read more at Bruegel http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/847-benefits-and-drawbacks-of-european-unemployment-insurance/

Institutional Moral Hazard in the Multi-tiered Regulation of Unemployment and Social Assistance Benefits. CEPS Special Report No. 137/April 2016 Wednesday, 27 April 2016

This paper studies eight countries in which the regulation of unemployment benefits and related benefits and the concomitant activation of unemployed individuals has a multi-tiered architecture. It assesses their experiences and tries to understand possible problems of ‘institutional moral hazard’ that may emerge in the context of a hypothetical European Unemployment Benefit Scheme.

Applicant Reference Guide For Individuals Filing For Unemployment Insurance Benefits

This guide gives important information about how to receive unemployment benefits. Topics include: Privacy Act, Equal Opportunity Statement, Income and Eligibility Verification Notice, Unemployment Insurance Benefits, Eligibility requirements, Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees, Employment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers,School Worker Claims, Pension Reduction, Official Court Appearances and Benefit eligibility, Benefits are Based on Wages Paid, Initial Determination, Benefit Year, Waiting Period, Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount, To Establish a Weekly Benefit Amount, Disqualification, Fraudulent claims, Requests for Reconsideration, Appeal Provisions, Standard and Alternate Base Period Explained, Partial Employment,Self-Employment, Students, Interstate Benefits, Benefits Will Be Taxable, Individual Benefits, Filing Your Weekly Claim, Filing Your Weekly Claim Online,Filing Your Weekly Claim by TelClaim and New Hires.

How Effective are Unemployment Benefit Sanctions? Looking Beyond Unemployment Exit

This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of benefit sanctions on post-unemployment outcomes such as post-unemployment employment stability and earnings. We use rich register data which allow us to distinguish between a warning that a benefit reduction may take place in the near future and the actual withdrawal of unemployment benefits. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-unemployment earnings. Actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post-unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Turbulence and unemployment in a job matching model

According to Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), high European unemployment since the 1980s can be explained by a rise in economic turbulence, leading to greater numbers of unemployed workers with obsolete skills. These workers refuse new jobs due to high unemployment benefits. In this paper we reassess the turbulence-unemployment relationship using a matching model with endogenous job destruction. In our model, higher turbulence reduces the incentives of employed workers to leave their jobs. If turbulence has only a tiny effect on the skills of workers experiencing endogenous separation, then the results of Lungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2004) are reversed, and higher turbulence leads to a reduction in unemployment. Thus, changes in turbulence cannot provide an explanation for European unemployment that reconciles the incentives of both unemployed and employed workers.

Unemployment duration and workers' wage aspirations in Spain

This paper examines unemployed workers' declared willingness to work for a wage lower than the one warranted by their qualification. We analyze which personal and economic characteristics determine thiswillingness and how it changes as unemployment spells lengthen. Moreover, we also study the influence of this willingness on unemployment duration. The main results are: (i) Young workers, those less educated and those living in regions with high unemployment show a more positive attitude towards accepting lower wages while married women with a working husband show more negative attitudes; (ii) The exhaustion of unemployment benefits has positive effects in the transition probability of the attitude from negative to positive; (iii) The effect of this attitude on the unemployment hazard rate is positive but only marginally significant which may be showing that this willingness is not only reflecting the worker's reservation wage but also some unobserved heterogeneity; (iv) The negative duration dependence of the unemployment hazard rate is substantially reduced when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for.