Exchange relationships in building services maintenance activity : a test of transaction cost economics and the resource dependency view

The firm is faced with a decision concerning the nature of intra-organizational exchange relationships with internal human resources and the nature or inter-organizational exchange relationships with market firms. In both situations, the firm can develop an exchange that ranges from a discrete exchange to a relational exchange. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Resource Dependency View (RDV) represent alternative efficiency-based explanations fo the nature of the exchange relationship. The aim of the paper is to test these two theories in respect of air conditioning maintenance in retail centres. Multiple sources of information are genereated from case studies of Australian retail centres to test these theories in respoect of internalized operations management (concerning strategic aspects of air conditioning maintenance) and externalized planned routine air conditioning maintenance. The analysis of the data centres on pattern matching. It is concluded that the data supports TCE - on the basis of a development in TCE's contractual schema. Further research is suggested towards taking a pluralistic stance and developing a combined efficiency and power hypothesis - upon which Williamson has speculated. For practice, the conclusions also offer a timely cautionary note concerning the adoption of one approach in all exchange relationships.

Integrating the resource-based view and transaction cost economics in immigrant business performance

This paper presents a new integrated framework that integrates the resource-based view and transaction cost economics to explain the phenomenon of immigrant entrepreneurship. We extend the existing literature on immigrant entrepreneurship by identifying different types of ethnic network resources and demonstrating how these resources interact with transaction costs in the context of Chinese immigrants. Thus, our study contributes to the literature by providing a theoretical framework which identifies mechanisms immigrant entrepreneurs use to strategically deploy resources to minimize costs and maximize performance outcomes.

The transaction cost economics theory of the family firm: family-based human asset specificity and the bifurcation bias

We develop a transaction cost economics theory of the family firm, building upon the concepts of family-based asset specificity, bounded rationality, and bounded reliability. We argue that the prosperity and survival of family firms depend on the absence of a dysfunctional bifurcation bias. The bifurcation bias is an expression of bounded reliability, reflected in the de facto asymmetric treatment of family vs. nonfamily assets (especially human assets). We propose that absence of bifurcation bias is critical to fostering reliability in family business functioning. Our study ends the unproductive divide between the agency and stewardship perspectives of the family firm, which offer conflicting accounts of this firm type's functioning. We show that the predictions of the agency and stewardship perspectives can be usefully reconciled when focusing on how family firms address the bifurcation bias or fail to do so.

Interpreting risk allocation mechanism in public-private partnership projects : an empirical study in a transaction cost economics perspective

Risk allocation in public-private partnership (PPP) projects is currently claimed as capability driven. While lacking theoretical support, the claim is often 'violated' by current industrial practice. There is thus a need for formal mechanisms to interpret why a particular risk is retained by government in one project while transferred to private partners in another. From the viewpoint of transaction cost economics (TCE), integrated with the resource-based view (RBV) of organizational capabilities, this paper proposed a theoretical framework for understanding risk allocation practice in PPP projects. The theories underlying the major constructs and their links were articulated. Data gathered from an industry-wide survey were used to test the framework. The results of multiple linear regression (MLR) generally support the proposed framework. It has been found that partners' risk management routine, mechanism, commitment, cooperation history, and uncertainties associated with project risk management could serve to determine the risk allocation strategies adopted in a PPP project. This theoretical framework thus provides both government and private agencies with a logical and complete understanding of the process of selecting the allocation strategy for a particular risk in PPP projects. Moreover, it could be utilized to steer the risk allocation strategy by controlling certain critical determinants identified in the study. Study limitations and future research directions have also been set out.

Allocating risks in public-private partnership projects using a transaction cost economics approach - a case study

Public-private partnership (PPP) projects are often characterised by increased complexity and uncertainty due to their idiosyncrasy in the management and delivery processes such as long-term lifecycle, incomplete contracting, and the multitude of stakeholders. An appropriate risk allocation is particularly crucial to achieving project success. This paper focuses on the risk allocation in PPP projects and argues that the transaction cost economics (TCE) theory can integrate the economics part, which is currently missing, into the risk management research. A TCE-based approach is proposed as a logical framework for allocating risks between public and private sectors in PPP projects. A case study of the Southern Cross Station redevelopment project in Australia is presented to illustrate the approach. The allocation of important risks is put under scrutiny. Lessons learnt are discussed and alternative management approaches drawing on TCE theory are proposed.

The role of Transaction Cost Economics in information technology outsourcing research : a meta-analysis of the choice of contract type

Two recent reviews report that the empirical findings in information technology outsourcing (ITO) research are frequently inconsistent with the prevailing dominant analytical framework of transaction cost economics (TCE). While employing similar methodologies, the two reviews propose different strategies to resolve the inconsistencies. One is to improve the methodological rigor, specifically, the operationalization of TCE constructs. The other is to abandon TCE in favor of a new analytical framework. This paper presents a meta-analysis of the empirical findings on the choice of contract type as a function of task uncertainty. The results support both strategies. Refining the operationalization of TCE constructs, specifically of task uncertainty, would have improved the reliability of findings on TCE-based relationships between task uncertainty and the choice of contract type. However, independent of such methodological improvements, TCE is of limited relevance in recent ITO research for predicting the choice of contract type. Generalizing these findings, we conclude that ITO research requires a new analytical framework to further develop the theory of ITO and to provide sound guidance to the ITO industry.

