Asset pricing in created markets

We investigate the applicability of the present-value asset pricing model to fishing quota markets by applying instrumental variable panel data estimation techniques to 15 years of market transactions from New Zealand's individual transferable quota (ITQ) market. In addition to the influence of current fishing rents, we explore the effect of market interest rates, risk, and expected changes in future rents on quota asset prices. The results indicate that quota asset prices are positively related to declines in interest rates, lower levels of risk, expected increases in future fish prices, and expected cost reductions from rationalization under the quota system. © 2007 American Agricultural Economics Association.

Policy-induced technology adoption: Evidence from the U.S. lead phasedown

Theory suggests that economic instruments, such as pollution taxes or tradable permits, can provide more efficient technology adoption incentives than conventional regulatory standards. We explore this issue for an important industry undergoing dramatic decreases in allowed pollution - the U.S. petroleum industry's phasedown of lead in gasoline. Using a duration model applied to a panel of refineries from 1971-1995, we find that the pattern of technology adoption is consistent with an economic response to market incentives, plant characteristics, and alternative policies. Importantly, evidence suggests that the tradable permit system used during the phasedown provided incentives for more efficient technology adoption decisions.

Fishing quota markets

In 1986, New Zealand responded to the open-access problem by establishing the world's largest individual transferable quota (ITQ) system. Using a 15-year panel dataset from New Zealand that covers 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas, we assess trends in market activity, price dispersion, and the fundamentals determining quota prices. We find that market activity is sufficiently high in the economically important markets and that price dispersion has decreased. We also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices, ecological variability, and market interest rates. Controlling for these factors, our results show a greater increase in quota prices for fish stocks that faced significant reductions, consistent with increased profitability due to rationalization. Overall, this suggests that these markets are operating reasonably well, implying that ITQs can be effective instruments for efficient fisheries management. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Managing shark fishermen in southern Australia : a critique

This paper analyses effects of a shift from input to output controls in Australia's Southern Shark Fishery. We show that the use of two management tools--individual transferable quotas and a "partnership approach"--was flawed and argue that primary contributing causes were the unjustified expectation that quota management would serve as a [`]technical fix' to a variety of presumed problems, the discounting of social effects and the extreme lack of stability in the organizational structure within which this fishery was situated.

Essays on emissions trading markets

This dissertation is a collection of three economics essays on different aspects of carbon emission trading markets. The first essay analyzes the dynamic optimal emission control strategies of two nations. With a potential to become the largest buyer under the Kyoto Protocol, the US is assumed to be a monopsony, whereas with a large number of tradable permits on hand Russia is assumed to be a monopoly. Optimal costs of emission control programs are estimated for both the countries under four different market scenarios: non-cooperative no trade, US monopsony, Russia monopoly, and cooperative trading. The US monopsony scenario is found to be the most Pareto cost efficient. The Pareto efficient outcome, however, would require the US to make side payments to Russia, which will even out the differences in the cost savings from cooperative behavior. The second essay analyzes the price dynamics of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary emissions trading market. By examining the volatility in market returns using AR-GARCH and Markov switching models, the study associates the market price fluctuations with two different political regimes of the US government. Further, the study also identifies a high volatility in the returns few months before the market collapse. Three possible regulatory and market-based forces are identified as probable causes of market volatility and its ultimate collapse. Organizers of other voluntary markets in the US and worldwide may closely watch for these regime switching forces in order to overcome emission market crashes. The third essay compares excess skewness and kurtosis in carbon prices between CCX and EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) Phase I and II markets, by examining the tail behavior when market expectations exceed the threshold level. Dynamic extreme value theory is used to find out the mean price exceedence of the threshold levels and estimate the risk loss. The calculated risk measures suggest that CCX and EU ETS Phase I are extremely immature markets for a risk investor, whereas EU ETS Phase II is a more stable market that could develop as a mature carbon market in future years.

Essays on Emissions Trading Markets

This dissertation is a collection of three economics essays on different aspects of carbon emission trading markets. The first essay analyzes the dynamic optimal emission control strategies of two nations. With a potential to become the largest buyer under the Kyoto Protocol, the US is assumed to be a monopsony, whereas with a large number of tradable permits on hand Russia is assumed to be a monopoly. Optimal costs of emission control programs are estimated for both the countries under four different market scenarios: non-cooperative no trade, US monopsony, Russia monopoly, and cooperative trading. The US monopsony scenario is found to be the most Pareto cost efficient. The Pareto efficient outcome, however, would require the US to make side payments to Russia, which will even out the differences in the cost savings from cooperative behavior. The second essay analyzes the price dynamics of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary emissions trading market. By examining the volatility in market returns using AR-GARCH and Markov switching models, the study associates the market price fluctuations with two different political regimes of the US government. Further, the study also identifies a high volatility in the returns few months before the market collapse. Three possible regulatory and market-based forces are identified as probable causes of market volatility and its ultimate collapse. Organizers of other voluntary markets in the US and worldwide may closely watch for these regime switching forces in order to overcome emission market crashes. The third essay compares excess skewness and kurtosis in carbon prices between CCX and EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) Phase I and II markets, by examining the tail behavior when market expectations exceed the threshold level. Dynamic extreme value theory is used to find out the mean price exceedence of the threshold levels and estimate the risk loss. The calculated risk measures suggest that CCX and EU ETS Phase I are extremely immature markets for a risk investor, whereas EU ETS Phase II is a more stable market that could develop as a mature carbon market in future years.

