The ADHD debate and the philosophy of truth

There is ongoing and wide-ranging dispute over the proliferation of childhood behaviour disorders. In particular, the veracity of the category Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), has been the subject of considerable scepticism. With no end to the debate in sight, it will be argued here that the problem might effectively be approached, not by addressing the specific features of ADHD itself, but rather by a philosophical analysis of one of the terms around which this entire problem revolves: that is, the notion of truth. If we state: “It is true that ADHD is a real disorder”, what exactly do we mean? Do we mean that it is an objective fact of nature? Do we mean that it fits seamlessly with other sets of ideas and explanations? Or do we simply mean that it works as an idea in a practical sense? This paper will examine the relationship between some of the dominant models of truth, and the assertions made by those in the field of ADHD. Specifically, the paper will contrast the claim that ADHD is a real disorder, with the claim that ADHD is a product of social governance. The intention is, first, to place some significant qualifications upon the validity of the truth-claims made by ADHD advocates, and second, to re-emphasise the potential and promise of philosophical investigation in providing productive new ways of thinking about some obstinate and seemingly intractable educational problems.

‘A cataclysm of truth from the crisis of falsehood’: reading Habermas on Calvino

Interest in the possibility of a Habermasian approach to literary criticism has recently been sparked by several book-length contributions from scholars working in the field of Frankfurt School Critical Theory. This article seeks to clarify the conceptual stakes in the current debate, which concern whether literature makes truth claims or merely imaginatively discloses new perceptions with a truth potential, by returning to Habermas’s most extended encounter with a literary work since the 1970s. Against the background of the philosophical issues, I re-read to Calvino’s highly self-reflexive If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller to show that in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas has managed to get everything backwards. Literature here reads philosophy alright, but not in the sense of the ludic deconstruction of rational argumentation into rhetorical play that Habermas supposes. Using the notion of an ontological poetics of self-reflexive literature, and with some help from Lacanian psychoanalysis, I interpret Calvino’s novel as a sustained meditation on the connection between authentic literature and the desire to read. In this light, it not only looks like Habermas has missed his polemical target, but, also, and more significantly, it becomes clear that abandonment of the link between literature and truth is misguided.

The logic of ADHD : a brief review of fallacious reasoning

This paper has two central purposes: the first is to survey some of the more important examples of fallacious argument, and the second is to examine the frequent use of these fallacies in support of the psychological construct: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The paper divides 12 familiar fallacies into three different categories—material, psychological and logical—and contends that advocates of ADHD often seem to employ these fallacies to support their position. It is suggested that all researchers, whether into ADHD or otherwise, need to pay much closer attention to the construction of their arguments if they are not to make truth claims unsupported by satisfactory evidence, form or logic.

ADHD : a case study in fallacy

This paper has two central purposes: the first is to survey some of the more important examples of fallacious argument, and the second is to examine the frequent use of these fallacies in support of the psychological construct: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The paper divides twelve familiar fallacies into three different categories—material, psychological and logical—and contends that advocates of ADHD often seem to employ these fallacies to support their position. It is suggested that all researchers, whether into ADHD or otherwise, need to pay much closer attention to the construction of their arguments if they are not to make truth claims unsupported by satisfactory evidence, form or logic.

Uskonto ilman uskontoa : Radikaalin postmodernin uskonnonfilosofian haaste

Religion without religion. The challenge of radical postmodern philosophy of religion. The aim of this study is to examine the central ideas of Mark C. Taylor, Don Cupitt, and Grace Jantzen on the subject of the philosophy of religion. The method is a qualitative, systematic analysis of the works of the aforementioned philosophers. The purpose is to present, analyze, identify, find connections, and to gain an understanding of the original texts. This thesis shows that radical postmodern religion is “religion without religion”. God is “dead” and the concept of God is seen as “writing”, an ideal, a relationship of meanings or a language. In ethics, there are no objective values or principles. People must create their own morality. Reality is each person´s concept of reality. Language is universal in that language and reality cannot be considered separately. The human subject is contingent and formed in the linguistic and social context. According to postmodern feminism, the ideas that men present as facts are often degrading to women, distort reality and support the power of men. For this reason, we should create a new kind of philosophy of religion and a new language that takes women into consideration. Finally, we will study some philosophers, who have used postmodern ideas in a more moderate manner. In this way, we will look for a balanced solution between modernism and postmodernism. This study shows that the postmodern idea of religion is very different from classical Christianity. Ethics becomes subjective, anarchistic and nihilistic. Epistemology is relativistic and the human being becomes the measure of all things. Objective reality becomes blurry. Language is seen to be game-like, and it has no relation to reality. The moral responsibility of a subject becomes problematic. Science and rationality come into question without the permanent core provided by our consciousness. Women are not in an epistemologically privileged position. The truth claims by either men or women must each be evaluated one at a time. Many postmodern ideas can successfully be made of use if used in moderate manner.

