Réformes institutionnelles sans révision du traité? = Institutional reforms without treaty revision? Research Paper in Law 3/2006

No abstract.

The Protocol of Frankfurt: a new treaty for the eurozone. EPC Discussion Paper, 12 January 2016

At a time when the EU finds itself in a perfect storm of crises which it seems unable to overcome, a bold move is needed to reinvigorate the EU’s system of government and stave off the risk of disintegration. In order to address the inherent weakness of the EU’s monetary and economic governance, this pamphlet proposes a new treaty for the eurozone: the Protocol of Frankfurt. Written by Andrew Duff, former Member of the European Parliament and Visiting Fellow at the EPC, it is the first ever attempt to draft a treaty aimed at setting up a fiscal union. “The Protocol of Frankfurt provides the constitutional framework for a proper economic government and will, hopefully, also serve to accelerate the debate on the Five Presidents’ Report”. Realising that the time is not ripe for a major constitutional overhaul, the pamphlet instead puts forward a shorter treaty revision that concentrates on re-engineering the Maastricht arrangements for the economic and monetary union, taking on the form of a Protocol to be added on to the existing Treaties. Article 48(2) of the Treaty on European Union allows the government of any member state, the European Parliament or the Commission to table amendments to the Treaties. Our hope is that somebody, informed by this draft Protocol, does just that.

HOLDING HANDS WHILE PARTING WAYS: EXAMINING ALLIANCE TREATY RENEGOTIATION

This study investigates the renegotiation of security alliances, specifically the structural conditions surrounding their revision. Although the field of international relations offers a rich discussion of the formation and violation of alliance treaties, few scholars have addressed the reasons why alliance members amend security obligations. After the formation of an alliance, a member may become dissatisfied owing to changes in the external and domestic security environments. A failure to address this discontent increases the risk of alliance breakdown. Members manage their alliance relationship through a negotiation process or intra-alliance bargaining in the search for a new arrangement that can endure. Factors that help to show commitment to the alliance and communicate a set of feasible solutions are crucial if members are to find a mutually acceptable arrangement. By taking these factors into account, allies are more likely to revise an existing treaty. Examining a set of bilateral alliances dating from 1945 to 2001, this research demonstrates that public requests for renegotiation compel allies to change the status quo. It is found that alliance-related fixed assets and the formation of external alliances increase the likelihood of treaty revision, though institutionalization of an alliance does not help to resolve interest divergence. In addition, this study examines the strategy of delay in intra-alliance bargaining. Allies may postpone a dispute by ignoring it while working to maintain the alliance. Tension among allies thus increases, but the alliance endures. I examine three alliances in order to illustrate this renegotiation process. Among these, the Anglo-Japanese alliance demonstrates two successful renegotiations that prolonged a wavering alliance relationship; the Sino-Soviet alliance is an example of failure owing to the lack of substantive cooperation; and the US-Taiwan alliance during the 1970s demonstrates successful use of a strategy of delay that appeases a dissatisfied member.

Reti transeuropee e servizi nei settori dell'energia, delle telecomunicazioni e dei trasporti