Incentive based policies on climate change: taxes and tradable emssions permits

The reduction of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) plays a central role in the environmental policies considered by countries for implementation not only at its own level but also at supranational levels. This thesis is dedicated to investigate some aspects of two of the most relevant climate change policies. The first part is dedicated to emission permit markets and the second part to optimal carbon taxes. On emission permit markets we explore the strategic behavior of oligopolistic firms operating in polluting industrial sectors that are regulated by cap and trade systems. Our aim is to identify how market power influences the main results obtained under perfect competition assumptions and to understand how actions taken in one market affects the outcome of the other related market. A partial equilibrium model is developed for this purpose with specific abatement cost functions. In Chapter 2 we use the model to explain some of the most relevant literature results. In Chapter 3 the model is used to analyze different oligopolistic structures in the product market under the assumption of competitive permits market. There are two significant findings. Firstly, under the assumption of a Stackelberg oligopoly, firms have no incentives for lobbying in order to manipulate permit prices up, as they have under Cournot competition...

A Tradable Permit System in an Intertemporal Economy

It is known that in an intertemporal competitive economy, a tradable permit system may not achieve efficiency without setting appropriate permit interest rates (i.e., rewards for holding permits). To find the rates, however, we need to know in advance the path of efficient permit prices, which is difficult to obtain. This study intends to solve this problem in two ways. First, we analyze a special case in which the permit interest rates are given by a simple rule. For example, if the marginal abatement cost of pollution emission is constant, then the appropriate rate is to equal the monetary interest rate. As is the case for global warming, if the damage is caused in the future far beyond the planning period of the environmental program, the appropriate rate coincides with the marginal self-recovery of environmental stock under certain conditions. As a second approach, we propose a tradable permit system with a permit bank, as a mechanism by which the permit interest rates are generated endogenously without governmental intervention other than the issuance of permits. However, we also show that this approach raises the problem of indeterminacy of the equilibrium. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.

Investing in the future : analysis of TxDOT 1547 Over-Axle Weight Tolerance Permits

The trucking industry has played a significant role in the economic growth in Texas by transporting and distributing commodities using commercial motor vehicles. The Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), however, has recognized that the large number of overweight trucks operating on the state highway system has resulted in the deterioration of pavement condition. In addition, the permit fee to carry higher loads above legal limits is much lower than the cost to treat the increase in pavement damage. The primary purpose of the research presented in this paper is to investigate current TxDOT overweight permit structures to support pavement management. The research team analyzed the TxDOT “1547” Over-axle Weight Tolerance Permit structure to support an increase in the fee structure, bringing it more in line with the actual pavement damage. The analysis showed that the revised overweight permit structure could provide an additional $9.3 million annually for pavement maintenance needs by increasing current permit fees. These results were supported by the 2030 Committee for recommendation to the Texas Transportation Commission and consideration by the State Legislature [1]. The research team recommends conducting further research to identify methods for working cooperatively with the trucking industry to develop improved methods for assessing weight damage relationships and developing more effective and accurate means for assessing overweight permit fees.

Cooperative and market-based solutions to pollution abatement problems

This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.

Development and validation of a molecular technique for the analysis of archived formalin-preserved phytoplankton samples permits retrospective assessment of Emiliania huxleyi communities

The coccolithophores, particularly the species Emiliania huxleyi (Lohmann) Hay & Mohler, account for the bulk of global calcium carbonate production and as such play a fundamental role in global CO2 cycling and the carbonate chemistry of the oceans. To evaluate the response of this functional group to the effects of climate change, we undertook a feasibility study to determine whether a retrospective approach could be used on archived coccolithophore datasets. We demonstrate for the first time a technique for the extraction of E. huxleyi nucleic acids from archived formalin-fixed samples of the long-term Continuous Plankton Recorder. Molecular analysis of a nine year old formalin-fixed sample reveals the presence of a diverse population of E. huxleyi genotypes within a developing coccolithophore bloom. In addition, E. huxleyi sequences were amplified from a number of formalin-fixed samples, the earliest of which was collected in August 1972. This molecular assay promises the possibility of studying global variations in the distribution and genetic make-up of E. huxleyi communities over extensive periods of time. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.