Policing expert testimony in a death investigation: Medical opinion as legal fact

Within coronial investigations, pathologists are called upon to given evidence as to cause of death. This evidence is given great weight by the coroners; after all, scientific ‘truth’ is widely deemed to be far more reliable than legal ‘opinion’. The purpose of this paper is to examine the ontological and epistemological status of that evidence, from the perspectives of both the pathologists and the coroners. As part of an Australian Research Council Linkage Grant, interviews were conducted with seven pathologists and 10 coroners from within the Queensland coronial system. Contrary to expectations, and the work of philosophers of science, such as Feyerabend (1975), pathologists did not present their findings in terms of unequivocal facts or objective truths relating to causes of death. Rather, their evidence was largely presented as ‘educated opinion’ based upon ‘the weight of evidence’. It was actually the coroners who translated that opinion into ‘medical fact’ within the proceedings of their death investigations, arguably as a consequence of the administrative necessity to reach a clear-cut finding as to cause of death, and on the basis of their own understanding of the ontology of medical knowledge. These findings support Latour’s (2010) claim that law requires a fundamentally different epistemology to science, and that science is not entirely to blame for the extravagant truth-claims made on its behalf

Most Haunted and the Convergence of Traditional Belief and Popular Television

Koven, M. (2007). Most Haunted and the Convergence of Traditional Belief and Popular Television. Folklore. 118(2), pp.183-202. RAE2008

A Theological Challenge: Coordinating Biological, Social, and Religious Visions of Humanity

This paper attempts two tasks. First, it sketches how the natural sciences (including especially the biological sciences), the social sciences, and the scientific study of religion can be understood to furnish complementary, consonant perspectives on human beings and human groups. This suggests that it is possible to speak of a modern secular interpretation of humanity (MSIH) to which these perspectives contribute (though not without tensions). MSIH is not a comprehensive interpretation of human beings, if only because it adopts a posture of neutrality with regard to the reality of religious objects and the truth of theological claims about them. MSIH is certainly an impressively forceful interpretation, however, and it needs to be reckoned with by any perspective on human life that seeks to insert its truth claims into the arena of public debate. Second, the paper considers two challenges that MSIH poses to specifically theological interpretations of human beings. On the one hand, in spite of its posture of religious neutrality, MSIH is a key element in a class of wider, seemingly antireligious interpretations of humanity, including especially projectionist and illusionist critiques of religion. It is consonance with MSIH that makes these critiques such formidable competitors for traditional theological interpretations of human beings. On the other hand, and taking the religiously neutral posture of MSIH at face value, theological accounts of humanity that seek to coordinate the insights of MSIH with positive religious visions of human life must find ways to overcome or manage such dissonance as arises. The goal of synthesis is defended as important, and strategies for managing these challenges, especially in light of the pluralism of extant philosophical and theological interpretations of human beings, are advocated.

The Transnational Geography of Sexual Rights

Among the signal developments of the last third of the twentieth century has been the emergence of a new politics of human rights. The transnational circulation of norms, networks, and representations has advanced human rights claims in ways that have reshaped global practices. Just as much as the transnational flow of capital, the new human rights politics are part of the phenomenon that has come to be termed globalization. Shifting the focus from the sovereignty of the nation to the rights of individuals, regardless of nationality, the interplay between the local and the global in these new human rights claims are fundamentally redrawing the boundaries between the rights of individuals, states, and the international community. Truth Claims brings together for the first time some of the best new work from a variety of disciplinary and geographic perspectives exploring the making of human rights claims and the cultural politics of their representations. All of the essays, whether dealing with the state and its victims, receptions of human rights claims, or the status of transnational rights claims in the era of globalization, explore the potentialities of an expansive humanistic framework. Here, the authors move beyond the terms -- and the limitations -- of the universalism/relativism debate that has so defined existing human rights literature.