Le reti transeuropee sono uno dei vettori della competitività, dell’integrazione e dello sviluppo sostenibile dell’Unione. La tesi mette in luce la progressiva affermazione di una coerente politica infrastrutturale europea a carattere strumentale, esaminando tale evoluzione sotto tre profili: normativo, istituzionale e finanziario. In primo luogo, sotto il profilo normativo, la tesi evidenzia, da un lato, la progressiva emancipazione delle istituzioni dell’Unione dall’influenza degli Stati membri nell’esercizio delle proprie competenze in materia di reti transeuropee e, dall’altro, lo sviluppo di relazioni di complementarietà e specialità tra la politica di reti e altre politiche dell’Unione. L’elaborato sottolinea, in secondo luogo, sotto il profilo istituzionale, il ruolo del processo di «integrazione organica» dei regolatori nazionali e del processo di «agenzificazione» nel perseguimento degli obiettivi di interconnessione e accesso alle reti nazionali. La tesi osserva, infine, sotto il profilo finanziario, l’accresciuta importanza del sostegno finanziario dell’UE alla costituzione delle reti, che si è accompagnata al parziale superamento dei limiti derivanti dal diritto dell’UE alla politiche di spesa pubblica infrastrutturale degli Stati membri. Da un lato rispetto al diritto della concorrenza e, in particolare, al divieto di aiuti di stato, grazie al rapporto funzionale tra reti e prestazione di servizi di interesse economico generale, e dall’altro lato riguardo ai vincoli di bilancio, attraverso un’interpretazione evolutiva della cd. investment clause del Patto di stabilità e crescita. La tesi, in conclusione, rileva gli sviluppi decisivi della politica di reti europea, ma sottolinea il ruolo che gli Stati membri sono destinati a continuare ad esercitare nel suo sviluppo. Da questi ultimi, infatti, dipende la concreta attuazione di tale politica, ma anche il definitivo superamento, in occasione di una prossima revisione dei Trattati, dei retaggi intergovernativi che continuano a caratterizzare il diritto primario in materia.

The Convention on the Future of Europe: Extended Working Group or Constitutional Assembly? Research Papers in Law, 4/2005

From the Introduction. “We are a Convention. We are not an Intergovernmental Conference because we have not been given a mandate by Governments to negotiate on their behalf the solutions which we propose. We are not a Parliament because we are not elected by citizens to draft legislative texts. […] We are a Convention. What does this mean? A Convention is a group of men and women meeting for the sole purpose of preparing a joint proposal. […] It is a task modest in form but immense in content, for if it succeeds in accordance with our mandate, it will light up the future of Europe”.1 In his speech inaugurating the Convention process on 26 February 2002 in Brussels, Convention President VALÉRY GISCARD D’ESTAING raises three issues: first, he refers to the Convention’s nature and method; second, he talks of the Convention’s aim and output; and, third, he evokes the Convention’s historic and symbolic significance. All three aspects have been amply discussed in the past two years by politicians and academics analysing whether the Convention’s purpose and instruments differ fundamentally from those of previous reform rounds; whether the input into and output of the Convention process qualitatively improves European Treaty revision; and whether the Convention as an institution lived up to its symbolic and normative load, reflected in comparisons with “Philadelphia” or references to a “constitutional moment”.2

Will Cameron get what he wants? Anticipating reactions to Britain’s EU reform proposals. CEPS Commentary, 29 October 2015

After months of speculation about the British Prime Minister’s specific demands in terms of the “renegotiation” of the UK’s relationship with the EU, David Cameron has bowed to pressure from the heads of state or government of the other EU member states and committed himself to setting out the UK’s specific “concerns” in writing by early November. While we cannot be certain of the contents of David Cameron’s missive to the EU, his recent pronouncements before Parliament set out an agenda whose contours have become quite clear. In this Commentary the authors consider how far the other EU member states might be willing to accommodate Cameron’s demands and provide him with the political capital he seeks to lead the ‘in’ campaign. They distinguish four different attitudes among EU countries, and advocate a constructive approach that sets the scene for a Convention after 2017 – one that opens the treaty for a revision that could accommodate both the British demands for an ‘opt-out’ from ever closer union and gives leeway to those who wish to integrate further. Putting emphasis on strengthening the single market in the more immediate term would allow the Prime Minister to show his home audience that he is a leading reformer and that the EU gives oxygen to the British economy.This is an obvious area where he might be able to seal deals during the UK’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2017. The authors also consider what the European Council Conclusions on the UK’s wish list for EU reform might look like, given that any treaty revision before the time set for the UK referendum is unattainable. They present the results of a two-day simulation exercise involving a cross-section of national experts and present mock European Council Conclusions on the areas of ever closer union; the role of national parliaments; competitiveness; economic and monetary integration; and the free movement of labour.