Monopoly power, trade protection and growth: cross industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of monopoly power on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator, concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that industries with higher monopoly power are more protected than competitive sectors. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in sectors with higher monopoly power. We thus have evidence favoring recent growth literature which stresses that interest groups with control over creasing productivity. The results here confirm the first part of this argument and show that organized groups in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce competition.

Monopoly power and trade protection: cross- industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of industry concentration on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator. concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that the higher the concentration of a given industry the higher its leveI of trade protection. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in more concentrated sectors. Assuming that concentration is ;1 gCl()d proX\' for mOllopoh' po\\'er as it reduces the free-rider problem in coordinating a lobby the results in this paper indicates that interest groups with control over specific markets in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce (international) competition.

Do Labor Market Imperfections Increase Trade Protection? A Theoretical Investigation

Labor market imperfections are commonly believed to be a major reason for imposing trade impediments. In this paper, I introduce labor market rigidities that are prevalent in continental European countries into the well-known protection for sale model proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). I show that contrary to commonly held views, imperfections in the labor market do not necessarily increase equilibrium trade protection. A testable equilibrium trade protection equation is also derived. The findings in this paper are hence particularly relevant for empirical tests of trade policy determinants in economies with more regulated labor markets.

Can we obtain realistic parameter estimates for the 'protection for sale' model?

In the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of endogenous trade protection, sectoral lobbies try to influence an incumbent government that maximizes a weighted sum of political contributions and aggregate welfare. We empirically investigate this model using U.S. and Turkish data. Our specification is more tightly tied to theory than those in existing studies. Additionally, we assume all specific‐factor owners to be organized into different lobbies. These changes, validated by hypothesis tests, yield more realistic parameter estimates of the government's concern for aggregate welfare and of the fraction of population organized into lobbies.

Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: evidence from Brazil

This paper applies an endogenous lobby formation model to explain the extent of trade protection granted to Brazilian manufacturing industries during the 1988- 1994 trade liberalization episode. Using a panel data set covering this period, we find that even in an environment in which a major regime shift has been introduced, more concentrated sectors have been able to obtain policy advantages, that lead to a reduction in international competition. The importance of industry structure appears to be substantial: In our baseline specification, an increase in concentration by 20% leads to an increase in protection by 5%-7%.

Trade barriers and productivity growth: cross-industry evidence

This article investigates the impact of trade protection on the evolution of labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) of the Brazilian manufacturing sector. An annual panel-dataset of 16 industries for the years 1985 through 1997, a period that includes a major trade liberalization, was used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator (nominal tari®s and e®ective protection rate were used), control variables and time period and suggest that barriers to trade negatively a®ects productivity growth at industry level: those sectors with lower barriers experienced higher growth. We were also able to link the observed increase of industry productivity growth after 1991 to the widespread reduction on exective protection experienced in the country in the nineties.

The competitiveness of agrifoods in Central American and Caribbean countries in the context of trade liberalization

Includes bibliography

Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information

In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convincingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost- based dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.

Closing the productivity gap and trade *policy

The relationship between trade policy and productivity growth is regarded as ambiguous in the literature. This dissertation examines under what condition the relationship would be positive (or negative). Through the use of static and dynamic analysis, we find two conflicting effects (the pro-protection effect and the pro-competitive effect) that cause the relationship to be ambiguous. If there exists a productivity gap between the import-competing and foreign industries, and if the level of protection is low (high), the relationship is positive (negative). We also show that the import-competing firm responds to a change in the protection level by choosing a level of investment in innovation which yields a different rate of productivity growth. The policy implication, therefore, is that a trade-policy maker should set the trade protection at a level which induces the firm to choose the highest rate of productivity growth, and, as a result, leading the firm to close the initial productivity gap in the most efficient way. ^

Efeitos de abertura comercial sobre a evolução da produtividade industrial no Brasil

Este trabalho avalia a evolução da produtividade industrial brasileira — utilizando um painel de 16 setores da indústria de transformação no período 1985/97 — e o papel da abertura econômica neste processo. Os resultados mostram que a produtividade da indústria brasileira, seja ela medida pelo conceito de produtividade total dos fatores (PTF) ou de produtividade do trabalho, passou por duas fases distintas: de 1985 a 1990, há um processo de estagnação e de 1990 a 1997, a indústria passa a apresentar significativas taxas de crescimento. A abertura comercial, caracterizada por menores tarifas nominais e menores taxas de proteção efetiva, exerce um efeito positivo sobre o aumento da produtividade. Em todas as regressões do modelo — em que se utilizam técnicas de estimação em painéis — não se pode rejeitar a hipótese de que aumentos nas barreiras comerciais implicam menores taxas de crescimento da produtividade do trabalho e da PTF. Este resultado confirma a evidência internacional de que países mais abertos crescem mais rápido e desestimularia a adoção de políticas de restrição comercial como estratégia de desenvolvimento e de proteção à indústria nacional.

The debt crisis: a re-appraisal

The 1980s' debt crisis is a landmark in developing economies' growth and stabilization. According to the most quoted empirical articles, external shocks and vicissitudes gave rise to crisis just because of delays in stabilization policies, engendered by internal conflicts and institutional immaturity. I review some of these papers, and find out some problems - in the measurement of shocks and foreign indebtedness, namely - whose corrections lead to opposite results: external shocks and foreign indebtedness explain that crisis regardless of domestic policies. At the same time, the strong correlation of income distribution to terms of trade changes and foreign indebtedness suggest that inequality may have contributed differently to that crisis: either through an economic channel, or through a political channel based on delays in reforms.

Countervailing Duties in the USA

This paper reveals the characteristics of the ITC's decisions on countervailing duties, which have seldom been studied. The empirical evidences based on time series data show that there is a long run equilibrium relationship between affirmative countervailing decisions and macroeconomic variables such as economic growth rates and import penetration ratios. The error correction models show that there is a unidirectional causality from affirmative countervailing decisions to slower economic growth.

Scenarios for the Agricultural Sector in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. MEDPRO Report No. 4, March 2013

The paper builds predictive scenarios for the agricultural sector of eleven southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs), namely Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. First, it assesses the performance trends of the SEMCs’ agricultural sector, with a focus on production, consumption and trade patterns, incentives, trade protection policies and trade relations with the EU, productivity dynamics and their determinants. Second, it presents four scenarios based on the main value chains of the SEMCs’ agriculture sector: animal products, fruit and vegetables, sugar and edible oils, cereals, fish and other sea products. The four scenarios are: business as usual, Mediterranean – one global player, the EU-Mediterranean area under threat and the EU and SEMCs as regional players on the global stage.

EU membership of the WTO: international trade disputes and judicial protection of individuals by EU Courts

The European Union (EU) is embedded in a pluralistic legal context because of the EU and its Member States’ treaty memberships and domestic laws. Where EU conduct has implications for both the EU’s international trade relations and the legal position of individual traders, it possibly affects EU and its Member States’ obligations under the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO law) as well as the Union’s own multi-layered constitutional legal order. The present paper analyses the way in which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) accommodates WTO and EU law in the context of international trade disputes triggered by the EU. Given the ECJ’s denial of direct effect of WTO law in principle, the paper focuses on the protection of rights and remedies conferred by EU law. It assesses the implications of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) – which tolerates the acceptance of retaliatory measures constraining traders’ activities in sectors different from those subject to the original trade dispute (Bananas and Hormones cases) – for the protection of ‘retaliation victims’. The paper concludes that governmental discretion conferred by WTO law has not affected the applicability of EU constitutional law but possibly shapes the actual scope of EU rights and remedies where such discretion is exercised in the EU’s general interest.