The Role of Subjectivity and Knowledge Power Struggles in the Formation of Public Policy

There is a growing incentive for sociologists to demonstrate the use value of their research. Research ‘impact’ is a driver of research funding and a measure of academic standing. Academic debate on this issue has intensified since Burawoy’s (2004) call for a ‘public’ sociology. However the academy is no longer the sole or primary producer of knowledge and empirical sociologists need to contend with the ‘huge swathes’ of social data that now exist (Savage and Burrows, 2007). This article furthers these debates by considering power struggles between competing forms of knowledge. Using a case study, it specifically considers the power struggle between normative and empirical knowledge, and how providers of knowledge assert legitimacy for their truth claims. The article concludes that the idea of ‘impact’ and ‘use-value’ are extremely complex and depends in the policy context on knowledge power struggles, and on how policy makers want to view the world. © The Author(s) 2012

“How Can a Woman Who Has Been Raped Be Believed?”: Andrea Dworkin, Sexual Violence and the Ethics of Belief

In June 2000, Andrea Dworkin, an American feminist activist and author, published an account of being raped in a Paris hotel room a year earlier. The story was met with widespread disbelief, including from feminist readers. This article explores the reasons for this disbelief, asking how and why narratives of rape are granted – or denied – truth status by their readers. The article argues for understanding the conferral of belief as a narrative transaction involving the actions of both narrator and reader. It posits that Dworkin was widely seen as an unreliable narrator but argues that for ideologically charged narratives such as rape narratives judgements of reliability and belief inevitably draw upon the normative standpoint of the reader. I suggest that there are opposing criteria for establishing the truth of rape narratives; a ‘factual’ or legal model, which sees rape narratives as requiring scrutiny, and an ‘experiential’ model, located within certain strands of feminist politics, which emphasises the ethical importance of believing women’s narratives. The article finishes with a consideration of the place of belief within an ethics of reading and reception of rape narratives.

Most Haunted and the Convergence of Traditional Belief and Popular Television.

LivingTV's flagship series, Most Haunted, has been haunting the satellite network since 2002. The set-up of the series is straightforward: a team of investigators, including a historian, a parapsychologist, and "spiritualist medium" Derek Acorah, "legend-trip," spending the night at some location within the United Kingdom that is reputed to be haunted, with the hopes of catching on video concrete proof of the existence of ghosts. However, unlike other reality television or true-life supernatural television shows, Most Haunted includes and addresses the audience less as a spectator and more as an active participant in the ghost hunt. Watching Most Haunted, we are directed not so much to accept or reject the evidence provided, as to engage in the debate over the evidence's veracity. Like legend-telling in its oral form, belief in or rejection of the truth-claims of the story are less central than the possibility of the narrative's truth - a position that invites debates about those truth-claims. This paper argues that Most Haunted, in its premise and structure, not only depicts or represents legend texts (here ghost stories), but engages the audience in the debates about the status of its truth-claims, thereby bringing this mass-mediated popular culture text closer to the folkloristic, legend-telling dynamic than other similar shows.

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

Writing/reading a life : the rhetorical practice of autobiography

This essay examines how the introduction/preface to a non-fiction text is constructed as autobiographical practice – a sort of ‘introduction-as-memoir’. The use and autobiographical effects of rhetorical tropes (stake inoculation, metaphor and binary oppositions) are examined in the introduction that prefaces Massacre myth (Moran, 1999), a polemic account of the 1926 police massacre of Aborigines that was the catalyst for Australia’s ‘History Wars’. Using the analytical methods of deconstruction, I tease out how language, structure and a (seemingly) objective account of historical virtues are recruited to the project of autobiography, and illuminate the role of language in the construction of the authorial subject (and Others), and show how these are entangled with broader social, political and epistemological issues. The analysis underlines the dialogic relationship between text, reader and society, and the instability of truth claims and the authorial subject of autobiography.