Transaction cost economics and industry maturity in it outsourcing: a meta-analysis of contract type choice

Recent reviews of the information technology outsourcing (ITO) literature report high variance in research results when Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is used as the analytical framework. Informed by ITO market developments, including increasing commoditisation, market consolidation, and market transparency, we develop an explanation for these mixed results contingent on ITO industry maturity. We adopt meta-analysis to show that ITO industry maturity significantly explains variance in the choice of contract type (time and materials vs. fixed price) in ITO projects. Our results suggest that TCE is relevant to explain the choice of contract type in the emerging phase of the ITO industry, but not in its current mature phase. We conclude that a TCE-based analytical framework is not well suited for the study of ITO in the current mature industry phase. Instead, we propose that an "endogenous" ITO theory should be developed that focuses on differences in client behaviour rather than vendor behaviour.

Transaction Cost Analysis of PPP Risk Share

PPP (Public Private Partnerships) is a new operation mode of infrastructure projects, which usually undergo long periods and have various kinds of risks in technology, market, politics, policy, finance, society, natural conditions and cooperation. So the government and the private agency should establish the risk-sharing mechanism to ensure the successful implementation of the project. As an important branch of the new institutional economics, transaction cost economics and its analysis method have been proved to be beneficial to the proper allocation of risks between the two parts in PPP projects and the improvement of operation efficiency of PPP risk-sharing mechanism. This paper analyzed the transaction cost of the projects risk-sharing method and the both risk carriers. It pointed out that the risk-sharing method of PPP projects not only reflected the spirit of cooperation between public sector and private agency, but also minimized the total transaction cost of the risk sharing mechanism itself. Meanwhile, the risk takers had to strike a balance between the beforehand cost and the afterwards cost so as to control the cost of risk management. The paper finally suggested three ways which might be useful to reduce the transaction cost: to choose appropriate type of contract of PPP risk-sharing mechanism, to prevent information asymmetry and to establish mutual trust between the two participants.

Information sharing with key suppliers : a transaction cost theory perspective

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explain variations in discretionary information shared between buyers and key suppliers. The paper also aims to examine how the extent of information shared affects buyers’ performance in terms of resource usage, output, and flexibility. ----- ----- Design/methodology/approach: The data for the paper comprise 221 Finnish and Swedish non-service companies obtained through a mail survey. The hypothesized relationships were tested using partial least squares modelling with reflective and formative constructs.----- ----- Findings: The results of the study suggest that (environmental and demand) uncertainty and interdependency can to some degree explain the extent of information shared between a buyer and key supplier. Furthermore, information sharing improves buyers’ performance with respect to resource usage, output, and flexibility.----- ----- Research limitations/implications: A limitation to the paper relates to the data, which only included buyers.Abetter approach would have been to collect data from both, buyers and key suppliers. Practical implications – Companies face a wide range of supply chain solutions that enable and encourage collaboration across organizations. This paper suggests a more selective and balanced approach toward adopting the solutions offered as the benefits are contingent on a number of factors such as uncertainty. Also, the risks of information sharing are far too high for a one size fits all approach.----- ----- Originality/value: The paper illustrates the applicability of transaction cost theory to the contemporary era of e-commerce. With this finding, transaction cost economics can provide a valuable lens with which to view and interpret interorganizational information sharing, a topic that has received much attention in the recent years.

Towards the development of a construction supply chain transaction cost economic model for strategic infrastructure procurement evaluation

Australia has adopted public-private partnership (PPP) as a major strategy for procuring infrastructure for decades. However, even though considered to be a mature and sophisticated market, several major
failures have occurred resulting in increasing financial burdens on taxpayers. Failures have typically been traced back to economic evaluation and, in particular, value-for-money across the supply chain
in the original proposal. However, the literature review identified that there was no economic model that evaluated holistically the transaction costs of PPPs across the supply chain. In this paper, theories of transaction cost economics and construction supply chain economics are critiqued and analysed in order to develop a strategic infrastructure procurement evaluation model. The model will offer decision makers with an insight into project life cycle economic outcomes needed to successfully deliver PPPs.

Economists' perceptions versus managers' decisions:an experiment in transaction cost analysis

Are the perceptions of professional economists on transaction costs consistent with make-or-buy decisions made within firms? The answer may have important implications for transaction cost research. Data on firms' outsourcing during the new product development process are taken from a largescale survey of UK, German and Irish manufacturing plants, and we test the consistency of these outsourcing decisions with the predictions derived from the transaction cost perceptions of a panel of economists. Little consistency is evident between actual outsourcing patterns and the predictions of the (Williamsonian) transactions cost model derived from the panel of economists. There is, however, evidence of a systematic pattern to the differences, suggesting that a competence or resource-based approach may be relevant to understanding firm outsourcing, and that firms are adopting a strategic approach to managing their external relationships. © Cambridge Political Economy Society 2005; all rights reserved.

Transaction cost analysis

Transaction cost theory is one of the most widely used theories in marketing, management, and economics. The focus of the theory is on explaining how firms organize transactions. The rules by which transactions are organized is called governance. A wide variety of strategic decisions of firms, such as outsourcing, the mode of organizing exports, the use of crowdsourcing, or partner selection efforts, can be analyzed and understood using transaction cost theory. The basic argument of transaction cost theory is that firms economize on costs by choosing a form of governance that minimizes production and transaction costs. We discuss the origins and uses of the theory, critical variables, assumptions, and limitations.